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Abstract 
 
 
Taiwan is facing a GI conundrum, symptoms of which are conceptual confusion between GIs 
and trademarks, the perennial overhaul of the GI registration system and the structural 
collapse between IP and non-IP law. Taiwan’s situation epitomises the inherent difficulty of 
accommodating GIs under the general framework of IP.  
 
IP is a generic title for patents, copyright, and trademarks and so forth. There are two 
characteristics shared by the various forms of IP, namely, the intangibility of subject matter 
and the negativity of the rights granted. IP is a form of government intervention in the 
economy designed to correct market failures. While patents and copyright are designed to 
overcome the public good problem, the justification for trademarks involves information 
asymmetry.  
 
Taking a doctrinal, international and comparative approach and using economic theory, the 
thesis analyses the difficulties of accommodating GIs under the IP framework as manifested 
in the TRIPS Agreement, which establishes GIs as a form of IP, and its two implementing 
paradigms, namely, the US trademark paradigm and the EU sui generis paradigm. The TRIPS 
GI provisions are anomalous in the IP framework. The US paradigm represents efforts to 
subsume GIs under existing trademark law. These efforts result in theoretical uncertainties 
because of the inherent incompatibility between the concept of GIs and trademarks. The EU 
paradigm establishes GIs as a separate category of IP, which represents a deviation from 
established IP system.  
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Chapter 1 General Introduction 
 
1.1 Background  
 
1.1.1 Taiwan’s GI conundrum   
 
Taiwan became the 144
th
 Member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in January 1, 
2002. As a WTO member, Taiwan is obliged to protect a form of intellectual property known 
as “geographical indications” (GIs). 1  Under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),
2
 GIs are “indications which identify a good as 
originating in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given 
quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its 
geographical origin.”3 The TRIPS Agreement mandates two levels of protection for GIs. For 
GIs for all goods, protection is based on consumer protection and the prevention of unfair 
competition.
4
 For GIs for wines and spirits, the level of protection is higher in the sense that 
there is no need to show that consumers might be misled or the use constitutes an act of 
unfair competition.
5
 Well-known examples of GIs include “Champagne”, “Tequila”, and 
“Roquefort”.6  In Taiwan, the term “geographical indications” is officially translated into 
                                                          
1
 Taiwan was formally approved to be a member of the WTO on 11 November 2001 when the Ministerial 
Conference in Doha, Qatar, endorsed the island’s accession protocol. Chinese Taipei (Taiwan) has been a 
member of WTO since 1 January 2002. Further background information on Taiwan’s WTO membership, see 
Steve Charnovitz, ‘Taiwan’s WTO Membership and Its International Implications’ 1 Asian J WTO & Int’l 
Health L & Pol’y (2006) 401. 
2
 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
3
 TRIPS Agreement, art. 22.1.  
4
 TRIPS Agreement, art. 22.2 . 
5
 TRIPS Agreement, art. 22.3; Daniel Gervais, ‘Traditional Knowledge: Are We Closer to the Answer(s)? The 
Potential Role of Geographical Indications’ 15 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. (2008-2009) 551, 562.  
6
 WTO <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/gi_e.htm> (visited Feb 21, 2012). 
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Chinese as “地理標示”.7 In its 2004 Communication to the TRIPS Council, the Taiwanese 
government enumerated the three elements of the Taiwanese GI regime as the Trade Mark 
Act, the Fair Trade Act, and the Tobacco and Alcohol Administration Act.
8
 While the Fair 
Trade Act and the Tobacco and Alcohol Administration Act provide administrative 
regulation for the prohibition of false or misleading representation of GIs, the heart of 
Taiwanese GI regime is the Trademark Act. Apart from “negative protection”, which  
prevents geographical terms being registered as trademarks, the Trademark Act also provide 
for “positive protection” of GIs, namely, the registration of geographical terms as 
certification marks. Later in 2007, collective trademarks were added as a means of positive 
protection.  
 
Taiwan’s GI regime is characterized by conceptual confusion, doctrinal dilemma, and 
practical difficulties. Symptoms of such a chaotic state are the confusion between GIs and 
trademarks, perennial overhauls of the mechanism governing “positive protection”, and the 
conceptual confusion between IP and non-IP.  
 
1.1.1.1 Interpreting GIs as trademarks  
 
According to the Taiwan Intellectual Property Office (TIPO), the governmental agency in 
charge of Taiwan’s intellectual property policy-making and administration,9 the adoption of 
this “trademark approach” is inspired by existing international paradigms. Taiwan’s policy-
makers, as well as commentators, identify two IP paradigms of GI protection. One is the EU 
sui generis paradigm and, the other, the trademark paradigm as advocated by the United 
States. Whereas the former establishes GIs as a form of intellectual property in its own right 
and protects GIs through sui generis legislation, the latter protects GIs as a subset of 
                                                          
7
 Taiwanese Trademark Act 2003 (hereinafter, TMA 2003) art. 23.  
8
 WTO Doc. IP/C/W/117/Add.30 Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property—Review under Article 24.2 of the Application of the Provisions of the Section of the 
TRIPS Agreement on Geographical Indications (16 June 2004) 1.  
9
 TIPO <http://www.tipo.gov.tw/ch/index.aspx.>.  
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trademark and subsumes them under existing trademark law.
10
 The reasons for adopting the 
trademark approach are twofold. First, in the eyes of Taiwan’s policy-makers, GIs are similar 
to trademarks. GIs are “commercially valuable source-identifiers” and, thus, are similar to 
trademarks in terms of their function and value. GIs and trademarks are also similar in terms 
of the rationale behind their legal protection, that is, consumer protection and prevention of 
unfair competition. Misuse of GIs may be detrimental to the interests of consumers and 
constitute unfair competition between producers.
11
  Secondly, subsuming GIs under existing 
trademark law is easy and convenient.
12
  
 
This interpretation raises three questions. First, under the TRIPS Agreement GIs and 
trademarks are two separate categories of intellectual property rights (IPRs). If GIs and 
trademarks are the same thing, then, why is it necessary to create two separate categories of 
IP under TRIPS Agreement? Secondly, TRIPS Agreement provides two levels of protection 
for GIs. Taiwanese policymakers’ interpretation only addresses the level of protection for GIs 
for all goods, which is based on consumer protection and prevention of unfair competition 
rationales and fails deal with the additional level of protection for wine and spirits. Thirdly, 
Taiwanese Trademark Act establishes the “registration protection principle” under which 
“protection” means acquisition of trademark rights through registration.13  To acquire the 
registered and protected status, the mark in question must meet three statutory requirements. 
Failure to comply with any of these requirements will lead to the refusal of registration and 
the mark unprotectable: (i) the mark in question must “be composed of a word, figure, 
symbol, colour, sound, three-dimensional shape or a combination thereof”;14 (ii) the mark in 
question must be capable of being “expressed in a visually perceptible representation”;15 (iii) 
the mark must be “distinctive enough for relevant consumers of the goods or services to 
                                                          
10
 TIPO, ‘Geographical Indications: Taiwan’s Protection Mechanism’ 
<http://oldweb.tipo.gov.tw/trademark/trademark_law/explain/trademark_law_2_26.asp> (visited Feb 14, 2010). 
11
 TIPO, ‘Understanding Geographical Indications’ 
<http://oldweb.tipo.gov.tw/trademark/trademark_law/explain/trademark_law_2_25.asp#> (visited Feb 14, 2010). 
Taiwanese scholars also hold this view. For example, MC Wang, ‘The Asian Consciousness and Interests in 
Geographical Indications’ 96 TMR (2006) 906, 914 states:  “Among these models, two major ones are the 
trademark model, associated primarily with the United States, and the French appellation of origin 
model…these models…are all oriented toward a twofold purpose: one the one hand, preventing misleading use 
and misappropriation of collective goodwill, and hence, on the other, protecting consumers.”   
12
 TIPO (n 11).  
13
 TIPO <http://www.tipo.gov.tw/en/FAQ_AnswerPage.aspx?faqid=1236&path=2647> (visited July 20, 2012); 
DT Wang, Trademark Law (2
nd
 edn, Wunan 2011) 6; CF Lin, Trademark (Wunan 2009) 39.  
14
 TMA 2003, art 5.1.  
15
 TMA 2003, art 17.1. 
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recognize it as identification to that goods or services and to differentiate such goods or 
services from those offered by others”.16  Non-distinctive elements may be included in a 
registered trademark in the condition that “the applicant disclaims the exclusive right for 
using the said feature.”17A registered trademark confers on its proprietor the right to exclude 
others from using that particular sign in relation to specified commercial activities.
18
 Such 
exclusive rights may be infringed by using the trademark in Taiwan without his consent.
19
 A 
registered trademark confers on its proprietor certain exclusive rights to use that particular 
sign in relation to specified commercial activities.
20
 Such exclusive rights may be infringed 
by using the trademark in Taiwan without his consent.
21
 The proprietor of a registered 
trademark may also license,
22
 assign,
23
 create a pledge over,
24
 or abandon
25
 his trademark 
rights. The proprietor also has the rights to customs and border measures
26
 The duration of 
registration lasts for ten years from the date of publication.
27
 Registration may be renewed for 
further periods of ten years.
28
 The proprietor’s exclusive rights in a registered trademark may 
not be infringed by the use of the trademark in Taiwan without his consent: (i) Bona fide and 
fair use of one’s own name or title or the name, shape, quality, function, place of origin, or 
other description of goods or services, provided that the use is for non-trademark purposes;
29
  
(ii) A three-dimensional shape of a good or package “indispensable for performing its 
intended functions”.30(iii) Bona fide use prior to the filing date of a registered trademark;31 
(iv) Goods bearing a registered trademark are traded or circulated in the marketplace by the 
trademark right holder or by an authorized person, or are offered for auction or disposal by a 
relevant agency, the right holder shall not claim trademark rights on the said goods.
32
 This 
“positive protection” for GIs is only available for certification mark and collective trademark.  
Negative protection for GIs refers to Articles 23.1(11) and 23.1(18). Article 23.1(11) 
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provides for the refusal of an application of trademark registration if the proposed mark is 
considered as “likely to mislead the public with respect to the nature, quality, or place of 
origin of the designated goods or services.”33 Article 23.1(18) provides for the refusal of a 
mark “that is identical or similar to a geographical indication of wines and spirits of a country 
or region that mutually protects trademark with the Republic of China, and is designated for 
use on wines and spirits.”34 This seems to suggest that GIs are categorically incompatible 
with trademarks.  
 
1.1.1.2 The perennial overhauls of positive protection  
 
The mechanism for registering GIs as certification marks and collective trademarks is 
characterized by perennial overhauls. The Trademark Act 2003, the first official response to 
GI obligation, simply added “place of origin” to the categories of qualities certifiable by 
certification marks. Later, a whole new administrative mechanism for “the registration of 
geographical indications as certification marks” was introduced by TIPO in 2004. It 
incorporated TRIPS’ definition of GIs and established procedures to ensure the existence of a 
required link between the product and the place of origin. It also introduced a decision-
making process in which the decision of granting GI protection was a joint decision by the 
TIPO and relevant government authorities in charge of the products identified by the GI, such 
as Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Treasury. This mechanism was abolished in 2007 
when the registration of “geographical certification mark” and “geographical collective 
trademark” was introduced by TIPO. At the heart of this new mechanism lies the requirement 
of distinctiveness of the geographical term. The verification of link between the product and 
place was not needed anymore. The TIPO now became the sole authority for granting GI 
protection. Further sea change came in mid-2011 with the adoption of the Trademark Act 
2012.
35
 The Trademark Act 2012 codifies the terms “geographical certification mark” and 
“geographical collective mark”. The TRIPS definition of GIs is now formally incorporated 
into the concept of geographical certification mark and geographical collective mark. 
                                                          
33
 TMA 2003, art. 23.1(11).  
34
 TMA 2003, art. 23.1(18).  
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 TMA 2012 was scheduled to enter into force in 2012 and thus termed the Trademark Act 2012. 
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Strikingly, the requirement of distinctiveness is abolished. Joint decision-making process is 
reintroduced, not for the qualification of product but for the qualification of the applicant.  
 
(1) Trademark Act 2003 
 
The Trademark Act 2003, the first official response to GI obligation, simply added “place of 
origin” to the categories of certifiable by certification marks. Under Taiwanese trademark law, 
a “certification mark is used to certify the characteristics, quality precision, place of origin or 
other matters of another person’s goods or services shall apply for certification mark 
registration.”36 That is, unlike general trademarks, a certification mark is not used to indicate 
a single business source. It is, instead, “used by multiple people who comply with the 
labelling requirements in connection with their respective goods or services.” 37  Only “a 
juristic person, an organization or a government agency capable of certifying another 
person’s goods or services” is eligible for applying for certification mark registration.38 The 
owner of a certification mark is not allowed to use the mark. He is obliged to “control the use 
of the mark, supervise the authorized users’ use, and ensure that the certified goods or 
services meet the articles governing use.”39 The owner of a certification must “permit any 
person who complies with the requirements to apply for using the certification mark.”40 2003 
saw the registration of the first geographical certification mark, “Chi-Shang rice”.41 This 
certification mark is registered by Chi-Shang Township Office of Taitung County to certify 
“rice originating from the Chi-Shang Township of Taitung County, and its quality meets the 
“Criteria Governing Chi-Shang Rice quality rice logo” established by the owner of the 
certification mark.”42  
 
                                                          
36
 TMA 2003, art. 72.1.  
37
 Examination Guidelines on Certification Marks, Collective Trademarks and Collective Membership Marks 
2007 (hereinafter, Examination Guidelines 2007) 5-6. 
38
 TMA 2003, art. 72.2.  
39
 Examination Guidelines 2007, 6. 
40
 Examination Guidelines 2007, 6. 
41
 Wang (n 11) 935. 
42
 Examination Guidelines 2007, 2.1.   
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Effect of registration of a geographical certification mark: If, after a geographical 
certification mark is registered, any application to register the same "geographical name" as a 
trademark such that the goods or services identified under the geographical indication may 
mislead the public with respect to the quality, nature or place of origin, the application shall 
be rejected pursuant to Article 23-1(11) of the Trademark Act. For example, after “池上米” 
(Chinese characters for “Chi-Shang rice") is registered, another person's application to 
register the same geographical name as part of a” trademark, which is likely to mislead the 
public with respect to the place of origin, shall be rejected. However, any registered 
trademark acquired prior to the registration of the corresponding geographical certification 
mark is not affected, and the owner of the geographical certification mark has no right to 
prohibit the owner of the trademark from using that geographical name in good faith and in a 
reasonable manner.
43
  
 
(2) Main Points for GI Registration 2004 
 
TIPO adopted the “Main Points for the Registration of Geographical Indications as 
Certification Marks” in September 2004 (hereinafter, the GI Registration Points 2004).  The 
GI Registration Points established a whole new administrative mechanism for the registration 
of geographical indications as certification marks. The GI Registration Main Points 2004 has 
three main features. First, it incorporated TRIPS’ definition of GIs.44 TIPO further analyses 
the three elements of this definition as (i) the indication must be a geographical name or a 
picture or word related to that geographical term which identifies the nexus between a given 
good and that geographical area; (ii) the geographical area in question may be the entire 
territory of a WTO Member, a single administrative unit, combination of several 
administrative units, or a specific area where the raw materials grow or processing takes 
place; and (iii) there must be a nexus between a given quality, reputation or other 
characteristic of the good and that geographical area.
45
  
                                                          
43
 Examination Guidelines 2007, 2.4.4.  
44
 The Main Points for the Registration of Geographical Indications as Certification Marks 2004 (hereinafter, GI 
Registration Points 2004) 2.1.  
45
 GI Registration Points 2004, 2.2.  
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Secondly, it establishes procedures to verify the existence of a required link between the 
product and the place of origin. TIPO sets three alternative criteria for determining the 
existence of the good-place nexus. First, all production stages (raw materials, processing, and 
packaging) take place in the designated area. Secondly, the main raw materials (tea leaves, 
for example) originate in the designated area and small portion of raw materials come from 
other areas; or, thirdly, the very production stage, which gives the product its distinctive 
feature takes place in that area.
46
 The applicant must submit a product specification, which 
contains the following information: (i) Definition of the geographical area; (ii) Raw materials 
and their place of origin; (iii) Description of the raw materials, including physical, chemical, 
microbiological, sensual characters and evidence of such characters; (iv) Description of 
methods of production, including the local conventional or unvarying methods; and (v) 
Description and evidence of the specific facts or factors in relation to the geographical 
environment, such as, the soil, climate, wind, water quality, altitudes, humidity and their 
connection to the product.
47
 
 
Thirdly, it also introduced a decision-making process in which the decision of granting GI 
protection was made jointly by the TIPO and relevant government authorities in charge of the 
products identified by the GI, such as Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Treasury. By 
and large, an application for registration of a geographical indication as certification mark 
will be examined by TIPO under the normal procedures for certification marks. Realizing that 
TIPO is not in the best position to judge the product-place nexus, the “Main Points”, obliges 
TIPO to acquire the professional opinions in this regard from the Council of Agriculture 
when the product in question is an agricultural product other than wine and alcohol or the 
Treasury of the Ministry of Finance when the product is wine or alcohol.
48
  
 
However, this new registration mechanism seems to add nothing to the effects of positive 
protection. Ali Shan (meaning Mt. Ali or Ali Mountain) is one of the most prestigious tea 
                                                          
46
 GI Registration Points 2004, 2.3.  
47
 GI Registration Points 2004, 3.2.2.2(2).   
48
 GI Registration Points 2004, 4.1.  
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production regions in Taiwan as well as in the Chinese speaking world. The Chia-Yi County 
Council registered as a geographical certification mark “Chia Yi County Alishan High 
Mountains Tea” (嘉義縣阿里山高山茶) on 16 December 2006.49 This certification mark is 
used to certify tea produced in six towns located around the Ali mountain area and complying 
with government safety regulations in relation to the use of chemicals. The Name “Ali Shan” 
is not disclaimed.
50
 A search of TIPO’s database on 10 April 2011 displays 104 entries 
containing the name“阿里山”(Ali Shan). Among them, 12 are in the application procedure 
(pending) and 92 are registered. Among the 92 registered, 37 are registered for tea products. 
Among the 37, 24 are registered after the geographical certification mark Alishan was 
registered on 16 December 2006.  
 
(3) The Examination Guidelines 2007 
 
The GI Registration Point 2004 was abolished in 2007 when the “Examination Guidelines on 
Certification Marks, Collective Trademarks and Collective Membership Marks” (hereinafter, 
the Examination Guidelines 2007) was introduced by the TIPO. The Examination Guidelines 
2007 marked the beginning of new phase of Taiwanese GI law. It, instead of using the term 
“geographical indications”, adopts the terms “geographical certification mark” (產地證明標
章)51  and “geographical collective trademark” (產地團體商標).52  Most importantly, the 
TIPO now required “distinctiveness” of the mark as the sine qua non condition for 
registration of geographical certification marks and geographical collective trademarks. The 
place-product nexus was no more required. The TIPO now became the sole competent 
authority in charge of the examination of application for registration of geographical 
certification marks and geographical collective trademarks.  
 
                                                          
49
 Registration number 01242948 (16/12/2006). 
50
TIPO <http://tmsearch.tipo.gov.tw/TIPO_DR/servlet/InitLogoPictureWordDetail?sKeyNO=095042675> 
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 Examination Guidelines 2007, 2.2.3.2.  
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 Examination Guidelines 2007, 3.3.2.  
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Like in the case of individual trademarks, distinctiveness is a sine qua non condition for the 
registration of geographical certification marks. The TIPO expounds the meaning of 
distinctiveness of a geographical certification mark as follows: 
 
“A “geographical certification mark” mainly comprises a geographical name and differs from 
a generally descriptive “indication of source.” A general “indication of source” only 
describes the place where the goods or services are manufactured, produced or provided, for 
instance, “台灣製造” (meaning “made in Taiwan”) and “made in Taiwan.” On the other 
hand, a “geographical certification mark” is used to certify that one’s goods or services 
originate in a certain geographical region and the certified goods or services have a certain 
quality, reputation or other features attributed to the specific natural or human factors of its 
geographical environment. In other words, because the geographical name has garnered 
certain reputation due to its use over time, consumers would immediately associate the 
geographical name with the certified goods or services as soon as they encounter it; therefore, 
the geographical indication may be granted registration because of distinctiveness.”53 
 
A collective trademark is “mainly used by the members of a collective group in order to 
identify the goods or services operated or offered by its members.”54 That is, a collective 
trademark allows the consumer to distinguish goods or services provided by a member of a 
collective group from those not offered by its members. Only a “business association, social 
organization, or any other group that exists as a juristic person” is eligible for applying for the 
registration of a collective trademark.
55
 It is commented that “[c]ollective trademarks are still 
trademarks by nature. While ordinary trademarks are used to identify a single source of goods 
or services, collective trademarks are used by the members of a given group on the goods or 
services provided by the members of that group.”56A collective trademark is similar to a 
general trademark in that they are both used to indicate the business source of goods or 
services.
57
 The main difference between these two categories of marks lies, according to the 
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 Examination Guidelines 2007, 2.4.1.2. 
54
 TMA 2003, art. 77.  
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 Examination Guidelines 2007, p. 32.  
56
 Wang (n 13) 20. 
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TIPO, in their respective relations to its user. A general trademark is used by the trademark 
owner himself/herself if no license is made. A collective trademark is jointly used by the 
members of a group on the goods or services of the respective members, but the owner of the 
collective trademark may, for the purpose of launching advertising campaigns for its 
members, use the collective trademark to promote the goods or services offered by its 
members.
58
 Under Taiwanese trademark law, the main difference between a collective 
trademark and a certification mark is that the former is closed and the latter is open to the 
public. That is, whereas a collective trademark is used by the members of a collective group, 
a certification mark of a certification mark must permit anyone complying with the 
prescribed requirements to use the mark.
59
   
 
As in the case of trademarks, a geographical collective trademark is not registrable if it is 
considered as being descriptive.
60
 A geographical collective mark however becomes 
registrable if it “has acquired distinctiveness as specified in Article 23-4 of the Trademark 
Act.” 61  The TIPO envisages the process in which a geographical name may acquire 
distinctiveness as follows:  
 
“Unlike an “indication of source” with a general descriptive nature, a “geographical 
collective mark” not only denotes the place where the goods or services are manufactured, 
produced or provided, but also signifies that the goods or services identified thereunder have 
certain quality, reputation or other characteristics attributable to the natural or human factors 
of that geographical region. Therefore, a geographical collective trademark identifies the 
goods or services originating in a particular region that has certain quality or characteristics. 
In other words, as the geographical name has acquired certain reputation after a long-term use, 
consumers can immediately associate it with the designated goods or services. Such 
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geographical collective trademark may be registered because it meets the distinctiveness 
requirements of a geographical collective trademark.”62  
 
Given the importance of distinctiveness, the TIPO provides a series of definitions to clarify 
the concept of distinctiveness under the Trademark Act. For individual trademarks, 
“distinctiveness of a trademark relates to how it denotes the source of goods or services and 
distinguishes such goods or services from those of others.”63 A general collective trademark 
is deemed distinctive “if it is able to distinguish the goods or services of the members of a 
collective group from those goods or services of non-member parties.”64  For TIPO, the 
“distinctiveness of a general certification mark refers to the characteristics, quality, precision 
or other matters that is/are used to certify one’s goods or services; the use of which on the 
certified goods or services is sufficient to distinguish them from the goods or services that are 
not certified.” 65 This definition is, however, ambiguous and elusive.  
 
Thus, TIPO creates new concept of distinctiveness for geographical certification marks and 
geographical collective trademarks. This new concept incorporates the definition of GIs 
under the TRIPS Agreement.  
 
(4) Trademark Act 2012   
 
Further sea change of GI protection came in mid-2011 with the adoption of the Trademark 
Act 2012.
66
TMA 2012 codifies the terms “geographical certification mark” and 
“geographical collective mark”. The TRIPS definition of GIs is partly incorporated into the 
definition of geographical certification mark and geographical collective trademark. 
                                                          
62
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Strikingly, the requirement of distinctiveness is abolished. Joint decision-making process is 
reintroduced, not for the qualification of product but for the qualification of the applicant. It 
also contains provisions explicitly dealing with the effects of registration.  
 
The Trademark Act 2012 codifies the terms “geographical certification mark” and 
“geographical collective mark”. 67 Article 80.1 defines certification marks as a mark used by 
its proprietor to certify the specific quality, precision, materials, method of production, place 
of origin, or other matters of others’ goods or services and to distinguish the certified goods 
or services from those uncertified.
68
 Article 80.2 further states the good or service certified by 
a geographical certification mark must have “a given quality, reputation, or characteristic.” 
There is, however, no requirement for the essential nexus between the product and place. For 
example, the place name “Taipei” (台北) cannot be registered as a geographical certification 
mark for rice noodle because it has no connotation of a given quality, reputation, or 
characteristic for rice noodle and describes simply the place of origin. On the other hand, 
since “Meinong” (美濃) has been famous for quality rice noodle, this will meet the definition 
of geographical certification marks.
69
 Article 88.2 uses and defines the term “geographical 
collective trademark.” Article 89.3 requires the proprietor of a geographical collective mark 
to admit the membership of anyone whose good or service complying with Article of Use. 
Thus, the distinction between certification mark and collective trademark seems blurred. 
Articles 80.2 and 88.2 provide for registration as geographical certification mark or 
geographical collective trademark respectively “a sign containing that geographical term or a 
sign capable of indicating that geographical area.” 70  Strikingly, the distinctiveness 
requirement does not apply to the “geographical name” used in geographical certification 
mark or geographical collective trademark.
71
 Intriguingly, it is not necessary to disclaim the 
geographical name in question.
72
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 TMA 2012, art. 88.2.   
68
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This provision is a reiteration of the fair use exception to trademark rights.
73
 It is explained 
that the purpose of this provision is to “safeguard the freedom of one’s right to describe his 
goods or services.”74  
 
These provisions break the general rules of trademark law and seem to suggest that exclusive 
rights be granted in relation to geographical certification marks and geographical collective 
trademarks disregarding the lack of distinctiveness. However, this speculation is 
compromised when one reads Article 84.2 which reads: “The proprietor of a geographical 
certification mark is not entitled to prohibit the use of the signs to indicate the geographic 
origin of their goods or services in according with honest practices in industrial or 
commercial matters.”75  
 
The Trademark Act 2012 contains provisions explicitly dealing with the effects of GI 
registration. As aforementioned, the Trademark Act 2012 waivers the distinctiveness 
requirement for the registration of geographical names as geographical certification marks or 
collective trademarks. It further provides that it is not necessary to disclaim such 
geographical names.
76
 The general trademark rule is that non-distinctive elements may be 
included in a registered trademark in the condition that “the applicant disclaims the exclusive 
right for using the said feature.” 77  This seems to suggest that the registration of a 
geographical certification mark or geographical collective mark will confer exclusive rights 
over its owner despite the lack of distinctiveness. The picture becomes ambiguous when one 
reads the provision providing that “proprietor of a geographical certification mark is not 
entitled to prohibit the use of the signs to indicate the geographic origin of their goods or 
services in according with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters.” 78  This 
provision is a reiteration of the fair use exception to trademark rights.
79
 Under the fair use 
doctrine, the proprietor’s exclusive rights in a registered trademark are not infringed by the 
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use of the trademark in Taiwan without his consent if the use constitutes the use of one’s own 
name or title or the name, shape, quality, function, place of origin, or other description of 
goods or services.
80
 It is explained that the purpose of adding this provision here is to 
“safeguard the freedom of one’s right to describe his goods or services.”81 As a result, no 
one’s right to use the registered geographical name is affect. The owner can exclude no one 
from using the registered geographical name to indicate the geographical origin of his goods 
or services.  
 
(5) Positive protection for GIs has been existing prior to 2003        
 
The certification mark was first included under TMA 1993. Under TMA 1993, certification 
marks are used to certify characteristics, quality, precision, or other matters of goods or 
services.
82
 As it has been argued, this provision is already broad enough cover “place of 
origin”. 83  A survey of TIPO’s trademark register also confirms that that there were 
certification marks registered prior to the entering into force of TMA 2003 on 28 November 
2003, which may certify the place of origin of products. Examples include “CALIFORNIA” 
with a device to certify that the cling peach products identified are originated from California, 
USA and comply with the quality standards set by the proprietor of the mark (certifier),
84
  
“QUALITY USA” quality standards with a device as a certification mark certifying “the 
certified peanut products are absolutely originated in the USA and comply the relevant US 
Federal standards and regulations,” 85  “IQF EDAMAME OF TAIWAN” with a map of 
Taiwan to certify that Edamame are originated in Taiwan and their quality and sanitation 
comply with the standards set by the certifier,
86
 and “JAMAICA BLUE MOUNTAIN” to 
certify that the coffee beans identified are originated in Jamaican Blue Mountain area and 
their storage, processing, and packaging comply with the requirements of the certifier.
87
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It is, thus, argued that the explicit listing of “place of origin” under TMA 2003 does not 
create any new legal right. It is simply a declaratory gesture used to articulate Taiwan’s 
determination to implement its TRIPS obligations.
88
  
 
Similar situation is found in the registration of geographical collective trademarks. Collective 
trademarks were first added to Taiwan’s trademark law in 2003.89 In 2007, as a response to 
the 2005 incident that the names of 7 well-known Taiwanese tea production districts were 
registered as trademark in China, the government decide to enhance GI protection by 
allowing the registration of “geographical collective marks”.90 However, the registration of 
“geographical collective trademarks” is not provided under TMA 2003 proper. It is, instead, 
recognized under the Examination Guidelines for Certification Marks, Collective Marks, and 
Collective Membership Marks 2007.
91
 TIPO treats the “geographical collective trademark” as 
a special type of collective trademarks. Section 3.1 of the 2007 Examination Guidelines states 
that: “In addition to a general collective trademark, the applicant may apply to register a 
geographical name as a geographical collective trademark, which is jointly used by the 
members of a collective group incorporated within the defined geographical region to denote 
the source of goods or services they offer.”92  Therefore, the registration of geographical 
collective trademarks was only officially allowed under The Examination Guidelines 2007. 
There are, however, collective trademarks registered prior to 2007, which seem to be capable 
of performing the same function as “geographical collective trademarks”. YAMAGATA 
SAKE BREWERY ASSOCIATION (Japan) (山形縣酒造合作社日本 ) registered the 
collective trademark “山形讚香 YAMAGATA SANGA” for Japanese wine and sake on 16 
December 2005.
93
The Italian CONSORZIO PRODUCTTORI MARMO BOTTICINO 
CLASSICO registered “MARMO BOTTICINO CLASSICO” for marble products on 01 
September 2006.
94
 “PARMA” for ham was registered as collective trademark by the Italian 
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“CONSORZIO DEL PROSCIUTTO DI PARMA” on 16 July 2007. 95  The Goat Farmer 
Association R.O.C. registered on 01 October 2006 the collective trademark “國產優質生鮮
羊肉 TAIWAN FRESH GOAT MEAT (with picture)” for goat meat.96 According to the Goat 
Farmer Association R.O.C., the function of this collective trademark is to certify that the goat 
meat identified is originated from Taiwan and thus facilitate the consumer to distinguish 
domestic goat meat from the imported.
97
  
 
1.1.1.3 GI protection and the scope of IP law  
 
The concept of GIs also challenges the established concept of Taiwanese IP law. As 
discussed, apart from trademark law, Taiwanese GI regime also includes the Fair Trade Act 
and Tobacco and Alcohol Administration Act.
98
 The Fair Trade Act is the legislation 
governing Taiwan’s antitrust law and unfair competition law.99 It was first enacted in 1992 
and subsequent amendments have been made in 1999, 2000, 2002, and 2010. The Fair Trade 
Act is enacted to maintain trading order, protect consumers’ interests, ensure fair competition, 
and promote economic stability and prosperity.
100
 The Fair Trade Act establishes the Fair 
Trade Commission as the competent authority.
101
 The Fair Trade Commission is an 
independent regulatory commission under the executive branch.
102
 It has the power to 
“investigate and handle, upon complaints or ex officio, any violation of the provisions of this 
Law that harms the public interest.”103 It is charged with drafting fair trade policy, laws, 
regulations, and investigating and handling various activities impeding competition, such as 
monopolies, mergers, concerted actions, and other restraints on competition or unfair trade 
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practices on the part of enterprises.
104
 The Fair Trade Act regulates activities of “enterprises”, 
which refers to a company, a sole proprietorship or partnership, a trade association, and any 
other person or organization engaging in transactions through the provision of goods or 
services.
105
   
 
The Fair Trade Act does not provide a general definition of “unfair competition”. Articles 18 
to 23 provide a non-exhaustive list of specific acts constituting unfair competition, including 
restriction on resale price;
106
 hampering fair competition;
107
 counterfeit;
108
 false or misleading 
presentations or symbol;
109
 damaging other enterprises’ goodwill; 110  multi-level sales. 111 
Article 24 is a general provision which prohibits “any deceptive or obviously unfair conduct 
that is able to affect trading order.”112 Article 21 of the Fair Trade Act is classified as a 
general provision for consumer protection law.
113
 According to Taiwanese government, GI 
protection falls with the scope of Article 21 of the Fair Trade Act, which prohibits the false or 
misleading presentations or symbols. This is because: 
 
“For any use of geographical indications that constitutes unfair competition, Article 21 of the 
Fair Trade Law, in conformity with Article 10bis of the Paris Convention, provides that 
enterprises shall not make false or misleading representations either on their products or in 
the advertisements of their products. In addition, they shall not sell, transport, export or 
import goods bearing false or misleading representations.”114  
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Under Article 21.1, it is held by the Fair Trade Commission that the term “Shin-Tzu Rice 
Noodle” (Shin-Tzu is a county in northern Taiwan) refers to the flavour, rather than the 
geographical origin of the rice noodle in question.
115
In a 1998 case, the Fair Trade 
Commission held that the term “Scotch Whisky” or its Chinese translation“蘇格蘭威士
忌”can only be used to identify whisky originated in Scotland. Placing “Scotch Whisky” or 
“蘇格蘭威士忌” on the bottles or packages of whisky not originated in Scotland may 
constitute making or using false or misleading representations or symbol as to place of 
origin.
116
 
 
To provide clear guidelines for the application of Article 21, the Fair Trade Commission 
adopted “Guidelines governing the use geographical terms under Article 21” in 1996, which 
was amended in 2005.
117
 According to the “Guidelines”, the nature of the good is an 
important factor when determining whether a geographical term constitutes a geographical 
indicator.
118
 First, for natural agricultural, forest, pastoral, and mineral products, the principle 
is that the geographical term shall be determined as indication of source unless the 
geographical term in question has become a generic term.
119
 Second, for processed 
agricultural, forest, pastoral, and mineral products: the geographical term normally refers to 
either the geographical source of the raw materials or the geographical area where the product 
is processed.
120
 Finally, for industrial products if the product is manufactured in one area, the 
geographical term indicates the geographical area of manufacturing. If the manufacture of the 
product involves several geographical areas, the geographical term shall refer to the area 
where the “substantial transformation” takes place.121   
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The Tobacco and Alcohol Administration Act is enacted to promote the sound administration 
of the tobacco and alcohol business and products.
122
 The competent authority under this Act 
is the Ministry of Finance.
123
 The Tobacco and Alcohol Administration Act regulates the 
production, manufacturing, repackaging, and other relevant activities by alcohol business 
operators, which include producers, importers, and sellers.
124
 Under the Tobacco and Alcohol 
Administration Act, producers and importers may choose to label the geographical 
indications of the wine or spirits.
125
 That is, the labelling of geographical indications is 
voluntary rather than mandatory. Producers or importers may choose to label geographical 
indications on their alcohol products, but the labelling shall not constitute false or misleading 
representation.  Each violation is subjected to a fine and the products are to be recalled and 
corrections to be made within a given period. Failure to comply will result in temporary 
manufacturing or import prohibition for six to twelve months, and confiscation of all 
merchandise in question.
126
 
 
The Tobacco and Alcohol Administration Act is supplemented by the “Regulations 
Governing the labelling of the Alcohol Products.” Article 13.1 incorporates the TRIPS 
definition of GIs.
127
 Pursuant to Article 13.2, the labelling of alcohol products shall not be 
used in translation or accompanied by expressions such as “kind”, “type”, “style”, “imitation” 
or the like, to convey erroneous impression or inference as to the origin of the alcohol 
product, even where the true origin of the product is indicated.
128
 What name actually 
constitutes a geographical indication is a matter left to be decided by the law of each region 
or country.
129
 For the purposes of evidence, Article 13.3 mandates where an alcohol product 
is labelled with a geographical indication, a certificate of the geographical indication issued 
by the government or chamber of commerce authorized by the government of the place 
(country) of production be submitted to the central competent authority for examination 
before the alcohol product is declared to the Customs or released from the factory.
130
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The listing of Article 21 of the Fair Trade Act and the Tobacco and Alcohol Administration 
Act as part of GI law leads to two developments. First, commentators start to include 
miscellaneous laws and regulations,
131
 such as the Food Administration Act,
132
Consumer 
Protection Act,
133
 the Merchandise Labelling Law,
134
 and even the Trade Law,
135
 into 
Taiwanese GI law, as long as they contain provisions regulating the labelling of place of 
origin of products. Second, commentators start to include Article 21 of the Fair Trade Act as 
part of intellectual property law because GIs are a form of intellectual property.
136
  
 
1.1.2 Taiwan’s GI conundrum in the broader context  
 
Is it possible that this conundrum is simply caused by Taiwan’s unfamiliarity with the GI 
issue? Prior to the 1980s, Taiwanese IP laws were criticized for their limited scope of 
recognition and protection of IPRs, inadequate deterrence for infringements, and protectionist 
provisions. Foreign entities were denied national treatment, and unrecognized foreign entities 
often were denied protection of their IPRs as well as standing to seek redress.
137
 Under the 
pressure of US trade retaliation, Taiwan started major IP law reform in the 1980s.
138
 The 
“crucial turning point” in the development of Taiwanese IP law occurred when Taiwan 
realized the political and economic importance of its accession to the GATT/WTO and the 
concomitant IP protecting obligation.
139
 This goal became the main impetus behind Taiwan’s 
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further IP reform. By 1998, one commentator was able to claim proudly that: “Taiwan’s 
statutory regime for Intellectual Property protection now by and large complies with the 
TRIPS Agreement. In some areas, the regime reaches beyond the Agreement’s threshold.”140 
Other commentators found that there is no basic difference between Taiwan’s IP law and 
TRIPS Agreement.
141
 
 
The picture is, however, completely different when it comes to GIs. GI protection has been 
viewed as a new IP issue to Taiwan. One commentator describes GIs a “purely transplanted 
norm for Taiwan”.142 TIPO claims GIs as a brand new legal norm introduced into Taiwan as 
a result of the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement:  
 
“After having joined the WTO, we have to implement the TRIPS obligations regarding 
geographical indications, but geographical indication is brand new norm that our people are 
not familiar with. What is a geographical indication? What is the scope of protection? How to 
claim the protection? These are all foreign to us.”143 
 
The “unfamiliarity” assumption is found unsatisfactory as soon as one realizes the existence 
of the “global struggle over geographical indications.”144 The inclusion of GIs in the Uruguay 
Round Negotiations was initiated by the EU and resisted by the United States, Canada, 
Australia
145
 and some Latin American countries.
146
 This disagreement was described as 
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“North-North division” 147 , “New World v. Old World”, 148  or “immigrant v. emigrant 
countries”149 The struggle continues and escalates after the conclusion of TRIPS Agreement 
and Taiwan itself is one of the participants. In 2002, Taiwan joined Argentina, Australia, 
Canada, Chile, Dominican, El Salvador, Guatemala, New Zealand, Paraguay, the Philippines, 
and the United States in opposition to the extension of the higher level of protection for GIs 
for wines and spirits to all goods.
150
 This is because “after thoughtful review, we have 
concluded that extension will not provide meaningful benefits but will instead create new 
difficulties.”151 In 11 March 2005, Taiwan joined a group of countries, including Argentina, 
Australia, Canada, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, New Zealand and the United States, supporting 
the establishment of a non-binding and voluntary multilateral register for wine GIs.
152
 This 
group of countries propose a decision by the TRIPS Council to set up a voluntary system 
where notified geographical indications would be registered in a database. Those 
governments choosing to participate in the system would have to consult the database when 
taking decisions on protection in their own countries. Non-participating members would be 
“encouraged” but “not obliged” to consult the database.153 
 
The following comments testify the existence of the GI conundrum:   
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(i) “Geographical indications (GIs) are intellectual property rights.”154 
(ii) GIs “are not property.”155 
(iii) “…GIs are private property rights”156 
(iv) “GIs…are inherently collective…”157 
(v) GIs “are usually group or state-owned property.”158 
(vi) “GIs should be considered trademarks…”159 
(vii) “…GIs are functionally similar to Trademarks.”160 
(viii) “…GIs and trademarks are inherently different intellectual property rights.”161 
(ix) GIs and trademarks are “quibbling siblings, members of the broader family of unfair 
competition law” 162 
(x) GIs “are rather part of a general regime of protection against misrepresentation”163 
(xi) “Geographical indications are…labels of origin…”164 
(xii) Geographical indications (GIs) “are distinctive signs…”165 
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(xiii) “…GIs are geographical names, which trademark doctrine considers descriptive and 
therefore unprotectable.”166  
(xvi) A “GI…is by definition descriptive…”167 
(xv) “Although GIs are…not purely descriptive terms, their function is analogous to a 
descriptive function.”168 
(xvi) “A GI…is both descriptive of origin and distinctive.”169 
(xvii) “Welcome to the new international intellectual property right…wherein generic names 
gain geographical indication status…”170 
(xviii) GIs can be applied to every sort of product.
171
 
(xix) “…the law of geographical indications is about foodstuffs.”172 
 
By now, it is clear that the GI conundrum is not unique to Taiwan. It is a common 
phenomenon with theoretical interests as well as policy significance. Taiwan as a country 
with a well-established IP regime has been struggling with the problem of accommodating 
GIs. TRIPS, the multilateral agreement which sets universal minimum standards has been 
experiencing a GI struggle since its negotiating stage. Academics from different jurisdictions 
and disciplines fail to agree on the basic relation between GIs and IP. All these make it 
reasonable to hypothesize that there must be some fundamental or inherent difficulty 
accommodating GIs under the concept of IP.       
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1.2 Objectives, hypotheses and questions 
 
This thesis is an attempt to provide explanations of Taiwan’s GI conundrum, that is, the 
puzzling questions that Taiwanese policymakers and scholars have been facing in 
implementing Taiwan’s obligation of protecting geographical indications (GIs) under the 
TRIPS Agreement by exploring and clarifying the relation between IP and GIs. By doing so, 
this research will, in turn, be exploited as the foundation for formulating practical guidelines 
for the making of GI policies either at the domestic or at international level. This research 
proceeds under two hypotheses: (i) there is an inherent incompatibility between the concept 
of GIs and the established IP system and (ii) the policy rationales behind sui generis GIs and 
trademarks are different.  
 
As already identified, Taiwan’s GI conundrum has been manifested in the confusion between 
GIs and trademarks, perennial overhaul of the positive protection, and the conceptual 
confusion between IP and non-IP. Now that GIs have been established as a form of IP under 
the TRIPS Agreement, two implementing paradigms are recognized, and Taiwan has a well-
development IP regime prior to accession to WTO, then why does the conundrum occur? 
More specifically, this research will ask:  
(i) Why is there a GI conundrum even though the TRIPS Agreement has established GIs as a 
form of IP with a specifically defined subject matter and universal minimum standards of 
protection?   
(ii) Why is there a GI conundrum even though Taiwan has followed the US trademark 
paradigm and mobilized, trademarks, certification marks, and collective trademarks, and 
other administrative measures to implement TRIPS obligations?  
(iii) Why, given that Taiwanese policymakers have recognized two GI-protecting paradigms, 
that is, the US trademark paradigm and the EU sui generis paradigm, the latter seems to be 
ignored?  
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(iv) What policy implications will an understanding of the GI conundrum provide for 
Taiwan’s policymakers?  
 
1.3 Scope and focus   
 
This study is neither about the relative merits or demerits of different GI-protecting 
approaches or measures nor about the formulation of an immediate solution to the 
international GI debates. What this study concerns is the relation between GIs and IP. 
Therefore, the concepts of intellectual property (IP) and geographical indications (GIs) 
constitute the focuses of this thesis.   
 
There is no general legal definition of IP under multilateral treaties.
173
 The WIPO Convention 
of 1967 “defines” IP by listing its protectable subject matter or examples of types of rights, 
including “the rights relating to—literary, artistic and scientific works—performances and 
performing artists, photographs and broadcasts—inventions in all fields of human 
endeavour—scientific discoveries—industrial designs—trade marks, service marks, and 
commercial names and designations—protection against unfair competition and all other 
rights resulting from intellectual activities in the industrial, scientific, literary or artistic 
fields.”174 A similarly technique is exploited in the TRIPS Agreement. Article 1.2 provides 
that “For the purposes of this Agreement, the term “intellectual property” refers to all 
categories of intellectual property that are the subject of Sections 1 through 7 of Part II.”175  
This thesis does not provide a thorough examination of each of the category. To serves its 
purposes, this study will construct an analytical framework for IP. As constructed in Chapter 
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2 of this thesis, this analytical framework will deal with three aspects of IP, namely, its 
terminology, shared characteristics, and economic justifications.
176
 
 
Although the TRIPS Agreement provides a legal definition of GIs and certain minimum 
standards for their protection, there is no consensus on what this definition actual means and 
how these standards should be implemented. Despite all the diverse interpretations and 
national and regional regimes, there are two generally recognized two implementing 
paradigms, i.e. the US trademark paradigm and the EU sui generis paradigm. This study 
focuses on these three regimes.  
 
Although, the TRIPS Agreement establishes GIs as a separate category of IP, many WTO 
Members protect GIs under existing trademark law. Under the law of the United States and in 
most of the common law countries, the concept of GIs is subsumed with the definition of 
“mark” and thus regulated under the existing trademark law. 177  This is also the case in 
countries, such as, Brazil, Ethiopia, Indonesia, the Russian Federation, and South Africa.
178
 
The United States system has been regarded as the paradigm of the preference for a 
trademark system and private rights as the legal means to protect geographical indications.
179
 
 
The term “sui generis GI law” generally refers to the protection of GIs through specific 
systems separated from trademark law.
180
 Sui generis GI laws generally provide “relatively 
stronger levels of producer protection when compared to trademark law.”181 Protection under 
such systems is normally based on registration and collective in nature.
182
 It is reported in 
2010 that some 76 countries protect GI through sui generis systems, which provide for 
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registration of geographical names as a separate kind of intellectual property right.
183
 One 
further characteristic of sui generis GI protection is that it dominantly concerns food 
products.
184
 Sui generis GI law usually provide specialized registers for GIs. The European 
Union, for example, maintain registers for GIs for wine, spirit drinks, and other agro-food 
products.
185
 The EU GI law have generally been regarded by scholars as the paradigm of the 
sui generis approach.
186
 Apart from the EU, a number of countries, such as, Chile, China, and 
India also protect GIs under sui generis systems.
187
 According to WIPO The most important 
specific feature that is common to protected appellations of origin and registered 
geographical indications appears to be that their legal protection is based on an act of public 
law (law, decree, ordinance) which stands at the conclusion of an administrative procedure. 
Through this administrative procedure, important parameters such as the demarcation of the 
area of production and production standards are defined.
188
 Some WTO Members have 
adopted specific legislation to define and protect GIs. Generally, such protection is based on 
registration.
189
 
 
EU GI law as it stands now consists of three Regulations, covering three types of products, 
namely, agro-food products, wines and spirit drinks respectively. Handcrafts and other 
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products are excluded.
190
 The protection of GIs for agricultural products and foodstuffs at the 
EU level was first established in 1992 under Council Regulation 2081/92.
191
 The GI 
Regulation 2081/92 was superseded by GI Regulation 510/2006.
192 
The adoption of this new 
Regulation in 2006 was a response to the decision of the WTO Panel, which found the 1992 
Regulation failed to provide national treatment to non-European WTO members because 
registration of GIs from a non-EU countries were contingent on the government of that 
country adopting a system of reciprocal GI protection. The panel also found that the 
requirement for government-monitored inspection structures under the 1992 Regulation 
discriminated against foreign nationals.
193
 The main difference between the 1992 and 2006 
Regulations is that the protection under the 2006 Regulation is extended to foreign 
geographical indications, irrespective of whether the foreign government provides reciprocal 
protection. Foreign parties with an in interest in a geographical indication are now able to 
apply directly to the Commission, rather than having first to register with a national 
government. Beyond these changes, the 2006 Regulation is similar to its 1992 predecessor.
194
 
Therefore, cases and comments under the GI Regulation 1992 are still relevant for the 
purposes of this study.  
 
GIs for wines and spirits are regulated under Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2008
195
  and 
Regulation (EC) No 110/2008 of the European Parliament and the Council on spirit drinks
196
 
respectively. Being modelled on Council Regulation 510/2006,
197
 all three Regulations have 
the same policy context. While there are certain procedural and technical differences based 
on specific requirements for the product types, the structure for the three systems are similar: 
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type of protection, definitions, administrative enforcement, relationship with trademarks, 
rules on coexistence with homonymous names, creation of a register, and role of a production 
specification.
198
 The reason for having three systems of registration and protection of GIs in 
the EU is “partly the result of specificities of the products concerns and the progressive 
implementation a protection system for each type of production.” 199  Since Council 
Regulation 510/2006 for agro-food products serves as the model for EU GI law, it constitutes 
the focus of this study.  
 
1.4 Research methodology   
 
The methodology used for the accomplishment of the present thesis is literature-based since 
no field research is conducted. This research will involve a qualitative critique of both 
academic literature and existing evidence. This thesis exploits economic theory as 
explanatory and normative guidelines and an analytical framework for IP. The present 
researcher is aware of the existence of other theoretical bases of intellectual property. Bell 
divides them into two broad categories. One is the utilitarian, instrumentalist theory and the 
other, the natural rights, right-based, deontological theory. He further observes that different 
countries may prefer different justifications. The United States and United Kingdom and 
other Anglo-Saxon countries favour utilitarian over deontological justifications. Other 
countries tend to reverse that order, favouring rights-based justifications to copyright over 
utility-based claims.
200
  
 
Before further introducing the method adopted in this study, it is necessary to explain why the 
natural rights, right-based, deontological justifications are not adopted.  
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Under the natural right theory, the basic reason for intellectual property, as for other tangible 
property, is that a man should have the natural right to own what he produces. This right-
based argument is normally connected to the property theory of the eighteenth-century 
philosopher, John Locke:  
  
“Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a 
“property” in his own “person.” This nobody has any right to but himself. The “labour” of his 
body and the “work” of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he 
removes out of the state that nature hath provided and left in it, he hath mixed his labour with 
it, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by 
him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by his labour something 
annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men. For this “labour” being the 
unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once 
joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others.”201  
 
Locke’s argument was an attempt to legitimize the existence of private property. Locke 
started his inference by the insertion of two metaphysical promises. The first is that in the 
state of nature, natural resources are common to all men. And the second is that everyone has 
a property in his own person and labour. Property rights are only granted to those whose 
labour adds value to the goods they take away from the common stock subject to the 
condition that there is ‘enough and as good’ left in common for others. For some scholars, 
this theory provides a ‘simple but powerful reason’ for intellectual property regime because 
‘a man uses nothing to produce it other than his mind.’202 The reason for this approval is 
apparent. One can easily draw a parallel between Locke’s theory and intellectual property. 
The public domain can be viewed as the counterpart of Locke’s common stock. 
Propertization of part of the public domain is justified when authors or inventors mix their 
‘mental labour’ with what they take from the public domain as long as they leave ‘enough 
and as good’ for others. By and large, this theory provides us with a self-contained and 
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morally persuasive justification. That is, the grant of intellectual property requires no 
exogenous justification. It is granted simply because ‘it is right and proper to do so’.203  
 
Nevertheless, using this theory to justify intellectual property may evoke a methodological 
problem. That is, Locke’s argument may be used out of context. Locke seemed to have based 
his argument on the concept of tangible goods. He found it necessary to justify private 
ownership because the owner ‘removed’ out of the common stock what had been common to 
all men. It is, however, hard to see what is removed out of the public domain in the creation 
of intellectual property. The fact that one writes a story consisting of ten thousand different 
words does not prevent anyone from using these words. Again, does one take away anything 
from anyone when he figures out a new method of catching rats? Obviously, he does not. 
This new method does not exist before he figures it out and all the old methods are still there 
for others’ use. Locke’s theory invokes property rights to protect fruits of one’s labour. If A’s 
neighbour eats his apple, he will not be able to have that apply for lunch. Therefore, he needs 
legal rights to stop others from eating his apple. But if A’s neighbour who overhears the song 
A wrote for his daughter decides to use that song to entertain his girlfriend A can still enjoy 
the pleasure of singing it. Again, sharing a new rat-catching method with other does not 
hamper one’s own use of that method or weaken its effectiveness. Since it is impossible for 
others to interfere with one’s intellectual creations, what is the point of invoking property 
right protection? 
 
The Lockean justification has also been attacked from a technical perspective. As Landes and 
Posner have argued, this theory may fail to take into consideration the actual process of 
intellectual creation: 
 
“[I]ntellectual creation is a cumulative process—each creator of “new” intellectual property 
building on his predecessors—and since copyright and particularly patent law give a long-
term property right to someone who may have won the race to come up with the new 
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expressive work or new invention by just a day, it is unclear to what extent an intellectual 
property right can realistically be considered the exclusive fruit of its owner’s labor.”204  
 
Natural rights theory is also criticized for its lack of ability to provide explanatory power and 
normative guidance.
205
  Most seriously, it is argued that natural rights theory has been 
misguiding the development of IP law. According to Lessig, a right-based theory may lead 
people to becoming “accustomed to thinking of the monopoly rights that the state extends not 
as privileges granted to authors in exchange for creativity, but as rights. And not as rights that 
get defined or balanced against other state interests, but as rights that are, like natural 
property rights, permanent and absolute.”206  
  
Whereas the natural right and reward theory justify intellectual property by considering what 
is good or fair for the author or inventor, the incentive theory has its argument based on what 
is good for society as a whole, at least in the economic sense. The essence of this theory is 
that intellectual property is not an end itself; it is an instrument for the stimulation of other 
matter, such as innovation or competition. It presupposes that innovation is good for the 
society or the public in general. It also presupposes that the supply of intellectual goods will 
be under the optimal level without proper incentives. This argument provides us with a 
utilitarian justification free from the entanglement of moral or other metaphysical 
considerations. Its merit is especially clear when dealing with areas where intellectual 
creations are the result of the intertexture of individuals and new technologies. This theory 
may be promising in providing normative guidance and explaining the working of intellectual 
property system, such as why the exclusive rights are only granted for a certain period of time 
and are subjects to a variety of exceptions. This is because it views the grant of intellectual 
property as a cost-benefit trade-off. Intellectual property bears social costs. It is, first if all, 
very costly to enforce. Its monopolistic nature can lead to deadweight loss and rent-seeking 
and, thus, misallocation of resources. In addition, it creates artificial barriers to the access of 
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information. The more expansive intellectual property rights are the heavier the social costs. 
Thus, it is important to strike a balance between benefits and costs.
207
 
 
More specifically, this study adopts the economic approach which views IP as a form of 
government intervention in the economy.
208
 Traditionally, economists identify three basic 
reasons why the government intervenes in the economy. First, the government may do so to 
improve economic efficiency by correcting market failures. Second, government may 
intervene to pursue social values of fairness, or equity, by altering market outcomes. Finally, 
the government may aim to pursue other social value by mandating the consumption of some 
goods, called merit goods, and prohibiting the consumption of some goods, called merit 
bads.
209
 This will form the overall analytical framework for this study.  
 
Table 1: Reasons for government intervention in the economy:
210
  
 
Government intervention in the economy 
Correcting market failures Pursuing 
social 
equity 
Promoting 
merit goods 
and 
discouraging 
merit bads 
Imperfect 
competition 
Information 
asymmetry 
Externalities Public 
goods 
 
 
1.5 Outline 
 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows:  
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Chapter 2 constructs an analytical framework of IP for subsequent discussion. This analytical 
framework will examine three broad aspects of IP including (i) terminology and definition; (ii) 
shared characteristics; and (iii) the economic rationales behind the institution. It will identify 
the concept of exclusivity, or the right to exclude, as hallmark of IP. It also adopts an 
economic explanation of IP, which justifies government’s intervention in the market through 
IP by the need to correct market failures.  
 
Chapter 3 introduces GIs as established under the TRIPS Agreement. The Chapter depicts 
GIs as they are under the TRIPS Agreement and identifies the anomalous or unique features 
of GIs vis-à-vis the general picture of IP under the TRIPS. It will (i) provide an overview of 
TRIPS Agreement, including its historical background and main elements; (ii) trace the 
unique historical background leading to the inclusion GIs in the TRIPS Agreement; (iii) 
introduce and analyse GI provisions under TRIPS Agreement.  
 
Chapter 4 explores the relation between GIs and IP in the context of the US trademark 
paradigm for GI protection. Realizing that under US law, GIs are more than an IP issue, the 
main body of this Chapter is divided into two parts. The first part deals with GI protection 
under trademark law. It will examine how and why GIs  protected as trademarks, certification 
marks, and collective trademarks. Two elements are examined: exclusivity and economic 
rationales. The second part introduces and analyse how and why GIs are treated and exploited 
under laws regulating product labelling and advertising.    
 
Chapter 5 explores the relation between GIs and IP in the context of the EU sui generis law 
by examination EU GI regulation for agro-food products. This will include (i) the historical 
and theoretical foundations of EU sui generis GI law; (ii) elements of the GI Regulation, and 
(iii) and analysis of the IP status and legitimacy of EU sui generis GI law.  
 
37 
 
Chapter 6 summarizes the findings of this study, explains the causes of Taiwan’s GI 
conundrum, and provides policy recommendations for policymakers.   
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Chapter 2 Intellectual Property: An Analytical 
Framework 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter provides an analytical framework for the subsequent discussion by identifying 
certain minimum parameters of the concept of intellectual property. It will do so by 
examining aspects of intellectual property, including terminology, shared characteristics, and 
economic justifications.  
 
2.2 What is intellectual property?  
 
This section answers that question “what is intellectual property?” by clarifying its 
terminology and definition and identifying the two common characteristics shared by all 
types of intellectual property rights, that is, the intangibility of subject matter and the 
negativity of rights conferred.  
 
2.2.1 Terminology and definition  
 
The term “intellectual property” was coined in the late nineteenth century when it was 
perceived that copyright, patent, and trademark laws, which recognized a new class of rights 
in intangible creations, had more in common with each other than with the older forms of 
39 
 
property known to Roman law.
211
 Traditionally, this term was used to describe the copyright 
protection of authors and to distinguish this from industrial property, i.e., patents for 
inventions, industrial design rights, trademarks and the like.
212
 Intellectual property is today 
“a generic title for patents, copyright, trademarks, design rights, trade secrets and so forth.”213 
Such usage became popular from the 1960s with the establishment of the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO).
214
 Landes and Posner provide the forming definition of 
intellectual property: 
 
“By “intellectual property” we mean ideas, inventions, discoveries, symbols, images, 
expressive works (verbal, visual, musical, theatrical), or in short any potentially valuable 
human product (broadly, “information”) that has an existence separable from a unique 
physical embodiment, whether or not the product has actually been “propertized,” that is, 
brought under a legal regime of property rights.”215 
 
Phillips and Firth further distinguish the “ordinary common-sense description of intellectual 
property” from the “legal description of intellectual property”. In its ordinary common-sense 
meaning, intellectual property simply “comprises all those things that are ‘intellectual’ 
because they emanate from the use of the human brain…” 216  The legal description of 
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intellectual property “differs from the colloquial in that it focuses upon the rights which are 
enjoyed in the produce of mind, rather than upon the produce itself.”217  
 
Recently, some scholars have expressed their discontent with the term intellectual property 
and advocate its replacement by “IP” (the abbreviation of intellectual property) or “IPR” (the 
abbreviation of intellectual property right). Such discontent is two-pronged. First, it is argued 
that the term intellectual property scarcely describes trademarks and similar marketing 
devices and the use of “IP” or “IPR” will “help to deflate the grandiloquence inherent in 
“intellectual property”. 218  It was, further, claimed by Merges that “conventional wisdom 
would have it that trademark law has long been an odd fit in the great triumvirate of 
intellectual property.”219 Secondly, there is a concern that such terminology may lead (or 
mislead) people to draw improper analogy between intellectual property and tangible 
property.
220
 Advocating the replacement of “intellectual property” by “IP”, Lemley asserts 
that “[i]f people think of intellectual property as a form of property because of its name and 
are misled by the connection, then the name should probably go.”221 
 
2.2.2 Shared characteristics  
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IP law confers property rights on certain forms of information. There are three recognized 
basic bodies,
222
 central types,
223
 or major areas,
224
 of IP, namely, patents, copyright, and 
trademarks. Patents provide time-limited protection for inventions, that is, new solutions to 
technical problems,
225
 whether products or processes, in all fields of technology.
226
 Such 
protection involves granting temporary exclusive rights to prevent others from making and 
exploiting the invention.
227
 Copyright protects the “form of expression” of ideas. 228 
Copyright protection extends to expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods of 
operation or mathematical concepts as such.
229
 This is known as the idea-expression 
dichotomy.
230
 The creativity protected by copyright law lies in the choice and arrangement of 
words, musical notes, colours and shapes. Copyright owners are granted time-limited rights 
against those who copy or otherwise take and use their original works.
231
 Trademarks provide 
protection for goodwill to marketing symbols,
232
 which may be any sign or any combination 
of signs which are capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from 
those of other undertakings.
233
  Trademarks generally grant exclusive rights to prevent third 
parties from using similar signs for identical or similar goods. Trademark rights may be 
maintained in perpetuity.
234
 Over time, intellectual property has been extended to new subject 
matter. Such extension has been achieved either by accretion or by emulation. Whereas 
accretion involves re-defining an existing right so as to encompass the novel material, 
emulation refers to the “creation of a new and distinct right by analogy drawn more or less 
eclectically from the types already known.”235 Such new IP rights are generally referred to as 
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“sui generis” IPRs.236 Sui generis is a Latin term meaning “of its own kind”, “forming a class 
of its own”, or “unique”.237 In the IP context, the term sui generis is used to identify “a legal 
classification that exists independently of other categorizations because of its uniqueness or 
because of the specific creation of an entitlement or obligation.”238 Examples of sui generis 
IPRs include sui generis design rights,
239
 utility models,
240
 semiconductor chips,
241
 and 
database rights.
242
  
 
Two characteristics shared by the various forms of IP have been identified by scholars. One 
relates to the nature of subject matter of IP and the other, the nature of rights granted. First, it 
is observed that various forms of IP, despite all the technical differences between them, 
“establish property protection over intangible such as ideas, inventions, signs, and 
information.”243 The intangibility of subject matter differs IP from the more familiar tangible 
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property.
244
 IP, as one commentator puts it, is “nothing more than a socially-recognized, but 
imaginary, set of fences and gates. People must believe in it for it to be effective.”245  
 
The other common characteristic of IP is the negative nature of rights. This point is 
emphasized by Cornish and Llewelyn that: 
 
“One characteristic that shared by all types of IPR is that they are essentially negative: they 
are rights to stop others doing certain things—rights, in other words, to stop pirates, 
counterfeiters, imitators and even in some cases third parties who have independently reached 
the same ideas, from exploiting them without the licence of the right-owner. Some aspects of 
intellectual property confer positive entitlements, such as the right to be granted a patent or to 
register a trade mark upon fulfilling the requisite conditions; but these are essentially 
ancillary.”246   
 
Such negative rights, as argued by Cornish, are referred to as property because “they are good 
against persons with whom no relationship exists” and also because they are “exclusive rights 
to prevent other people from doing things.”247 The negativity of IPRs is the corollary of the 
intangibility of subject matter. That is, due to the intangibility of subject matter, the 
possession or utilisation of the goods in question does not impede per se others from 
possessing or using them simultaneously.”248 Therefore, the right in intangible goods, such as 
knowledge, ideas, or reputation, “must be the right to exclude others from using and 
exploiting ideas, for possession alone is not enough to secure exclusivity.”249 
 
2.3 Economic justifications for IP   
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A justification is an “action of showing something to be just, right, or proper.250 It has been 
felt that the status and legitimacy of intellectual property need to be justified. This is because 
the grant of IPRs is a policy choice which impinges on the traders, the press and media, and 
the public. On the other hand, the conventional arguments which justify the grant of private 
property rights in land and tangible resources are often premised on the scarcity or limited 
availability of such resources, and the impossibility of sharing, it seems especially important 
to justify the grant of exclusive rights over resources—ideas and information—that are not 
scarce and can be replicated without direct detriment to the original possessor of the 
intangible.
251
 
 
Scholars, analysing IP through the lens of economics, view IP as a form of government 
intervention in the economy. Hovenkamp, for example, explicitly describes intellectual 
property as a form of government intervention aimed at correcting some sources of market 
failure.
252
 He argues that:  
 
“At some level even the most hard core neoclassicists concede that some markets are efficient 
only if the state intervenes…In fact, however, the exiting IP system is a very elaborate effort 
to correct a market failure…Anyone who does not believe that the IP laws are a form of 
regulation has not read the Patent, Lanham, or Copyright Acts and the maze of technical rules 
promulgated under them.”253  
 
Hovenkamp’s insight is reinforced by other IP scholars. Lemley describes intellectual 
property as “government regulation in the classic neutral sense of the term—government 
intervention in the free market to alter the outcome it would otherwise produce because of a 
perceived market failure.”254 Similarly, Ghosh submits that “patent law should be viewed as a 
form of regulation integrated into other activities of the modern regulatory state.”255 Through 
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the lens of market failures, a generally accepted distinction is made between patents and 
copyright on the one hand and trademarks on the other. While the former are designed to 
address the public good problem,
256
 the latter are legal responses to the problems of 
information asymmetry.
257
  
 
2.3.1 Public good problem and incentives for innovation  
 
The main economic justification for patents and copyright is that they serve as incentives for 
the goals of promoting innovation and progress.
258
 Advocates of this theory argue that the 
subject matter of intellectual property, namely, information and ideas, is characterized by 
what economists call ‘public good’ characteristics. A public good is a commodity with two 
closely related characteristics. One is ‘non-rivalrous consumption’, which means the 
consumption of a public good by one person does not leave less for any other consumer. The 
other characteristic of public goods is ‘non-excludability’, which means the costs of 
excluding non-paying beneficiaries are so high that no private profit-maximizing firm is 
willing to supply the good.
259
 The standard example of a public good is national defence.
260
 
In contrast, a private good, such as a hot dog, is consumed by only one consumer—it cannot 
be consumed by another as well.
261
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Economists also view information or idea as a public good.
262
 It can be easily observed from 
daily experience that one person’s use of an idea or information does not diminish its 
availability for others to use. Thus, consumption of information is non-rivalrous. Meanwhile, 
the costs of excluding some people from learning about a new idea can be high because the 
transmission of ideas is so cheap. Information, therefore, is non-excludable.
263
 The public 
good characteristics of information and ideas beget the problems of free-riding and ‘non-
appropriability’. That is, they are generally costly to produce and cheap to transmit. Popular 
music, for example, is costly to make and recordings are cheap to copy. The instant the 
producer sells information to the buyer, that buyer becomes a potential competitor with the 
original producer. A buyer of a compact disk recording at a music store can copy the disk 
immediately and resell it to others. He can undercut the original producer because he bears 
only the cost of transmission, not the cost of production. Customers will also try to “free ride” 
by paying no more than the cost of transmission. The fact that producers have difficulty 
selling information for more than a fraction of its value is called the problem of non-
appropriability.”264  
 
As a consequence of these two problems, rational producers will refuse to invest their own 
time and money in creating new information products. They will, instead, wait for others to 
do so and then free ride the fruit. The result of such collective rational behaviour is the 
insufficient supply of intellectual goods.  
 
As advocates of the incentive theory, Burk and Lemley assert, in the patent context, that:  
 
“There is virtually unanimous agreement that the purpose of the patent system is to promote 
innovation by granting exclusive rights to encourage invention. The standard account of the 
patent system recounts how such exclusive rights address the public goods nature of 
inventions that are expensive to produce but easy to appropriate. The consensus position has 
been that such legal restraints on patentable inventions are justifiable if they offer a net 
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benefit to society, trading the disutility of restricted output and higher prices for the greater 
social utility of inventions that might otherwise not be produced.”265  
 
Similarly, Netanel justifies copyright protection by arguing that:  
 
“Unlike most goods and services, creative and informational works can be enjoyed by 
unlimited numbers of persons without being consumed…Copyright protection is necessary 
because, in its absence, unbridled competition from free riders who are able to copy and 
distribute the work without paying copyright royalties would drive the price for user access to 
its near-zero marginal cost. This free rider problem, in turn, would greatly impair author and 
publisher ability to recover their fixed production costs. In a world without copyright, only 
authors unconcerned with monetary remuneration would produce creative expression and 
only publishes with no need for financial return would invest in selecting, packaging, 
marketing, and making such expression available to the public. Without copyright, creative 
expression would likely be both underproduced and, no less importantly, 
underdisseminated.”266 
  
It can be observed that the incentive theory paints a rather pessimistic picture of IP. Lemley 
has gone so far as to claim IP as “a necessary evil.”267 The reason for such a pessimistic 
attitude lies in the realization of the social costs imposed by the IP system. Criticisms of the 
IP system are several-fold. First, it may create monopoly power. Exclusive rights to prevent 
other people from doing things are at least monopolistic in a legal sense, if not necessarily in 
an economic one.
268
 Its monopolistic nature can lead to deadweight loss
269
 and rent-
seeking
270
 and, thus, misallocation of resources. In addition, it creates artificial barriers to the 
access of information.  Secondly, being market-oriented, the IP system spreads the burdens of 
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the system among those who buy the knowledge goods, and thus spreads the burden based on 
consumer preferences. It cannot induce investment that is not projected to yield a profit under 
current rules of IP, but by punishing those who make non-remunerative investments, enforces 
a kind of disciple on investment decisions.
271
 Thirdly, under the IP system, there would be 
cost associated with deciding the granting of patents, the protection of IP, and the ligation. 
Costly to enforce: the costs of implementing a system of IP laws include establishing the 
infrastructure of an IP regime, and mechanisms for enforcement of IP rights as well as the 
post-implementation costs such as the costs of scrutinizing the validity of claims to patent 
rights and adjudication upon actions for infringement.
272
 Enforcement of IPRs is especially 
difficult because the boundary of rights is very not clear. In many cases, it is impossible to 
know whether one is “trespassing” upon another’s IPR.273 Fourthly, the inventors or creators 
bear risks because it is market-mediated and the reward is, therefore, not guaranteed.  It is 
estimated that at least two-third of all patents turn out to be worthless.
274
 
 
As a result, the incentive theory of intellectual property dictates that intellectual property 
rights should be granted only where necessary.” This theory is promising in providing 
normative guidance and explaining the working of intellectual property system, such as why 
the exclusive rights are only granted for a certain period of time and are subjects to a variety 
of exceptions.
275
 This is because it views the grant of intellectual property as a cost-benefit 
trade-off. Intellectual property bears social costs. The more expansive intellectual property 
rights are the heavier the social costs. Thus, it is important to strike a balance between 
benefits and costs.
276
  
 
                                                          
271
 Peter M. Gerhart, ‘The Tragedy of TRIPS’ 2007 Mich St L Rev (2007) 143, 150 at n 25.  
272
 Lauren Loew, ‘Creative Industries in Developing Countries and Intellectual Property Protection’ 9 Vand J 
Ent & Tech L (2006-2007) 171. 
273
 Lemley (n 220) 1100.  
274
 Lemley (n 220) 1103.  
275
 This does not mean that the incentive theory can provide exact answers to these technical issues. H. 
Hovenkamp (‘Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise’ 2004 Colum Bus L Rev (2004) 335, 336-337) argues that 
IP laws are “very rough guesses about the optimal scope of protection”: “In fact, the detailed regulatory regimes 
that we call the IP laws are filled with very rough guesses about the optimal scope of protection—ranging from 
the duration of patents and copyrights to the scope of patent claims and fair use of copyrighted material. The 
range of government estimation that goes on in the IP system is certainly as great as in regulation of, say, retail 
electricity or telephone service.” 
276
 Landes and Posner (n 215) 21-24.  
49 
 
IP is not the only policy tool for the promotion of innovation. Recognition through 
publication, academic tenure, and prizes for achievements may also provide incentives.
277
 An 
often mentioned alternative system to IP is subsidy or direct reward by government.
278
 
Netanel, for example, claims that in the absence of massive government or private subsidy, 
some measure of copyright protection is necessary to support authors and publishers engaged 
in the creation and dissemination of original expression.
279
 Occasionally, IP is analogous to a 
form of government subsidy which is “designed to influence supply in market away from the 
competitive norm just as support from the National Endowment of the Arts, the National 
Institutes of Health, or crop supports to farmers are.”280 The main feature of a subsidy system 
is that it spreads the burdens of the system among taxpayers, who may or may not benefit 
from the investment. The distribution of the burden depends on the tax rate. The subsidy can 
directly target certain fields for investment but is not subject to any penalty if the investment 
turns out not to be beneficial. It is argued that the government subsidy possesses some 
advantages vis-à-vis the IP system. First, under the subsidy system incentives to innovate are 
provided without granting innovators monopoly power over price.
281
 This can engender 
significant increase in consumer welfare in some areas. Pharmaceutical products, for example, 
would be far cheaper and more widely used.
282
 Secondly, under this system, innovations 
would pass immediately into the public domain, becoming freely available to all. Therefore, 
subsequent innovators are free to improve it immediately.
283
  
 
However, as it has been observed, the subsidy system also possesses certain inherent 
shortcomings. First, there is a problem of government ignorance. Unlike the decentralized 
marketplace, the government may lack the knowledge of what needs to be invented or how to 
value new inventions. Incorrect decisions on the part of government decision-makers could 
result in insufficient investment in invention or investing in the wrong types of invention or 
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under-or-overvaluation of what has been invented.
284
 Government subsidies can, thus, lead to 
misallocation of resources unless the government has very good information and the will to 
use it.
285
 Second, there is a rent-seeking problem. That is, competition for government 
funding also lead to rent-seeking problems on the part of private actors or agency captured by 
the affected industries.
286
  
 
2.3.2 Information asymmetry and institutionalization of reputation  
 
The economic justifications for trademarks involve another subset of market failures known 
as information asymmetry, which refers to the situation wherein one party in an economic 
relationship has more information than the other.
287
 This theory argues that trademarks 
operate in the public interest because they increase the supply of information to consumers 
and, thereby, the efficiency of the market.
288
 The starting point of this argument is that in 
many markets, sellers have much better information as to the unobservable features of a 
commodity for sale than the buyers.
289
 Nelson contends that it is difficult for consumers to 
obtain information about the quality variation of products. Such limitations of consumer 
information about quality have profound effects on the market structure of consumer 
goods.
290
 Based on how information regarding to quality is accessed by or conveyed to 
consumers, economists classify goods into three categories, namely, search goods, experience 
goods, and credence goods. In the case of search goods, consumers can ascertain quality prior 
to purchase through inspection and/or research. In the case of experience goods, consumers 
can ascertain quality after purchase through use and experience. In the case of credence 
goods, neither prior inspection nor subsequent use is sufficient to ascertain quality. Purchase 
decisions will be based mainly on the information provided by the producer. Independent 
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certification becomes important.
291
 It is argued that information asymmetry impacts 
negatively on the market. In his seminal work ‘Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty 
and the Market Mechanism’, Akerlof, taking the market for second hand cars as an example, 
illustrates how information asymmetry could lead to adverse selection and moral hazard:  
 
“An asymmetry in available information has developed: for the sellers now have more 
knowledge about the quality of a car than the buyers. But good cars and bad cars must still 
sell at the same price—since it is impossible for a buyer to tell the difference between a good 
car and a bad car… For most cars traded will be the “lemons,” and good cars may not be 
traded at all. The “bad” cars tend to drive out the good (in much the same way that bad 
money drives out the good) […] the bad cars sell at the same price as good cars since it is 
impossible for a buyer to tell the difference between a good and a bad car; only the seller 
knows.”292  
 
Thus, asymmetrical information in relation to the quality of goods will impact adversely on 
the market. Higher-quality products will be driven out of the market, resulting in a drop in the 
quality of goods supplied and some consumers will no longer be able to satisfy their 
preferences.
293
 
 
“Reputation” is used by economists as shorthand of the quality expectation on the part of 
consumers.
294
 When saying that a firm has a good reputation, we are, more often than not, 
referring to “the “goodwill” value of the firm’s brand name or royal customer patronage.”295 
The concept of reputation only operates in a world of asymmetrical information. If all 
attributes of the product were imperfectly observable prior to purchase, then, the consumer 
would simply make the best choice. Previous purchasing experience would be irrelevant. 
Contrarily, if product attributes are difficult to be observed in advance, consumers tend to 
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rely on the quality of products offered by the same producer in the past as an indicator of 
future level of quality.
296
 Thus, the concept of reputation serves to an extent to bridge the 
market failure associated with asymmetry of information. Since consumers rely on sellers’ 
reputation, a seller who chooses to enter the high quality segment of the market must initially 
invest in his reputation via the production of quality merchandise. Thus, in the context of 
information asymmetry, reputation becomes not only and indicator, but also an inducer, of 
quality.
297
 
 
The importance of trademarks in the world of information asymmetry is that they reduce 
consumers’ cost of search for desirable attributes of products: 
  
“The economic role of the trademark is to help the consumer identify the unobservable 
features of the trademarked product. This information is not provided to the consumer in an 
analytical form, such as an indication of size or a listing of ingredients, but rather in summary 
form, through a symbol which the consumer identifies with a specific combination of features. 
Information in analytical form is a complement to, rather than a substitute for trademarks.”298  
 
Thus, trademarks, as distinctive signs, are able to protect reputation through the process of 
“institutionalization of reputation.”299 That is, they are able to institutionalize reputation by 
making use of a process which requires formalization of the relationship between the product 
and the source or origin. Legal protection is needed because a successful trademark attracts 
not only customers but also free-riders. In the absence of legal impediments, competitor A 
could easily pass his own products off as having come from B by duplicating B’s trademark 
because the cost of duplicating someone else’s trademark is small and the incentive to incur 
this cost in the absence of legal impediments will be greater the stronger the trademark. The 
free-riding competitor will, at little cost, capture profits associated with a strong trademark 
because some consumers will assume (at least in the short run) that the free rider’s and the 
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original trademark holder’s brands are identical.300 The result would be higher search costs 
for consumers and a disincentive to firms to invest in goodwill and quality products and 
services.
301
 If the law does not prevent it, free riding may eliminate the incentive to develop a 
valuable trademark in the first place.”302 
 
Trademark is not designed to deal with the public good problem. As argued by Landes and 
Posner, a trademark is not a public good in the sense that it has social value only when used 
to designate a single brand. If A develops a strong trademark for his brand that other 
completing firms are free to affix to their own brands, the information capital embodied in 
A’s trademark will be destroyed. In contrast, unauthorized copies of a copyrighted work will 
not destroy the value of the work. 
303
 Unlike copyright and patent law, the trademark is not 
designed to offer its holder incentives to innovate or create.
304
 Trademark law aims to provide 
business with an incentive to provide consistency in the quality of their products or services, 
rather than the development of the trademark itself.
305
 Patents and copyright incentivize 
future creation by granting exclusive rights to creators over their creation, which insulating 
them from market competition. They, thus, represent a departure from the competitive 
market.
306
  Trademark law, on the contrary, is an affirmation of competition. It facilitates 
market competition by making information less expensive.
307
 
 
The registration of a trademark does not give the owner a monopoly in either the mark, or the 
underlying goods or services in connection with which the trademark is registered. If one has 
to use the term “monopoly”, it is only a monopoly over the use of the mark in connection 
with the goods and services for which it is registered.
308
 Therefore, the characterization of 
trademarks as monopolies is unhelpful in clarifying the nature of trademark rights.
309
 The 
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most obvious social cost of trademarks is that it restricts other traders from using the using 
the same or similar sign.
310
 More expansive trade mark protection, which gives a trade mark 
holder the ability to control non-trade mark uses or uses of similar marks in relation to 
dissimilar goods, impose further costs. Some such regulations may even restrict free 
speech.
311
 Trademark rights also incur the problem of cost of enforcement. Trademark rights 
cover an undefined set of similar terms that will be based on what consumers ultimately find 
confusing in surveys. As a result, not only is there no way to determine the scope of 
trademark rights ex ante, but even a court decision won’t fix it in time or space, as changes in 
consumer beliefs will change the scope of rights.
312
 
 
2.4 Conclusion  
 
Intellectual property (IP) is a generic title for patents, copyright, and trademarks and so forth. 
IP is a form of government intervention in the market, which creates exclusive rights over 
certain intangibles, such as, ideas, inventions, and signs. IP is traditionally justified by the 
need to correct market failures. While patents and copyright are designed to overcome the 
public good problem by providing market-based incentives for innovations, the justification 
for trademarks involves another subset of market failure, namely, information asymmetry.   
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Chapter 3 Geographical Indications under the 
TRIPS Agreement 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The TRIPS Agreement is an integral part of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). As one of the multilateral trade agreements, it is binding on all 
members and hence is also a condition of membership for countries which have not yet 
joined the WTO.
313
 The TRIPS Agreement marks the beginning of the global IP epoch.
314
 
Since the outset, the GI has been an anomaly of the TRIPS Agreement.  At the negotiating 
stage, it does not follow the North-South disagreement typical in other topics of IP 
negotiations. It is, instead, characterized as North-North division, New World v. Old World, 
or immigrant v. emigrant countries. It is also an issue for continuing negotiations. That is, in 
sharp contrast with the TRIPS provisions on other categories of IP, which were written as 
complete and final, the GI negotiation is unfinished and the TRIPS Agreement mandates for 
continuing negotiations. Articles 22 to 24 of the TRIPS Agreement are devoted to deal with 
geographical indications. These provisions represent a strategic compromise and are 
characterized by illogicality, inconsistency, and inconclusiveness. The TRIPS Agreement 
mandates two levels of protection for GIs. The differential treatment was not based on 
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economic or any other logic reasons, but rather a strategic compromise between the EU and 
the US. The standard protection for GIs for goods reflects the US trademark justifications, 
which is based on the prevention of consumer confusion and unfair competition. The 
additional protection for wines and spirit drinks represents the victory of EU. However, the 
policy rationale behind this level of protection is not explicitly expressed in the TRIPS 
Agreement. Under the WTO framework, the GI issue is not limited to the TRIPS Agreement. 
It is also an issue for agricultural negotiations.  
 
3.2 The TRIPS Agreement  
 
3.2.1 TRIPS Agreement: the global epoch of IP  
 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was signed in Havana in 1947. From 
1948 to 1994, GATT served as an unofficial de facto international trade organization which 
provided the rules for much of the international trade. Over the years GATT evolved through 
several rounds of negotiations.
315
 The objectives of the early GATT negotiations rounds were 
primarily to reduce tariffs, the customs duties imposed on merchandise imports.
316
 The 
reduction of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), such as, quotas, import licensing systems, sanitary 
regulations, prohibitions, etc., became the main concern of the last two GATT Tokyo and 
Uruguay Rounds.
317
 The Uruguay Round, which lasted from 1986 to 1994, is the last and 
largest GATT round. It was in the Uruguay Round that negotiators decided that the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) come into being on 1 January 1995.
318
 Whereas GATT mainly 
dealt with trade in goods, the WTO and its agreements now also cover trade in services, and 
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intellectual property.
319
 The TRIPS Agreement is the result of a modern trend of harmonizing 
IP, which started in the end of the 19
th
 century with the conclusion of the Paris Convention of 
1883.
320
 
 
The history of patents and copyright can be traced back to the system of royal privilege-
giving which seems to have operated in most of Europe. The Venetians are credited with the 
first properly developed patent law in 1474.
321
 In 1710, the Great Briton enacted the first 
modern copyright statute, the Statute of Anne.
322
 The early history of trademarks has been 
obscure.
323
 It is argued that the use of trademarks “dates from the very earliest times of which 
we have knowledge.” 324  It is, however, noted that trademark in their modern sense, as 
indicators of source of traded goods, were in common use in ancient Roman.
325
 Similarly, it 
is reported that the use of trademarks can be traced back over one thousand years in ancient 
China.
326
 As early as the thirteenth century, the copying of valuable marks had become a 
common infringement which was severely punished.
327
 The first distinctive recognition of 
modern trademark doctrine by an English court appeared in 1783.
328
 The second part of the 
19
th
 century saw the proliferation in Europe of national IP regimes. Outside of Europe, IP 
laws spread along colonial pathways.
329
 Up to this point, IP protection was subject mainly to 
the principle of territoriality, that is, the principle that intellectual property rights did not 
extend beyond the territory of the sovereign which had granted the rights. Thus, IP owners 
found themselves facing a classic free-riding problem.
330
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Since the late nineteenth century, some countries, concerned with the protection of their 
domestic interests, promoted the international scope of IP.
331
 This movement led to the 
conclusion of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883, which 
was designed to protect patents, trademarks, industrial designs, trade names, appellations of 
origin, and utility models
332
 and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works of 1886.
333
 These two conventions ushered in the multilateral era of 
international co-operation in intellectual property.
334
 The World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO), the main international organization governing IP protection,
 335
 was 
created by the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, which 
was opened for signature on July 14, 1967 and came into force in 1970.
336
 In 1974, WIPO 
became a specialized agency of the United Nations (UN).  By 1992, WIPO administered 24 
IP treaties most important among them were the Paris Convention and the Berne Convention. 
A further aspect of WIPO’s achievement was the administrative framework for obtaining 
protection beyond one’s own country. This became increasingly less burdensome through the 
adoption “registration treaties” and agreements concerning “classification systems”.337 From 
the IP owners’ point of view, WIPO-administered treaties has not been able to provide 
adequate international protection of IP. The Paris Convention and Berne Convention were 
built around two basic propositions, namely, the substantive minima and the principle of 
national treatment.
338
 Under the substantive minima, signatory states provided in their 
domestic law certain minimum levels of IP protection, which were initially quite 
undemanding and in most cases meant to reflect the existing state practice.
339
 Second, under 
the principle of national treatment, a signatory state was obliged to offer protection to 
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nationals of other signatory states that matched the protection it afforded its own nationals.
340
 
The principle of national treatment is thus, fundamentally, a rule of non-discrimination. It 
allows countries the autonomy to develop and enforce their own laws, while meeting the 
demand for international protection. Thus, the principle of national treatment, as commented 
by Bently and Sherman, is “a mechanism of international protection without 
harmonization.”341 The main problem with the national treatment principle is that it is useless 
for foreigners if a state does not provide adequate treatment for its own nationals.
342
 In 
addition to the weak standards of protection, these existing international agreements do not 
provide for powers to enforce intellectual property rights or means to settle disputes.
343
 WIPO 
has been ineffective at adjudicating IP disputes. In spite of the fact that both the Paris and the 
Berne Conventions refer to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague as the 
dispute adjudicating forum,
344
 this was not implemented.
345
 Seeking to enhance IP protection 
under WIPO framework was, however, very difficult.  First, some most notorious piracy 
countries were not members to Paris Convention or Berne Convention. It was reported in 
1988 that Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan were 
the seven worse pirating countries.
346
  Some of these countries were not members and thus 
not subject to WIPO rules. India, Singapore, and Taiwan were not signatories to the Paris 
Union and Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan were not signatories to the Berne Union.
347
  The 
political structure of WIPO made it impossible for the industrialized countries to enhance IP 
protection.
348
 In a nutshell, “The international world of intellectual property over which 
WIPO presided was a world in which sovereign states had agreed to certain foundational 
principles, the most important being the principle of national treatment. By no means was it a 
world in which there was a harmonization of technical rules. States retained enormous 
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sovereign discretion over intellectual property standard setting.” 349   This period, as 
characterised by Drahos, “was a world in which a lot of free-riding was tolerated.”350 
 
As it has been argued that the free-riding of IP may incur profound economic consequences 
not only to the right-holders but also to their countries. Manufacturers of affected products 
have a direct loss in sale revenues; this is often directly related to losses in tax revenues, and 
may also result in job losses. In social terms, the illegal business of counterfeiting and piracy 
brings with it all the negative side effects of clandestine labour.
351
  However, there are 
reasons for developing countries to provide weak IP protection. First, IP protection may 
simply be too new a concept for their legal tradition.
352
 Second, free-riding of IP may be 
exploited as a strategy of development for some developing countries. This is because free-
riders enrich not only themselves but also, at least in the short run, the countries in which 
they operate.
 
 Through free-riding, developing countries can procure needed goods and 
services at little cost, while industries that specialize in producing counterfeiting goods 
employ thousands of workers.
353
  
 
Prior to the 1970s, the United States government’s role in the international protection of US 
companies’ IPRs was very limited. US companies with substantial investment in foreign 
countries were able to negotiate an acceptable arrangement with a host government in 
relation to the protection of their IPRs. The situation started to change during the 1970s. 
Technological improvements made it much easier to copy products. Certain countries became 
centres of piracy.
354
 In some countries, governments, in pursuit of their own industrial policy, 
even rolled back the level of protection provided. India, for example, withdrew patent 
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protection for pharmaceutical products.
355
  Realising that the problem was structural and 
beyond their ability, US companies found “the option of involving the US government in a 
more activist role became more attractive.” 356  In the early 1980s, the US government 
received pressure from its industries to use its domestic law to assure protection in foreign 
markets. Industries complained that they lost billions in revenue annually to counterfeiting.
357
 
Dissatisfied with the international state of affairs relating to IP protection, the US began to 
use its economic muscle to ensure that countries around the world seeking economic favours 
from it reformed their IP laws and their mechanisms for enforcement to stem what was 
perceived by the US to be major losses resulting from counterfeiting and other forms of 
piracy.
358
  
 
The inclusion of IP as a negotiating issue under the Uruguay Round of trade talks was 
initiated by the United States and supported by Europe, Canada and Japan.
359
 The adoption of 
such a trade-based approach to IP protection was the result of both the power of various 
industry associations, and the specific ideas and policy prescriptions that they promoted. This 
powerful group of associations mobilized behind a trade-based conception and presented 
themselves as part of the solution to America’s trade problems. These associations captured 
the imagination of American policymakers who sought to stave off an apparently impending 
protectionist approach to trade policy.
360
 The US industries also managed to secure support 
from European and Japanese industries.
361
 Thus, the incorporation of IPRs into the WTO, 
manifested in the move from WIPO to GATT to TRIPS, was nominally carried out by trade 
officials from the United States and the EU. But it was a strategy adopted at the urging of 
American and European IP industries, which were dissatisfied with status quo approaches to 
IP law-making and foresaw considerable advantage from shifting negotiations into the trade 
regime.
362
 The basic rationale behind the inclusion is that most aspects of IP law have effects 
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on trade.
363
 The group of developed countries believed that the absence of protection or 
inadequate protection of intellectual property rights within the territory of certain countries 
was equivalent to a barrier to trade, and therefore that the GATT should deal with this 
issue.
364
 It is argued that the failure of many developing in proving adequate IP protection 
may amount to non-tariff barriers against foreign exports.
365
 Certain institutional features of 
the GATT/WTO made it a superior venue for the United States and EU to negotiate IP 
protection standards. First, these states enjoy significant negotiating leverage in the 
GATT/WTO.
366
 Second, the ability to link intellectual property to other issue as within the 
GATT/WTO expanded the zone of agreement among states with widely divergent 
interests.
367
 Third, the GATT’s dispute settlement system was perceived to be far more 
effective than the mechanism for reviewing states’ compliance with WIPO-based 
conventions.
368
 The developing countries led by Brazil and India argued that IP issues were 
the exclusive territory of WIPO and that GATT was not the forum for IP.
369
 Developing 
countries join the multilateral trade system because they, like the developed countries, seek 
the large scale economic gains offered by a multilateral system of trade.
370
 From the 
developing countries point of view, accepting TRIPS was in exchange of market access to 
developed countries in other areas.
371
 The rationale that presided over the harmonization of IP 
in the TRIPS was that IP was a “bargaining chip for obtaining access to market.”372  With the 
conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement, intellectual property is no longer a matter solely within 
the sovereign power of individual nations. Rather, IP has become a substance governed by 
international law. As such, the US, along with other WTO Members, loses sovereign power 
over IP policy.
373
 The TRIPS Agreement has transformed intellectual property rights into 
internationally governed rights, leaving what seems like very little discretion to sovereign 
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states.
374
 This is because not seeking WTO membership is not a truly viable option for most 
countries. Neither is disregard for TRIPS’ requirements in light of the harsh retaliatory 
sanction that could be imposed.
375
 The objective of TRIPS is also to eliminate ‘free-riding’ 
distortions resulting from the fact that some countries did not protect IPRs.
376
  
 
3.2.2 IP protection under TRIPS Agreement  
  
TRIPS’ most significant features include: (i) linking intellectual property rights to trade for 
the first time in a multilateral international IP agreement, and (ii) requiring member countries 
to implement and enforce minimum standards for protecting intellectual property rights.
377
 
The stated objective of TRIPS Agreement is to liberalize the international trading system 
while protecting the private rights of IP owners by reducing piracy and misappropriation.
378
 
Its overall concern is to overcome “territorial limitations on intellectual property rights.”379 
This is achieved through two aspects of TRIPS: (i) establishing domestic IP regime; (ii) non-
discrimination (ii) dispute settlement Offering IP protection to the persons of other Members. 
Two general principles apply to all types of IP: the national treatment
380
 and the most-
favoured nation.
381
 This section deals with three aspects of the required domestic regime: the 
substantive minimum standards for IP protection, enforcement, and acquisition and 
maintenance. “Members shall give effects to the provisions of this Agreement. Members may, 
but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required 
by this Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this 
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Agreement. Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the 
provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice.” Thus, WTO 
Members must implement in their domestic law the protection required by the TRIPS 
Agreement. According to the Panel in Canada-Term of Patent Protection (, the discretion of 
Members under Article 1.1 to determine the appropriate method of implementing their 
obligations under the TRIPS Agreement did not extend to choosing with which obligation to 
comply.
382
 The Panel in China-Intellectual Property Rights held that WTO Members are free 
to determine the appropriate method of implementation and implement higher standards 
subject to conditions; but they do not have the freedom to implement a lower standard.
383
 
Therefore, the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement are minimum standards only; the 
Agreement “is not intended to be a harmonisation agreement,”384 but it also allows WTO 
members to implement protection beyond the minimum standards “Countries have much less 
opportunity to decide whether it suits their situation to offer high or low levels of 
protection.”385  
 
3.2.2.1 National treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment  
 
Under the national treatment (NT), each member state must extend the same protection to 
nationals of other member states as to its nationals.
386
 NT permits countries to vary the level 
of protection they give to IP according to what they see as their needs, provided that they do 
not discriminate between foreigners and locals. The TRIPS moderates this effect by 
standardizing levels of protection between members.
387
 The most-favoured-treatment (MFN) 
is not included under the Paris Convention. MFN is one of the basic principles of TRIPS 
Agreement, under which, with regard to the protection of IP, an advantage, favour, privilege 
or immunity granted by a member to the nationals of any other country shall be accorded 
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immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of other members.
388
 The most-favoured-
nation provision not only prevents a member from preferring its own citizens over non-
citizens from other member states but also generally prohibits discrimination between 
nationals of different member states.
389
 Certain advantages, favours, privileges or immunities 
are exempted from this MFN obligation, including: (i) deriving from international agreements 
on judicial assistance or law enforcement of a general nature and not particularly confined to 
the protection of intellectual property; (ii) granted in accordance with the provisions of the 
Berne Convention (1971) or the Rome Convention authorizing that the treatment accorded be 
a function not of national treatment but of the treatment accorded in another country;  (iii) in 
respect of the rights of performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting organizations 
not provided under this Agreement; (iv) deriving from international agreements related to the 
protection of intellectual property which entered into force prior to the entry into force of the 
WTO Agreement, provided that such agreements are notified to the Council for TRIPS and 
do not constitute an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against nationals of other 
Members.
390
 Taken together, the national treatment and MFN provisions attempt to rectify 
the damage that some states recently inflicted on the international intellectual property system 
by unilaterally asserting claims of material reciprocity with respect to hybrid legal regimes 
falling in the penumbra between the Paris and Berne Conventions.
391
  
 
3.2.2.2 Dispute settlement  
 
According to Helfer, the GATT’s dispute settlement system was one of the “institutional 
features” which motivated the United States and the EC to shift intellectual property law 
making from WIPO to GATT.
392
 The TRIPS Agreement is the first international treaty to 
introduce a system of sanctions against members who do not enforce the minimum protection 
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of intellectual property rights.
393
 The TRIPS Agreement makes the WTO’s dispute settlement 
mechanism available to address conflicts arising under TRIPS, and significantly provides for 
the possibility of cross-retaliation for states that fail to abide by WTO’s Dispute Settlement 
Body’s rulings. Enforcement includes trade sanctions, which consists of compensatory and 
retaliatory withdrawal of trade concessions and the imposition of tariffs and quotas. The 
overall benefits of TRIPS are exemplified in the following comments:  
 
“The real genius of TRIPS lies in its provisions establishing a system of dispute resolution 
between member states.”394 
 
“…the enforcement system of the new WTO was probably one of the most attractive features 
of the GATT to the intellectual property community” and the incorporation of TRIPS into the 
GATT means that “member states will, for the first time, have a place to resolve disputes 
concerning the recognition of copyright, patent, trademark, and related rights.”395 
 
“…the enforcement provisions of the TRIPS Agreement fill a gap in the pre-existing 
intellectual property conventions, which either ignored the issue of effective implementation 
of agreed minimum standards or relegated to the theoretical possibility of litigation before the 
International Court of Justice.”396 
 
3.2.2.3 Substantive minimum standards of protection  
 
For the purposes of the TRIPS Agreement, “intellectual property” refers to seven subject-
matter categories enumerated in Sections 1 to 7 of Part II, including copyright and related 
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rights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, layout designs of 
integrated circuits, and undisclosed information.
397
 According to the Preamble of TRIPS
398
, 
IPRs are private rights
399
 and the underlying policy objectives of national systems for the 
protection of IP include developmental and technological objectives.
400
 Instead of setting up, 
in itself, a body of international IP law, the Agreement establishes minimum standards for 
protection in each of the seven areas. WTO members must adjust their domestic laws so that 
those laws comply with its parameters.
401
 The TRIPS Agreement establishes minimum 
standards for the protection of IP rights in each of the seven defined areas of IP, meaning that 
WTO Members are generally entitled to provide higher but not lower levels of IP 
protection.
402
  
 
(1) Patents 
 
TRIPS Articles 27 to 34 deals with the protection of patents. Patents shall be available for 
any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they 
are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.
403
 However, 
WTO Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their 
territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or 
morality, including the protection of human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious 
prejudice to the environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the 
exploitation is prohibited by their law.
404
 WTO Members may also exclude from patentability 
(i) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals and 
(ii) plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for 
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the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes.  
However, WTO Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents 
or by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof.  The provisions of this 
subparagraph shall be reviewed four years after the date of entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement.
405
 
 
TRIPS also attempts to harmonize the patent term by providing a minimum 20-year term of 
protection counted from the filing date.
406
 During the term of protection, the owner of a 
patent enjoys certain rights to exclude and rights to authorize.   
 
Under Article 28.1, a patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights: (i) 
where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties not having the 
owner’s consent from the acts of:  making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for 
these purposes that product and (ii) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to 
prevent third parties not having the owner’s consent from the act of using the process, and 
from the acts of:  using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes at least the 
product obtained directly by that process.
407
 Patent owners shall also have the right to assign, 
or transfer by succession, the patent and to conclude licensing contracts.
408
 
 
TRIPS allows WTO Members to provide “limited exceptions” to the exclusive rights 
conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a 
normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of 
the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.
409
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(2) Trademarks 
 
TRIPS Articles 15 to 21 lay down the rules for protection of trademarks. Article 15.1 defines 
a trademark as “[a]ny sign, or any combination of signs, capable of distinguishing the goods 
or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings.”410  Such signs, in particular 
words including personal names, letters, numerals, figurative elements and combinations of 
colours as well as any combination of such signs, shall be eligible for registration as 
trademarks.  Where signs are not inherently capable of distinguishing the relevant goods or 
services, Members may make registrability depend on distinctiveness acquired through use.  
Members may require, as a condition of registration, that signs be visually perceptible.
411
 
 
For the purposes of trademark protection, signs can be broadly divided into three categories, 
namely, distinctive, descriptive, and generic. A trademark, in order to function, must be 
distinctive. A sign that is not distinctive cannot help the consumer to identify the goods of his 
choice. Distinctiveness is a relative, rather than absolute, concept. Distinctive character must 
be evaluated in relation to good to which the trademark is applied. For example, the word 
apple or an apple device cannot be registered for apples, but is highly distinctive for 
computers. The test whether a trademark is distinctive is bound to depend on the 
understanding of the consumer. There are different degrees of distinctiveness.
412
 As a rule of 
thumb, if a sign is not distinctive its registration should be refused. By and large, it is up to 
the registrar to prove lack of distinctiveness, and in the case of doubt the trademark should be 
register. Some trademark laws put the onus on the applicant to show that his mark ought to be 
registered.
413
 Descriptive terms are “those that serve in trade to designate the kind, quality, 
intended purpose, value, place of origin, time of production or any other characteristic of the 
goods for which the sign is intended to be used or is being used.
414
 A sign is generic when it 
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“defines a category or type to which the goods belong.” Examples of generic terms include 
“furniture”, “chair”, “coffee”, “instant coffee”, etc.415   
 
Members may make registrability depend on use.  However, actual use of a trademark shall 
not be a condition for filing an application for registration.   An application shall not be 
refused solely on the ground that intended use has not taken place before the expiry of a 
period of three years from the date of application.
416
 The nature of the goods or services to 
which a trademark is to be applied shall in no case form an obstacle to registration of the 
trademark.
417
 Members shall publish each trademark either before it is registered or promptly 
after it is registered and shall afford a reasonable opportunity for petitions to cancel the 
registration.  In addition, Members may afford an opportunity for the registration of a 
trademark to be opposed.
418
 
 
Initial registration, and each renewal of registration, of a trademark shall be for a term of no 
less than seven years.  The registration of a trademark shall be renewable indefinitely.
419
 
During the term of protection, the owner of a trademark enjoys the right to exclude third 
parties from using the mark as well as the right to authorize the use of the mark.   
 
The owner of a registered trademark shall have the exclusive right to prevent all third parties 
not having the owner’s consent from using in the course of trade identical or similar signs for 
goods or services which are identical or similar to those in respect of which the trademark is 
registered where such use would result in a likelihood of confusion.  In case of the use of an 
identical sign for identical goods or services, a likelihood of confusion shall be presumed.  
The rights described above shall not prejudice any existing prior rights, nor shall they affect 
the possibility of Members making rights available on the basis of use.
420
 Members may 
determine conditions on the licensing and assignment of trademarks, it being understood that 
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the compulsory licensing of trademarks shall not be permitted and that the owner of a 
registered trademark shall have the right to assign the trademark with or without the transfer 
of the business to which the trademark belongs.
421
   
 
Two specific paragraphs deal with the protection of well-known marks. First, Article 16.2 
extends the applicability of Article 6bis of the Paris Convention (1967) to services.  In 
determining whether a trademark is well-known, Members shall take account of the 
knowledge of the trademark in the relevant sector of the public, including knowledge in the 
Member concerned which has been obtained as a result of the promotion of the trademark.
422
 
 
Article 6bis of the Paris Convention (1967) shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to goods or 
services which are not similar to those in respect of which a trademark is registered, provided 
that use of that trademark in relation to those goods or services would indicate a connection 
between those goods or services and the owner of the registered trademark and provided that 
the interests of the owner of the registered trademark are likely to be damaged by such use.
423
 
 
TRIPS Agreement allows WTO Members to provide limited exceptions to the rights 
conferred by a trademark, such as fair use of descriptive terms, provided that such exceptions 
take account of the legitimate interests of the owner of the trademark and of third parties.
424
 
 
The owner of a registered trademark is granted “the exclusive right to prevent all third parties 
not having the owner’s consent from using in the course of trade identical or similar signs for 
goods or services which are identical or similar to those which the trademark is registered 
where such use would result in a likelihood of confusion.”425 A likelihood of confusion is 
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presumed when identical marks are used on identical goods or services.
426
 WTO Members 
are free to determine conditions on the licensing and assignment of trademarks.
427
 The owner 
of a registered trademark also has the right to assign the trademark with or without the 
transfer of the business to which the trademark belongs.
428
 Heald interprets this provision as 
to “allow the assignment of a trademark without its attendant goodwill”.429 Registration of a 
trademark shall be for term of no less than seven years that may be renewed indefinitely.
430
  
 
3.2.2.4 Domestic enforcement  
 
Titled “Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights”, Part III of the TRIPS Agreement 
constitutes “a major addition to the international provisions for intellectual property 
protection.” 431  Under the Paris Convention, a country was under no obligation to enact 
legislation permitting seizure or prohibiting importation of infringing goods.
432
 WTO 
Members are required to provide adequate and effective enforcement mechanisms for IP 
protection, including civil and administrative proceedings, border measures, and criminal 
penalties for violations of IP rights.
433
 In a nutshell, WTO Members, with respect to the 
enforcement of IPRs, are obliged to ensure the availability of effective, fair and equitable 
enforcement procedures for IPRs covered by the TRIPS Agreement.
434
 Civil judicial 
procedures concerning the enforcement of IPRs shall be made available to right holders.
435
 
Criminal procedures and penalties shall be applicable at least in the cases of wilful trademark 
counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale.
436
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3.2.2.5 Acquisition and maintenance of IPRs 
 
Under article 62 of TRIPS Agreement, which deals with the “acquisition and maintenance of 
intellectual property and related inter-partes procedures”, Members may require, as a 
condition of the acquisition or maintenance of the intellectual property rights compliance 
with reasonable procedures and formalities.
437
 Where the acquisition of an intellectual 
property right is subject to the right being granted or registered, Members shall ensure that 
the procedures for grant or registration, subject to compliance with the substantive conditions 
for acquisition of the right, permit the granting or registration of the right within a reasonable 
period of time so as to avoid unwarranted curtailment of the period of protection.
438
 
Procedures concerning the acquisition or maintenance of intellectual property rights and, 
where a Member's law provides for such procedures, administrative revocation and 
inter partes procedures such as opposition, revocation and cancellation, shall be governed by 
the general principles set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 41;
439
 Final administrative 
decisions in any of the procedures referred to under paragraph 4 shall be subject to review by 
a judicial or quasi-judicial authority. However, there shall be no obligation to provide an 
opportunity for such review of decisions in cases of unsuccessful opposition or administrative 
revocation, provided that the grounds for such procedures can be the subject of invalidation 
procedures.
440
  
 
3.3 The inclusion of GIs under TRIPS Agreement  
 
The inclusion of geographical indications in the Uruguay Round Negotiations was initiated 
by the EU. In 1987, the EU, Japan, and the US submitted their opinions on ‘trade problems 
encountered in connection with intellectual property rights.’441 The EU was the only party 
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that identified GI protection as an issue. According to the EU, the protection of appellation of 
origin and of other geographical indications is of fundamental importance in many areas 
especially in the field of foodstuffs such as wines and spirits. The wine and spirits sector is 
one which is particularly vulnerable to imitation, counterfeit and usurpation. Such unfair 
trading practices cause serious damage not only to producers who, under appellation of origin 
regimes, are subject to extremely demanding conditions of production, but also to consumers, 
who are misled as to the real nature, quality and origin of the products offered. The effects of 
such practices involve unfair trade, not only in the markets of countries who do not respect 
appellation of origin but also in third country markets where EU products have to compete 
with those from such countries.
442
 After stating the necessity of protection, the EU went on 
deploring the insufficiency of GI protection at the international level. From the EU’s point of 
view, the three WIPO-administered international treaties dealing with GI protection, namely, 
the Paris Convention, the Madrid Agreement, and the Lisbon Agreement failed to provide 
adequate protection. The Paris Convention is limited in that the only sanction foreseen is 
possible seizure on importation, since no general civil or criminal law protection has been 
provided for. Equally the Madrid and Lisbon Agreements, while providing for more 
extensive protection, suffer from less than widespread membership.
443
  
 
3.3.1 Protection under WIPO-administered treaties 
 
3.3.1.1 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 1883 
  
The Paris Convention includes “indications of source or appellations of origin” as subject 
matter of protection of industrial property.
444
 “Indications of source or appellations of origin” 
were left undefined. According to Bodenhausen the word “or” in the text of the Convention 
was “introduced at a time when the terminology was more fluid, is no longer quite 
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correct.”445 In 1958, however, the International Bureau explained that “indications of source 
or appellations of origin” should be understood as referring to two distinct things. Whereas an 
indication of source is merely a geographical designation, indicating simply the place of 
production, manufacture, or excerption of certain products, an appellation of origin 
designates a geographical denomination corresponding to a country, region, or other locality 
serving as the appellation of the product originating therein and which product is known by 
this appellation on account of certain renowned qualities owing exclusively and essentially to 
particular geographical conditions or to particular methods of production or manufacture.
446
 
 
Instead of introducing an international standard,
447
 the Paris Convention obliged its parties to 
provide protection for an interested party against “direct or indirect use of a false indication 
of the source of goods.”448 Certain protective measures at the borders under the national law 
are required. (Article 9 of the Paris Convention.) The Paris Convention contains a separate 
Article 10, “the purpose of which is to protect indications of origin over and above the 
national-treatment clause of article 2.”449  
 
The Paris Convention has generally been viewed as an ineffective international agreement 
because the substantive levels of protection were low, enforcement procedures were not 
absolutely required, and no credible body existed to resolve inter-sovereign disputes.
450
 
Though the Paris Convention has over one hundred signatories, it is generally viewed as an 
ineffective international agreement because it contained no enforcement provisions. In 
addition, the Paris Convention essentially contained no substantial provision for the 
protection of geographic indications, and it left to the member nations to devise “border 
                                                          
445
 G. H. C. Bodenhausen, Guide to the Application of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property as Revised at Stockholm in 1967 (BIRPI 1969) 23.  
446
 Stephen S. Ladas, Patents, Trademarks, and Related Rights: National and International Protection, vol. III 
(Harvard University Press 1975) 1574.  
447
 Felix Addor and Alexandra Grazioli, ‘Geographical Indications beyond Wines and Spirits: A Roadmap for a 
Better Protection for Geographical Indications in the WTO TRIPS Agreement’ 5 JWIP (2002) 865, 876. 
448
 Paris Convention, art. 10(1). The scope of interested parties is defined in Article 10(2) as: “Any producer, 
manufacturer, or merchant, whether a natural person or a legal entity, engaged in the production or manufacture 
of or trade in such goods and established either in the locality falsely indicated as the source, or in the region 
where such locality is situated, or in the country falsely indicated, or in the country where the false indication of 
source is used.” 
449
 Ladas (n 446) 1577. 
450
 Heald (n 389) 655.   
76 
 
measures for false indications without defining the conditions for protection.” 451   It is 
specifically pointed out that one weakness of the Paris Convention is that it prevents only the 
importation of goods containing false geographical indications but it is not applicable to these 
that are merely misleading
452
 “Geographical indications can be misleading although not false.” 
An example is “California Chablis” for a term that is not false but could nevertheless be 
misleading.
453
  The main strength of the Paris Convention is that it successfully attracts a 
huge number of members.
454
 
 
3.3.1.2 Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive 
Indications of Source on Goods 1891 
 
The Paris Convention permits members states to enter into other arrangements for the 
protection of industrial property.
455
 The discontent with the Paris Convention led to some 
countries to enter the Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications 
of Source on Goods in 1891.
456
 The Madrid Agreement was based on a French proposal and 
“was drafted to specifically for France’s needs”.457 The Madrid Agreement does not directly 
define the term “indications of source”. Article 1(1), however, “All goods bearing a false or 
deceptive indication by which one of the countries to which this Agreement applies, or a 
place situated therein, is directly or indirectly indicated as being the country or place of origin 
shall be seized on importation into any of the said countries.”458 
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The Madrid Agreement has been viewed as a step further in GI protection when compared to 
the Paris Convention because it provides an indirect definition of “indication of source”,  
protects false and deceptive indication of source, and achieves a higher standard of treatment 
for “regional appellations concerning the source of products of the vine” in relation to generic 
issue.
459
 As has been described, “Madrid Agreement contained a controversial provision that 
prohibited member countries from treating geographical indications of wines as generic 
terms.”460 Thus, it is said that the Madrid Agreement “is of minor importance except for 
certain regional wine appellations.
461” 
 
The Madrid Agreement has not been successful in attracting contracting parties. Only 29 
countries joined the Madrid Agreement by 1990 and 35 by 2010.
462
 The United States is not a 
member of the Madrid Agreement. Simon suggests that the United States’ refusal to 
participate is “indicative of its position that strict protection for industrial property is an 
unnecessary and undesirable restriction on trade name use and would only benefit foreign 
producers.”463 The unwillingness of many countries to accede to the Madrid Agreement is 
owing to two main reasons. First, it is said that one reason for the Madrid Agreement’s lack 
of support may be that many countries do not possess important appellations of localities or 
regions concerning manufactured or agricultural products which need to be protected.
464
 
Another reason for objections of the Madrid Agreement focuses primarily on its treatment of 
generic names. Under the Madrid Agreement each country may decide whether appellations 
have become generic except those for products of the vine.
465
 This may be seen as 
discrimination against other products
466
 and is criticized as only working for French 
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interests.
467
 Some countries are reluctant to give up the power of their courts to determine the 
genericness of geographical indicators.
468
 “In general, if a geographic denomination becomes 
so associated with a product that customers regard it as the name of the product, regardless of 
its true geographic origin, then the term has become the generic name of the product. The 
criteria for such degeneration is public usage. That is, what does the public think the word 
denotes—the generic name of the product or a mark indicating merely one source of that 
product. Under United States law no one may claim exclusive rights to a generic term.” 
Therefore, it is difficult for the United States adherence to Madrid Agreement since “many 
foreign appellations have become generic in the United States for a wide variety of wines.”469 
 
3.3.1.3 Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellation of Origin and 
Their International Registration 1958  
 
The object of the Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellation of Origin and their 
International Registration is to deal with “the special case of appellations of origin as distinct 
from indications of source” because it was felt that “article 10 of the Paris Convention and 
the Madrid Arrangement did not ensure an effective protection of appellations of origin.”470 
This agreement was, again, concluded under the French influence and the protection 
established by this agreement is very similar to the system that had already developed in 
France.
471
 The Lisbon Agreement obliges its signatories “undertake to protect on their 
territories…appellations of origin of products of other countries of the Special Union.”472  
Article 2.1 of the Lisbon Agreement defines “appellation of origin” as “the geographical 
name of a country, region, or locality, which serves to designate a product originating therein, 
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the quality and characteristics of which are due exclusively or essentially to the geographical 
environment, including natural and human factors.”473 
 
It is said that this definition is derived from the French concept of “appellations 
d’origine.”474 The protection for appellation of origin under the Lisbon Agreement has been 
described as “absolute protection” by commentators.475 By virtue of Article 3, parties are 
obliged to protect appellations of origin against “any usurpation or imitation, even if the true 
origin of the product is indicated or if the appellation is used in translated form or 
accompanied by terms such as “kind,” “type,” “make,” “imitation” or the like.”476 And it 
prohibits any geographical indication to be considered generic, so long as the geographical 
indication is protected in the country of origin.
477
 
 
The Lisbon Agreement also establishes a registration system for appellations of origin.
478
 
This international registration, as Ladas has pointed out, would “serve the purpose of giving 
precise information to other countries on the appellation in question and also of defining the 
persons entitled to claim rights in the same.”479 The proposition of registration is that the 
country of origin must recognize and protect the appellation in question. Pursuant to Article 
1(2), in order to qualify for registration at the International Bureau of WIPO, an “appellation 
of origin” must be “recognized” and “protected” in the “country of origin”, that is, “the 
country whose name, or the country in which is situated the region of locality whose name, 
constitutes the appellation of origin that has given the product its reputation.”480 The manner 
in which recognition takes place is determined by the domestic legislation of the country of 
origin.
481
 Once an appellation is protected in its country of origin and registered with the 
WIPO, each member country to the Lisbon Agreement is required to protect that appellation 
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within its own borders—subject to a one year window in which the country “may declare that 
it cannot ensure the protection of an appellation of origin whose registration has been notified 
to it.
482
 
 
The Lisbon Agreement successfully provides a definition of appellation of origin, establishes 
an international registration system, and achieves “absolute protection” for appellations of 
origin for all categories of products. Nonetheless, the Lisbon Agreement has not been an 
attractive treaty. 
483
 Up to 1970, only eight countries, namely, Cuba, France, Haiti, Hungary, 
Italy, Israel, Mexico, and Portugal joined the Lisbon Agreement. The number of contracting 
parties was 27 by early 2011. 
484
 Two main reasons have been used to explain the Lisbon 
Agreement’s unpopularity. First, it is argued that the international protection is granted only 
if the geographical indication is protected in the country of origin “as such”; hence, the 
concept of protection through the law of unfair competition or the law of advertising is not 
recognized. A number of states are not willing to transform their system of protection in order 
to be compatible with the standards of the Lisbon Agreement.
485
 Cotton suggests that since 
“the treaty only applies to the appellations of origin “recognized and protected as such in the 
country of origin”, members may only give notice of those appellations protected by a 
legislative, administrative, or judicial act. This appears to define appellations of origin as 
those created by fiat by the state and controlled by the state—a public right, not a privately 
owned rights.”486 One further reason for the unpopularity of the Lisbon Agreement lies in its 
treatment of the generic issue.
487
 McCarthy and Veronica Devitt accurately stated that: 
 
“The unpopularity of the Lisbon Arrangement…is in no small measure attributable to its 
treatment of genericness. Under the Lisbon Arrangement an appellation of origin cannot be 
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deemed generic by any of the members of the Special Union as long as it is protected in its 
country of origin, which is the country in which the named region or locality is situated.”488  
 
Thus, the United States is not a member again mainly because of the generic issue.
489
  
 
3.3.2 The disagreement and compromise during the Uruguay Round 
Negotiations  
 
In the spring of 1990, the EU tabled a Draft Agreement containing a section dealing with 
“geographical indications including appellations of origin”. 490  The EU Draft provided a 
definition of geographical indications, (which is based on the appellation of origin). 
491
 It also 
laid down a series of “restricted acts”, which were considered by the EU as constituting an 
act of unfair competition, including use which is susceptible to mislead the public as to the 
true origin of the product. More specifically, these acts included “any direct or indirect use in 
trade in respect of products not coming from the place indicated or evoked by the 
geographical indication in question”, “any usurpation, imitation or evocation, even where the 
true origin of the product is indicated or the appellation or designation is used in translation 
or accompanied by expressions such as “kind”, “type”, “style”, “imitation” or the like; and 
“the use of any means in the designation or presentation of the product likely to suggest a link 
between the product and any geographical area other than the true place of origin.”492 
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The EU’s proposal was resisted by some former immigrant countries, like the USA, Australia 
and Canada.
493
 EU’s demand was also opposed by many Latin American countries under the 
concern that as “former colonies of European nations, their businesses would suffer if 
geographic indications linked to past colonial powers were now seen as trademark 
infringement.”494 They claim that protection of geographical indications has to be limited to 
cases where the public is misled, and that generic or semi-generic indications are not capable 
of enjoying protection at all.
495
  Thus, this disagreement does not follow the North-South 
division typical in other topics of intellectual property negotiations.  It is, instead, described 
as “North-North division”496, “New World v. Old World”,497  or “immigrant v. emigrant 
countries”498 
 
The resistance by the New World has it historical and industrial background. While European 
countries developed different specialty cheese over centuries, the United States producers 
acquired knowledge of cheese production from immigrants who brought the production 
processes from their countries of origin. Thus, US-produced cheeses are almost entirely 
derivatives of European originals. Gradually, US consumers have come to recognize the 
names of cheeses which originated in Europe as a type of a product, not a location. Because 
US consumers’ general attitude regarding the substitutability of cheeses as well as the fact 
that the most US produced cheeses are based on traditional European cheeses, the US is 
reluctant to restrict the use of GIs.
499
 
 
                                                          
493
 LA Lindquist, ‘Champagne or Champagne? An Examination of U.S. Failure to Comply with the 
Geographical Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement’ 27 Ga J Int’l & Comp L (1999) 309, 315-6; Stacy D 
Goldberg, ‘Who Will Raise the White Flag? The Battle between the United States and the European Union over 
the Protection of Geographical Indications’ 22 U Pa J Int’l Econ L (2001) 107, 109-110.  
494
 Ross and Wasserman (n 313) 2302-2304. 
495
 Anthony Howard and Jorg Reinbothe, ‘The State of Play in the Negotiations on Trips (GATT/Uruguay 
Round)’ 13 EIPR (1991) 157, 161. 
496
 Conrad (n 451) 29-31 
497
 Murphy (n 401) 1186; Lina Montén, ‘Geographical Indications of Origin: Should They Be Protected and 
Why?—An Analysis of the Issue from the U.S. and EU Perspectives’ 22 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech L 
J (2005-2006) 315, 315; Hughes (n 482) 301-302.  
498
 José Manuel Cortés Martín, ‘TRIPS Agreement: Towards a Better Protection for Geographical Indications?’ 
30 Brook J Int’l L (2004) 117, 127.  
499
 Ivy Doster, ‘A Cheese by Any Other Name: A Palatable Compromise to the Conflict over Geographical 
Indications’ 59 Vand L Rev (2006) 873, 890-891.  
83 
 
Similar development can be found in the wine industry in US, Australia, and New Zealand. 
European settlement in the US goes back to the late 16
th
 century, but it was two centuries 
later that wine was first successfully produced there. The first successful commercial wine 
production in the US began in Indiana around 1806.
500
 In the 1800s, the United States 
experienced a huge influx of immigrants from Europe. Many of these immigrants brought 
their wine-making skills and vine cuttings with them. These growers named the wines they 
produced after the regions from which they came. American wine producers at the end of the 
twentieth century continue to produce wines bearing these designations.
501
 The “Prohibition” 
is generally considered the period in the US, 17 January 1920 to 5 December 1933, during 
which, the “manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors” throughout the 
country was prohibited. The Prohibition had disastrous consequence to US wine industry.
502
 
The Second World War, by cutting off European supplies, brought new prosperity to US 
wine industry. American wines, after “the bad old examples set in the 19th century, continued 
to use generic names such as Burgundy, Chablis, Sherry, and Champagne.”503  In the late 
eighteenth century Australian settlers brought vine cuttings with them. Between 1820 and 
1840 commercial viticulture was progressively established in Australia.
504
 During the 1840s, 
influential colonists encouraged European vintners to migrate to Australia to assist settlers in 
their winemaking efforts. As a result of these migrations, Australian began to use European 
geographical indications as wine types. Some Australian wineries continue to use European 
GIs to identify various domestically produced wines.
505
New Zealand Missionaries were 
responsible for New Zealand’s first grapevines in the early nineteenth century. 506  New 
Zealand also tried to lure European wine makers to establish a wine industry. Many European 
geographical designations appear on wine currently produced in New Zealand as well.
507
  
 
Later, the United States tabled a Draft Agreement also containing a section dealing with the 
protection of “geographical indications including appellation of origin.”508 The US proposal 
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did not define the term geographical indications. It obliges contracting parties to “protect 
geographic indications that certify regional origin by providing for their registration as 
certification or collective marks.” 509  It also mandates the protection for “non-generic 
appellations of origin for wine by prohibiting their use when such use would mislead the 
public as to the true geographic origin of the wine.” 510  As pointed by commentators, 
generally speaking, whereas the EU demanded high level of protection of GIs based on the 
concept of unfair competition, prohibiting even the use of GIs even when accompanied by 
words such as “type” or “style” and the “rollback” of a list of terms used as generic terms in 
other countries, the US proposed a lower level of protection based on misuse and “some type 
of grandfathering for existing terms”511 “Furthermore, the EC proposal placed the burden on 
governments to monitor what might be considered a geographical indication, rather than 
requiring manufacturers to register”512   
 
The final inclusion of GIs in the TRIPS Agreement has been described as “a classic 
compromise.”513 The limited success of EU was as follows (i) the inclusion of GIs as a 
category of IP in the TRIPS Agreement; (ii) a definition of GIs; (iii) the higher level of 
protection for wines and spirits and (iv) the built-in clauses for further negotiations. For the 
US the success was (i) the standard protection for GIs for all goods; (ii) an array of 
exceptions and (iii) room for interpretation and implementation of Articles 22 to 24 indicate 
that “the most on which these parties could agree was that, in principle, GIs should be 
included in a multilateral agreement on intellectual property.” 514 The incoherence in terms of 
level of protection that WTO Members are obliged to provide EC-levels of protection for 
wine and spirit GIs but lower for other GIs and issues were left open for further negotiation 
are viewed as “testament to the deep divisions over how GIs ought to be protected.” 515 
According to Okediji, the EU agreed to compromise because, first, the EU had a 
“responsibility and a stake in ensuring a successful outcome of the TRIPS negotiations” to 
secure other key areas of the TRIPS Agreement common to U.S./EU interests. Secondly, the 
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EU could compromise also because its principal interests in GI protection, that is, wines and 
spirits, had been satisfied.
516
 
 
3.4 GIs under Articles 22 to 24 
 
Articles 22 to 24 can be considered as consisting of five main elements: (i) a definition of GIs; 
(ii) substantive standards of protection for GIs for all goods; (iii) substantive standards of 
protection for GIs for wines and spirits; (iv) an array of exceptions to protection and (v) 
mandate for further negotiations.
517
  
 
The TRIPS Agreement does not specify the legal means to protect GIs. This is left for 
Members to decide.
518
As the TRIPS does not specify the legal means, WTO Members may 
choose to “implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by Agreement, 
provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement.”519 WTO 
Members are also “free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions 
of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice.”520  
 
3.4.1 Subject matter that may be protected by GIs  
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The TRIPS Agreement is the first multilateral treaty dealing with the notion of geographical 
indications as such.
521
 Thus, it is argued that “geographical indications as we think of them 
today are legal constructs of the TRIPS Agreement.”522 Article 22.1 of the TRIPS Agreement 
defines “geographical indications” as “indications which identify a good as originating in the 
territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, 
reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical 
origin.” 523 According to the WTO, examples of such indications include “Champagne”, 
“Tequila” or “Roquefort”524  
 
If the definitions of indication of source, appellation of origin and geographical indication are 
compared with each other, the following can be observed. First, Indication of source is the 
broadest term among the three. The definition of indications of source does not require any 
special quality, characteristic or reputation of the identified product. It only requires that the 
product on which the indication of source is used originate in a certain geographical area. 
Thus, the concept of indications of source comprises geographical indication and appellation 
of origin. Secondly, geographical indications are more broadly defined than appellations of 
origin.  The Lisbon Agreement limits appellations of origin to the criteria of quality and 
characteristics of a product attributable to its geographical origin, whereas the TRIPS 
Agreement also mentions the reputation of the product.
525
  
 
Diagram 1: The relation between the definitions of indications of source, GIs, and 
appellations of origin (based on Addor and Grazioli (2002) 870) 
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The subject matter of GIs is indications. To qualify for protection, the indication in question 
must satisfy two criteria. First, it must be able to “identify a good as originating” in a specific 
geographical area. Second, the good must have “a given quality, reputation or other 
characteristic” which is essentially attributable to it geographical origin.526 Under this good-
place nexus criterion, the protectability of GIs depends not only on the nature of the 
indication but also on the nature of the good identified. This contrasts sharply with 
trademarks. TRIPS Agreement specifically provides that the nature of the goods or services 
to which a trademark is to be applied shall in no case form an obstacle to registration of the 
trademark.
527
 Thus, not all geographical terms or marks are GIs within the meaning of Article 
22.1.
528
 In other words, nations that are parties to TRIPS must ban the use of a geographical 
term or device for a good only when both of the following requirements are satisfied. The 
TRIPS Agreement, however, does not provide any further test for determining when a given 
quality, reputation or other characteristic of a good can be deemed “essentially attributable” 
to its geographical origin.
529
 Nonetheless, it is argued that, to qualify as a GI, the good 
identified must be “inextricably linked to a particular locale” 530  or, there must be “an 
essential land/qualities connection”,531 because “substance of the concept” of GIs is that they 
are “used to demonstrate a link between the origin of the product to which it is applied and a 
given quality, reputation or other characteristic that the product derives from that origin.”532  
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Diagram 2: The structure of GIs as defined under Article 22.1 of the TRIPS Agreement: 
“Indication” is the broadest concept. The scope of “indications which identifies a good as 
originating in a place” is broader that” an indication which identifies a good as originating in 
a place “where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially 
attributable to its geographical origin.”  
 
 
 
The unique structure of GI definition may raise one further problem. Logically speaking, any 
legal measures protecting “indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of 
a Member, or a region or locality in that territory” will, at the same time, cover any a GI that 
meets the further criterion of “where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the 
good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin.” This phenomenon is noticed by 
Heald. According to Heald, the failure of the US Congress to define GIs may in fact work to 
foreign industry because “[w]ithout this restrictive definition in the Lanham Act, the 
argument could be made that any mark containing a word that has a geographic connotation, 
such as “Champagne” or “Scotch,” is unregistrable…when applied to goods coming from 
outside the indicated region.”533  
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3.4.2 Protection afforded    
 
The TRIPS Agreement mandates two levels of protection for GIs. The differential treatment 
was not based on economic or any other form of logic, but rather was the result of historical 
negotiation and specific circumstances that were particular to the wine sector. It had been 
agreed as a significant concession in the Uruguay Round, not because of any belief in its 
inherent merits.
534
 The explanation of this structure is that the baseline protection for GIs 
reflects U.S. trademark justifications, which is the based on the prevention of consumer 
confusion and unfair competition. The additional protection for wines and spirits represents 
the European victory.
535
 However, the TRIPS Agreement does not provide theoretical 
explanation for the higher level of protection for wines and spirits. According to Dudas, the 
Deputy under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property of the United States, the 
higher level of protection for GIs for wine and spirits is demanded by the EC. The United 
States agreed to the European demands for the provisions because the TRIPS Agreement 
includes exceptions which are deemed as sufficient to protect U.S. industries.
536
  
 
3.4.2.1 Protection for GIs for all goods  
 
(1) Acts to be prevented  
 
Article 22.2(a) obliges WTO Members to provide the legal means for interested parties to 
prevent the use of “any means in the designation or presentation of a good that indicates or 
suggests that the good in question originates in a geographical area other than the true place 
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of origin in a manner which misleads the public as to the geographical origin of the good”537 
This provision can be understood as having three requirements: (i) the use of any means in 
the designation or presentation of a good that indicates or suggests that the good in question 
originates in a geographical area; (ii) the good in question does not originate in that 
geographical area; (iii) the public is misled.  
 
Article 22.2(b) obliges WTO Members to provide the legal means for interested parties to 
prevent “any use which constitutes an act of unfair competition within the meaning of 
Article 10bis of the Paris Convention (1967).”538 The “repression of unfair competition” is 
one of the objects protected under the Paris Convention.
539
 Article 10bis of the Paris 
Convention of the Brussels Revision Conference of 1900 established a basic rule concerning 
protection against unfair competition.
540
 The Paris Convention provides in Article 10bis that 
the countries of the Union are bound to assure to persons entitled to benefit from the 
Convention effective protection against unfair competition. The Convention does not specify 
the manner in which such protection should be granted, leaving this to the laws existing in 
each of the member countries.
541
 It is argued that member States are not obliged to introduce 
special legislation to this effect if their existing general legislation—for example, provisions 
of civil law directed against torts or principles of common law—suffices to assure effective 
protection against unfair competition.
542
  
 
Article 10bis essentially consists of a general clause and three specific cases. This structure is 
said to be a compromise between the continental European legal tradition, which preferred 
broad prohibitions based on a general clause, and the British approach that preferred narrowly 
defined cases.
543
 Article 10bis broadly defines unfair competition as any act contrary to 
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honest practices in industrial or commercial matters. The idea behind this definition is that a 
“particular act of competition is to be condemned as unfair because it is inconsistent with 
currently accepted standards of honest practice.”544 However, what is to be understood by 
“competition” is to be determined in each country according to its own concept. If a judicial 
or administrative authority of the country where protection is sought finds that an act 
complained of is contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial matters, it will be 
obliged to hold such act to be an act of unfair competition and to apply the sanctions and 
remedies provided by its national law.
545
 Article 10bis also lists three types of practices 
which shall, in particular, be prohibited. The first is of all acts of such a nature as to create 
confusion by any means whatever with the establishment, the goods, or the industrial or 
commercial activities, of a competitor.
546
 These acts cover not only the use of identical or 
similar marks or names, which could be attacked as an infringement of proprietary rights, but 
also the use of other means which can create confusion. Such could be the form of packages, 
the presentation or style used on products and on their corresponding outlets or points of 
distribution, titles of publicity, etc.
547
 The second is of false allegations in the course of trade 
of such a nature as to discredit the establishment, the goods, or the industrial or commercial 
activities, of a competitor.
548
 It has been left to the domestic legislation or case law of each 
country to decide whether, and in what circumstances, discrediting allegations which are not 
strictly untrue may also be considered acts of unfair competition.
549
 thirdly, indications or 
allegations the use of which in the course of trade is liable to mislead the public as to the 
nature, the manufacturing process, the characteristics, the suitability for their purpose, or the 
quantity, of the goods are banned
550
 This final provision may be distinguished from the 
previous cases to the extent that it is concerned with the interests and well-being of the public 
and is one of the provisions in the Convention that is more directly related to the consumer 
protection role of industrial property.
551
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(2) GIs v. trademark registration  
 
Article 22.3 obliges a WTO Member to refuse or invalidate the registration of a trademark, 
either ex officio or at the request of an interested party, if the trademark in question (i) 
contains or consists of a GI; (ii) the good identified by that trademark does not originate in 
the territory indicated and (iii) the use of the indication in the trademark for such goods in 
that Member misleads the public as to the true place of origin.
552
  
 
Thus, the fact that a trademark contains or consists of a GI per se is insufficient for the 
refusal or invalidation of its registration. What is outlawed under Article 22.3 is the 
registration of a false geographical indication which misleads the public as to the true place 
of origin.
553
 A US food company, Pepperidge Farms, for example, registered a line of cookies 
named after European place names, such as, BORDEAUX® , GENEVA® , MILANO® , 
VERONA® , BRUSSELS® , etc.
554
 Registration of such names may not violate Article 22.3 
on the ground that they do not mislead American consumers as to the true place of origin of 
these cookies.
555
 Under United States law, a false geographic designation can be registered as 
a trademark if it is deemed to be “arbitrary.” An arbitrary mark is one that does not lead to a 
false “goods-place” association on the part of the public, or in other words, does not lead the 
public into believing that the goods originate in the place named. For example, 
NANTUCKET might be arbitrary as applied to certain men’s clothing, though not as applied 
to sailboats.
556
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(3) Homonymous names  
  
The Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines the word ‘homonym’ as ‘each of two or more words 
having the same written form but of different meaning and origin’.557And ‘homonymous’ is 
defined as ‘employing the same name for different things, equivocal, ambiguous’; ‘having the 
same name’; or ‘having the written or spoken form but differing in meaning and origin.’558 
“The protection under paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall be applicable against a geographical 
indication which, although literally true as to the territory, region or locality in which the 
goods originate, falsely represents to the public that the goods originate in another 
territory.”559 It is said that the purpose of this provision is to regulate the homonymous use of 
GIs.
560
 Homonymous indications refer to the situation where “two geographical names which 
are spelled and pronounced alike, but which designate the geographical origin of products 
stemming from different countries.”561 An example of such geographical indications is “Rioja” 
wine produced in both Argentina and Spain.
562
 Gervais further explains the cause of such a 
phenomenon: “...a phenomenon known as homonymous indications. This may happen in the 
case of former colonies, for example: if French nationals emigrated to another country and 
founded a village or town, they may have given it the name of their village or region of origin, 
which may be famous for a special kind of cheese. In such a case, the “second” village 
produced cheese under its name it could (depending on circumstances of each case, of course) 
false represent the origin of the cheese in minds of the average consumer, especially in 
international trade, thereby free-riding on the reputation acquired by the first users of the 
indication.”563 
 
3.4.2.2 Additional protection for GIs for wines and spirits 
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Additional level of protection for GIs for wines and spirits is laid down in Article 23 of the 
TRIPS Agreement. Protection provided under Article 23 applies only to and between 
geographical indications for wines and spirits. Thus, the scope of additional protection is 
limited to the use of geographical indication for other wines and spirits.
564
 The main feature 
of Article 23, which is also the reason why it is regarded as conferring stronger protection, is 
that it eliminates any requirement of likelihood of confusion or being misled.
565
 Again, no 
specific legal mechanism or measure is mandated by the TRIPS Agreement. Members are 
only required to provide “legal means for interested parties” to prevent certain types of acts.  
 
(1) Acts to be prevented  
 
Article 23.1 obliges WTO Members to provide the legal means for interested parties to 
prevent a GI for wines or spirit drinks being used to identify wines or spirit drinks “not 
originating in the place indicated by the geographical indication in question”. The protection 
provided by Article 23.1 is extended to the situation “even where the true origin of the goods 
is indicated or the geographical indication is used in translation or accompanied by 
expressions such as “kind”, “type”, “style”, “imitation” or the like.”566 In other words, Article 
23.1 simply outlaws any incorrect use of GIs, even if the indication would not be misleading 
or unfair.
567
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The TRIPS Agreement mandates WTO Members to make available to right holders, 
including federations and associations having legal standing to assert such rights,
568
 civil 
judicial procedures concerning the enforcement of any intellectual property right covered by 
this Agreement.
569
 It is noteworthy that the enforcement procedures concerning the higher 
level of protection for GIs for wines and spirits as laid down in Article 23.1 constitute 
derogation from Article 42. That is, with respect to the obligation under Article 23.1, WTO 
Members may simply provide for enforcement by administration.
570
 
 
There are two main differences between the basic level of protection provided in Article 22 
and the higher level of protection provided in Article 23. First, whereas the basic protection 
under Article 22.2 is based on misleading the public or unfair competition, the higher level of 
protection provided in Article 23 is based simply on the fact that the use of GI is incorrect 
and “there is no need here to show that the public might be misled or that the use constitutes 
an act of unfair competition.” 571  Secondly, the scope of protection under Article 23 is 
extended to the situation where the true origin of the goods is indicated or the geographical 
indication is used in translation or accompanied by expressions such as “kind”, “type”, 
“style”, “imitation” or the like.572 Thus, whereas it is unlawful to use designations such as 
“sparkling wine in the style of champagne, produced in Chile” or “Napa Valley Wine of 
France”, it may be permissible to use “Roquefort cheese, produced in Norway” or “Bukhara 
carpets, made in U.S.A.” In the latter cases, a judge would probably consider that these 
designations do not mislead the public, since the true origin of the product is actually 
indicated.”573 Consequently, protection of geographically significant foodstuffs thus requires 
that producers meet a burden of proof not required of producers of geographically-significant 
wines and spirits.”574 
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(2) GIs v. trademark registration   
 
Article 23.2 obliges WTO Members to refuse or invalidate the registration of a trademark, 
either ex officio or at the request of an interested party, if (i) the trademark in question is for 
wines or spirits; (ii) the trademark in question contains or consists of a geographical 
indication identifying wines or spirits and (iii) the trademark in question is used to identify 
wines or spirits not having this origin.
575
  
 
(3) Homonymous names  
 
Homonymous use of GIs for wines and spirits is dealt with in Article 23.3. In the case of 
homonymous geographical indications for wines, protection shall be accorded to each 
indication, subject to the provisions of paragraph 4 of Article 22. Each Member shall 
determine the practical conditions under which the homonymous indications in question will 
be differentiated from each other, taking into account the need to ensure equitable treatment 
of the producers concerned and that consumers are not misled.
576
 
 
3.4.3 Exceptions to protection  
 
Article 24.4 to 9 provides a series of exceptions to GI protection:  
 
(i) The Grandfather Clause. Under Article 24.4, a WTO Member is not obliged to prevent its 
nationals or domiciliaries from using another Member’s GIs for wines or for spirit drinks to 
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identify their own goods or services as long as such use is in a continuous manner with regard 
to the same or related goods or services in the territory of that Member and for at least 10 
years preceding 15 April 1994 or in good faith preceding that date.
577
 This clause is referred 
to as a “grandfathering clause”,578 which can generally be understood as a “statutory or 
regulatory clause that exempts a class of persons or transactions because of circumstances 
existing before the new rule or regulation takes effect.”579 It aims to provide “safeguard” to 
protect prior users.
580
 Cordray notes that the insertion of such grandfathering rights are most 
likely a compromise between the French wineries, claiming IPRs in geographic regions, e.g., 
burgundy wine, and the U.S. wineries using French geographical indications, such as 
burgundy, to identify their wines.
581
 
 
(ii) Good Faith Exception for Trademarks: Article 24.5 states that the eligibility for or the 
validity of the registration of a trademark is not affected on the basis that such a trademark is 
identical with, or similar to, a GI where the trademark has been applied for or registered in 
good faith, or rights to the trademark have been acquired through use in good faith either 
before the date of application of these provisions in that Member as defined in Part VI or 
before the geographical indication is protected in its country of origin.
582
 The good faith 
exception, as argued by Lindquist, may, however, be easily eliminated because under normal 
circumstance “no vintner could argue that he did not realize Burgundy, France was a region 
known for its wines.” 583    
 
(iii) Generic Exception. Pursuant to Article 24.6, WTO Members have no obligation to 
protect a GI of another country if that GI in question “is identical with the term customary in 
common language as the common name for such goods or services in the territory of that 
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Member.” 584  It is commented that this provision provides a general exception for 
geographical terms that have become generic in a WTO member.
585
 The limitation on generic 
words allows Argentine vintners to continue to make “Champagne” sparkling wine and South 
African farmers to continue to see “Camembert” cheese.586 
 
(iv) Grape Variety Names Exception. The second sentence of Article 24.6 exempts WTO 
Members from protecting “a geographical indication of any other Member with respect to 
products of the vine for which the relevant indication is identical with the customary name of 
a grape variety existing in the territory of that Member as of the date of entry into force of the 
WTO Agreement.”587 
 
(v) Five-Year Time Limit. Article 24.7 allows WTO Members to set a five-year time limit 
within which the right to invalidate or refuse registration of a trademark contains or consists 
of a GI must be exercised. It has been observed that Article 24.7 “is directed at negotiating 
the very complex trademark-GI relationship” and “aims at providing a degree of legal 
security to trademark holders”.588  
 
(vi) Own Name Exception. It is recognized as an exception to GI protection that any person 
has right “to use, in the course of trade, that person’s name or the name of that person’s 
predecessor in business, except where such name is used in such a manner as to mislead the 
public.”589 
 
(vii) Dependency Exception. There is no obligation to protect “geographical indications 
which are not or cease to be protected in their country of origin, or which have fallen into 
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disuse in that country.” 590  It is commented that this provision establishes a form of 
“dependency”. 591  According to Correas, “there would be no reason to protect a foreign 
geographical indication if it is not recognized in the country where it originates, or where it is 
not actually used in trade.”592 One possible consequence of this dependency exception is that 
an indication destined exclusively for export markets may not have to be protected under 
TRIPS.
593
 Addor and Grazioli argue that under the dependency exception, actions at national 
level are needed to take advantage of GI protection. It is crucial that WTO Members are 
aware of the key role that the establishment of a national system of protection for their own 
GIs plays, in order to be sure that their GIs are recognized and protected internationally under 
the TRIPS Agreement.
594
  
 
When compared with exceptions to trademarks, these exceptions are highly technical and 
detailed. Article 17 of TRIPS Agreement provides that WTO Members may provide limited 
exceptions to the rights conferred by a trademark, such as fair use of descriptive terms. Such 
exceptions must take account of the legitimate interests of the owner of the trademark and of 
third parties.
595
 The long list of exceptions to GI protection is a compromise in exchange of 
the higher level of protection for wine GIs.
596
Article 24 provides an array of exceptions, 
which “simultaneously freezes the protection available under Article 22 and 23 at whatever 
level it existed on the eve of the Marrakesh signing.” 597The array of exceptions to GI 
protection are the result of difficult negotiation between those participants, including in 
Western Europe, that wished to protect indications for wines and spirits fully, i.e. without 
legitimising “past sins”, and others that were afraid it might affect rights more or less 
considered to be acquired rights in certain appellations.
 598
 In Lehman’s words, these 
exceptions represent a compromise between “the strong French interest in appellations such 
as Champagne, Burgundy, and Chablis” and “U.S. labelling practices.”599 In other words, 
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these exceptions are the conditions Dudas, the Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce for 
Intellectual Property of the United States, states that the higher level of protection for GIs for 
wine and spirits is demanded by the EC. The United States agreed to the European demands 
for the provisions because the TRIPS Agreement includes exceptions which are deemed as 
sufficient to protect U.S. industries.
600
 
 
3.4.4 Mandates for further negotiations  
 
The status quo of GI protection under the TRIPS Agreement does not satisfy the EU. The 
TRIPS Agreement contains built-in mandates calling for continued discussion of 
geographical indications in three separate provisions: Article 23(4), Article 24(1), and Article 
24(2). This contrast sharply with the TRIPS provisions on copyrights and patents, which were 
written as complete and final.” 601  In order to facilitate the protection of geographical 
indications for wines, negotiations shall be undertaken in the Council for TRIPS concerning 
the establishment of a multilateral system of notification and registration of geographical 
indications for wines eligible for protection in those Members participating in the system.
602
 
The mandate of further negotiations was expanded under the Doha mandate. Two issues are 
currently debated under the Doha mandate, namely, the creation of a multilateral register for 
GIs for wines and spirits and the extension of the higher level of protection beyond wines and 
spirits. Both issues are related to the enhancement of GI protection.
603
 
 
Article 24.1 provides that “Members agree to enter into negotiations aimed at increasing the 
protection of individual geographical indications under Article 23. The provisions of 
paragraphs 4 through 8 below shall not be used by a Member to refuse to conduct 
negotiations or to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements. In the context of such 
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negotiations, Members shall be willing to consider the continued applicability of these 
provisions to individual geographical indications whose use was the subject of such 
negotiations.” By virtue of Article 24.1, the array of exceptions under Article 24 cannot be 
used as reasons to impede further negotiations or conclusion of bilateral or multilateral 
agreements. One commentator claims that this provision reflects the “French hope to reclaim 
key viticultural words.” 604  The other commentator describes Article 24.1 as a necessary 
compromise because the “only possible outcome not blocking the negotiation was thus to 
agree to further talks.”605 
 
The Doha Declaration set a mandate for the negotiation of a multilateral system of 
notification and registration for geographical indications for wines and spirits and the 
extension of the higher level of protection currently given to wines and spirits under Article 
23 to all goods.
606
 It was decided that the deadline for completing the negotiations was the 
Fifth Ministerial Conference to be held in Cancύn in 2003.607 The EU was the first to make to 
proposal for the establishment of a multilateral system of notification and registration of GIs 
for wines.
608
 The key issue of the debate was the legal effect of registration.
609
 Opinions were 
strongly held on both sides of the debate, with some highly detailed arguments presented by 
each side. 
 
In 2005, the EU submitted a proposal advocating for the establishment of a binding 
multilateral register.
610
 Under EU’s proposal, the register should be open to all products 
rather than limited to wines and spirits.
611
 Successful registration of GIs will produce three 
legal effects. First, WTO Members must provide the legal means for interested parties to use 
the registration of the geographical indication as a rebuttable presumption of the eligibility 
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for protection of that geographical indication. Secondly, WTO Members cannot refuse 
protection of the registered GI on the following three grounds: (1) it does not meet the 
definition of GI as set out in Article 22.1; (2) it although literally true as to the territory, 
region or locality in which the goods identified by it originate, falsely represents to the public 
that the goods originate in its territory, as provided for in paragraph 4 of Article 22 of the 
TRIPS Agreement; and (3) it is identical with the term customary in common language as the 
common name for a wine or spirit in the territory of the Member lodging the reservation ("the 
challenging Member") or, with respect to products of the vine, with the customary name of a 
grape variety existing in the territory of the challenging Member as of the date of entry into 
force of the WTO Agreement, or,  with respect to plants or animals, with the name of a plant 
variety or animal breed existing in the territory of that Member as of the date of entry into 
force of the WTO Agreement as amended, as provided for in paragraph 6 of Article 24 of the 
TRIPS Agreement.
612
 Thirdly, WTO Members are obliged to notify the administering body in 
charge of the multilateral register of any applications for trademark registration that contain 
or consist of a geographical indication that has been registered or applied for, if the notifying 
participating Member has required so.
613
 
 
A group of countries including Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay, South Africa, the United States, and Taiwan, submitted a “joint 
proposal” in 2005, which was later revised in 2008.614 Under this proposal, the multilateral 
system for the notification and registration is open only to GIs for wines and spirits and the 
participation of which is “strictly voluntary.”615  This multilateral register will serve as a 
searchable on-line, free of charge “Database of Geographical Indications for Wines and 
Spirits” accessible to the public. 616  Members participating in the system would have to 
consult the Database when making decisions regarding registration and protection of 
trademarks and geographical indications for wines and spirits in accordance with its domestic 
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law. Members who choose not to participate are encouraged, but are not obliged, to consult 
the Database in making decisions under their domestic law involving registration or 
protection of trademarks and geographical indications for wines and spirits.
617
 
 
The issue of GI-extension concerns whether to expand the higher level of protection under 
Article 23 to other goods.
618
 This is a “forward-looking initiative” that seeks to establish an 
adequate framework of protection for GIs not yet considered as generic or registered as 
trademarks.
619
  The EU is not the only advocate of the GI-extension. Bulgaria, Guinea, India, 
Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, Pakistan, Romania, Sri Lanka, 
Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia and Turkey also support the GI-extension.
620
 It is contended 
that GI protection under Article 22 is insufficient and the imbalance between Article 22 and 
Article 23 should be eliminated by extending the protection accorded to wines and spirits to 
all goods.
621
 In a nutshell, the obligation to provide the legal means to interested parties to 
prevent certain types of imitations (Article 23.1), as well as the obligation to refuse or 
invalidate trademarks including geographical indications (Article 23.2) are extended to any 
situation in which the trademark or the imitation concerns a product of the same kind as the 
one protected by the geographical indication.  In addition, the provision on homonyms 
(Article 23.3) would also apply to geographical indications on all products.
622
  
 
Countries opposing the GI-extension include Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, New Zealand, Panama, 
Paraguay, the Philippines, Taiwan, and the United States.
623
 They argue that the existing 
(Article 22) level of protection is adequate. They caution that providing enhanced protection 
would be a burden and would disrupt existing legitimate marketing practices. They also reject 
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the “usurping” accusation particularly when migrants have taken the methods of making the 
products and the names with them to their new homes and have been using them in good faith. 
The differential treatment was not based on economic or any other form of logic, but rather 
was the result of historical negotiation and specific circumstances that we particular to the 
wine sector. It had been agreed as a significant concession in the Uruguay Round, not 
because of any belief in its inherent merits.
624
 
 
It is observed that countries which are against the establishment of a binding multilateral 
registration system for wines and spirits are almost the same ones opposing the higher level 
of protection for all goods. Countries supporting extension of the higher level of protection 
are more all less the same ones favouring a binding multilateral registration system.
625
 
 
3.5 Claw-back of names in the agricultural negotiations 
 
Under the WTO framework, the GI issue is not limited to the TRIPS Agreement. In a 2003 
press release, the EU declared a list of 41 EU regional quality products whose names the EU 
wants to recuperate. According to the EU, this list contains well established European quality 
products whose names are being abused today. This list is not proposed under the TRIPS 
context but in the agricultural negotiations within the Doha Development Agenda.
626
 
Included in this list are 22 names for wines and spirits, such as BORDEAUX, CHABLIS, 
CHAMPAGNE, AND COGNAC and 19 names for other food products, such as FETA, 
PROSCIUTTO DI PARMA, and ROQUEFORT.
627
 The list was presented to the WTO 
during the Fifth Ministerial Meeting in Cancún, Mexico in September 2003. The EU 
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requested that 41 product terms be protected by WTO members.
628
 The motivation behind 
EU’s request is to ensure market access for EU GI agriculture products by asking WTO 
members to remove prior trademarks and, if necessary, grant protection for EU GIs that were 
previously used or have become generic.
629
  
 
EU’s proposal is rejected under the reason that by requesting claw-back, the EU actually 
“sought to go back in time and prohibit the use of certain terms, some of which had become 
generic in nature or had been trademarked, by requiring WTO Members to give up their 
rights to use the exceptions contained in Article 24 of TRIPS Agreement” and therefore 
constituted immediate forfeiture of the exceptions set out in the TRIPS Agreement.
630
 It is 
further alleged that EU’s proposal constitutes a de facto subsidy to EU producers. According 
to Dudas, it appears that the EU is asking the US Government, producers, and consumers to 
subsidize EU producers through the “claw back” of generic terms so that EU producers can 
charge monopoly prices for their products. He sees no basis for US producers, trademark 
owners, and consumers to be asked to stop the use of generic terms.
631
 
 
3.6 Conclusion  
 
The TRIPS Agreement is an integral part of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). As one of the multilateral trade agreements, it is binding on all 
members and hence is also a condition of membership for countries which have not yet 
joined the WTO. The TRIPS Agreement marks the beginning of the global IP epoch. Since 
the outset, the GI has been an anomaly of the TRIPS Agreement.  At the negotiating stage, it 
does not follow the North-South disagreement typical in other topics of IP negotiations. It is, 
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instead, characterized as North-North division, New World v. Old World, or immigrant v. 
emigrant countries. It is also an issue for continuing negotiations, In sharp contrast with the 
TRIPS provisions on other categories of IP, which were written as complete and final, the GI 
negotiation is unfinished and the TRIPS Agreement mandates for continuing negotiations. 
Articles 22 to 24 of the TRIPS Agreement are devoted to deal with geographical indications. 
The provisions are a strategic compromise and are characterized by illogicality, inconsistency, 
and inconclusiveness. The TRIPS Agreement mandates two levels of protection for GIs. The 
differential treatment was not based on economic or any other of logic, but rather a strategic 
compromise between the EU and the US. The standard protection for GIs for goods reflects 
the US trademark justifications, which is based on the prevention of consumer confusion and 
unfair competition. The additional protection for wines and spirit drinks represents the 
victory of EU. However, the policy rationale behind this level of protection is not explicitly 
expressed in the TRIPS Agreement. Under the WTO framework, the GI issue is not limited to 
the TRIPS Agreement. It is also an issue for agricultural negotiations.  
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Chapter 4 The US Trademark Paradigm 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
Although the TRIPS Agreement recognizes GIs as a separate category of IP, this is not the 
case in the US law. It is claimed that the concept of GIs as a separate category of IP “has 
been viewed by many commentators as historically alien to U.S. jurisprudence.”632 The term 
“geographical indication” is not defined in any federal statute or regulation, including the 
Lanham Act, which codifies the federal trademark law.
633
 Under the US law, “geographical 
indications” is understood as an interchangeable term for geographical designations and, 
therefore, the scope of GI law is not limited to trademark law. It is claimed that the United 
States protects GIs through a number of regimes
634
 deriving from “a collection of unrelated 
laws and regulations.”635 However, there is no consensus on the exact components of the US 
GI law. In its 1998 communication to the Council for TRIPS, the US government stated that 
the US provides protection for GIs in a variety of ways, including by unfair competition law, 
by federal and state statute, and by regulation.
636
 Commentators specifically refer to as GI-
protecting measures some state statutes restricting the use of specific geographical 
designations associated with local specialty products
637
 and federal marketing orders.
638
 
Three points will be made clear in this Chapter: (i) there is an inherent incompatibility 
between the concepts of trademarks and GIs; (ii) certification marks and collective 
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trademarks better accommodate GIs, as the origin of these two categories of marks in US 
were both connected to the issue of protecting geographical designations. However, being 
subject to the general principle of trademark law, the protection for GIs that these two 
categories of marks can provide is rather weak and uncertain; and (iii) administrative 
schemes regulating product labeling and advertising are also relevant to GI protection. These 
regulations serve diverse policy goals, ranging from consumer protection, domestic producer 
protection, to facilitate the development of specific industry.     
 
4.2 GI protection under trademark law  
 
The United States trademark law is a mix of federal and state statutory and common law.
639
 
Federal trademark law is codified in the Lanham Act, also referred to as the Trademark Act 
of 1946.
640
 The Congress derives its power to enact trademark legislation from the Commerce 
Clause of the Constitution.
641
 Because federal trademark law is based on the Commerce 
Clause, federal rights in a mark exist only when the mark is used in interstate commerce. 
State trademark law, which is nearly identical to federal law, applies to intrastate 
commerce.
642
 The Lanham Act alone is not sufficient for the purposes of proper 
understanding of US trademark law because the federal statutory law does relatively little 
conceptual work in defining the nature and scope of trademark rights. Many of the 
foundational concepts of trademark law were developed by courts before the Lanham Act 
was enacted, and Congress intended the Lanham Act to codify much of the earlier common 
law. Consequently, early trademark decisions have continuing relevance, even in cases 
involving registered trademarks, and whether those cases were decided as a matter of 
statutory or common law.
643
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When the term “mark” is used in the Lanham Act, it includes any trademark, service mark, 
collective mark, or certification mark.
644
 These four categories of marks are defined 
differently under the Lanham Act.
645
 The term “trademark” may be used in different sense in 
different contexts. In its narrowest sense, “trademark” is used to designate words or symbols 
used to identify and distinguish goods, as opposed to other categories of marks.
646
 The term is 
often used to refer to both trademarks and service marks. The latter is “the same as a 
trademark, except that it identifies and distinguishes the source of a service rather than 
goods.”647  In its broad sense, trademark or trademark law is an expansive term used to 
indicate the whole field of protection of all forms of indication of origin, including marks 
used on goods, service marks, collective marks, trade names, and trade dress. Usually this is 
the meaning intended when one sees phrases like, “the principles of trademark protection” or 
“slogan can be protected as trademarks.” 648 The Lanham Act governs the registration and 
protection of trademarks, service marks, collective marks and certification marks, prohibits 
the infringement of most types of unregistered marks and prohibits false advertising and 
product disparagement.
649
 Service marks, collective marks, and certification marks are, by 
and large, registrable “in the same manner and with the same effect as are trademarks” and 
“when registered they shall be entitled to the protection provided…in the case of 
trademarks.” 650  However, federal registration is not a necessary condition for the 
establishment of trademark rights at the federal level since one can “establish rights in a mark 
based on legitimate use of the mark.”651 Nevertheless, federal registration on the Principal 
Register
652
 provides certain advantages, including (i) Constructive notice to the public of the 
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registrant's claim of ownership of the mark; (ii) A legal presumption of the registrant's 
ownership of the mark and the registrant's exclusive right to use the mark nationwide on or in 
connection with the goods/services listed in the registration; (iii) The ability to bring an 
action concerning the mark in federal court; (iv) The use of the U.S registration as a basis to 
obtain registration in foreign countries; (v) The ability to file the U.S. registration with the 
U.S. Customs Service to prevent importation of infringing foreign goods. Other advantages 
may include Federal registration initially provides prima facie evidence of validity. (vi) After 
five years of continuous registration and use, federal registration provides conclusive 
evidence of validity, and (vii) the right to use the mark ® .
653
 
 
The USPTO and some commentators view GIs as a subset of trademarks, which are protected 
under the existing trademark system.
654
 From their point of view, like trademarks, GIs are 
source-identifiers, indicators of quality, and business interests.
655
 But, sometimes, the USPTO 
seems to equate GIs with geographical designations, that is, terms capable of identifying 
geographical places.
656
 The US trademark law provides protection for four distinct categories 
of marks, namely, trademarks, service marks, certification marks, and collective marks. It is 
asserted that all these four categories can be used to protect GIs.
657
 USPTO claims that the 
United States, by subsuming geographical indications under the existing trademark law, 
provides “TRIPS-plus levels of protection to GIs, of either domestic or foreign origin.”658  
 
4.2.1 Trademarks  
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4.2.1.1 What are trademarks?  
 
The Lanham Act defines “trademark” as any word, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination used by a person, or which a person has a bona fide intention to use in 
commerce and applies to register on the principal register established by this chapter, to 
identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those 
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is 
unknown.
659
 
 
4.2.1.2 Validity of marks  
 
The established doctrine under U.S. trademark law is that all signs used as trademarks are 
initially categorized for their validity as being inherently distinctive or non-inherently 
distinctive.
660
 The universal requirement for a sign to be protected as trademark is that it must 
be distinctive.
661
 Marks are broadly classified as distinctive, descriptive, and generic. 
Distinctiveness can be inherent or acquired. Descriptive marks can be protected if they 
“become distinctive” (e.g., “Park ‘N Fly” long-term parking lot service near airport). On the 
other hand, generic marks (e.g., “Shredded Wheat” breakfast cereal)—the common name for 
a class of products or services—are never considered worthy of trademark protection.662 The 
U.S. court developed a “spectrum of distinctiveness” known as “the Abercrombie Test.”663 
Under this test, marks can be categorized as (i) generic names; (ii) descriptive marks; (iii) 
suggestive marks; and (iv) arbitrary or fanciful marks. Marks in categories (iii) and (iv) are 
inherently distinctive and can be protected as trademarks. Marks in category (ii) are non-
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inherently distinctive, which can only be protected as trademark if they acquire 
distinctiveness through the acquisition of secondary meaning.
664
  
 
(1) Distinctiveness  
 
In the trademark sense, “distinctive” traditionally has meant the ability of a mark to 
distinguish the user’s goods or services from those offered by others. 665The term ‘distinctive’ 
is a key term of art in trademark law.”666 Distinctiveness is the “primary prerequisite to 
trademark protection”667  and “is the heart of trademark law much like originality is for 
copyright and novelty and nonobviousness are for  patent.”668 The concept of distinctiveness 
is expressly embodied in the definition of trademark contained in the Lanham Act.
669
 The 
Lanham Act, however, does not define the term “distinctive”.670 Prior to the enactment of the 
Lanham Act, the Supreme expounded the minimal requirement for the distinctiveness of a 
trademark as to consist in the awareness of a sufficient number of customers that “a single 
thing is coming from a single source,” whether such customers know the name of the source 
or not.
671
 The essence of this exposition, according to Martin, is that the public takes the 
trade-mark to mean a single source or origin even if it neither knows nor cares to know the 
name of the manufacturer.”672 In the economic parlance, lack of distinctiveness would “make 
the mark incapable of identifying the good and recalling to a consumer the information 
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(generated by previous experience with the good by him or other consumers) that lowers his 
search costs and enables the producer to charge a higher price.”673 
 
Distinctiveness can be either inherent or acquired through secondary meaning.
674
 Inherent 
distinctiveness operates as a legal presumption that the mark in question “will operate to 
identify the source of the product and distinguish it from others.” Thus, no further empirical 
proof of actual source-identification or consumer association is, or can be, demanded of 
inherently distinctive marks.
 675
 A mark which is not inherently distinctive may acquire 
distinctiveness through secondary meaning. Secondary meaning exists only if a significant 
number of prospective purchasers understand the term, when used in connection with a 
particular kind of good, service, or business, not merely in its lexicographic sense, but also as 
an indication of association with a particular, even if anonymous, entity. The secondary 
meaning inquiry focuses on evidence of actual consumer association. Secondary meaning 
takes time to develop. Even if it is inferred circumstantially, proof of secondary meaning 
must await the development of the evidence from which it can be inferred, and thus 
protection is not available upon first use.
676
 The distinctiveness of a mark cannot be 
determined by the nature of the term alone. Considerations must be made to the category to 
which the underlying good belongs and consumers’ perception about the combination of the 
mark. When the mark in question is a geographical mark, the relation between the good and 
the geographical area indicated by the mark needs to be considered. 
 
 (2) Descriptiveness  
 
A descriptive mark is “a word, name, or symbol used to indicate a brand of product or service 
that also describes the qualities or characteristics of the product or service sold under that 
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mark.”677 The general rule is that descriptive marks cannot be protected as trademarks unless 
they evidence acquired distinctiveness, which is shown through proof of secondary 
meaning.
678
 It is argued that the First Amendment of the US Constitution, which provides that 
“Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech or the press”,679 does not 
allow the government to grant and enforce exclusive rights in descriptive marks.” because 
descriptive terms “inherently provide information regarding product sold under the mark.” 680 
The economic incentive for business operators to choose descriptive marks is that they are 
able to convey additional information about the attributes the good and thus function as a 
partial substitute for advertising.
681
 However, allowing the exclusive use of descriptive terms 
will be unfair to competitors. If one producer is allows to appropriate exclusively the word 
that describes a key attribute which interests the consumer, he will obtain rents measured by 
the higher price the receives for his product because “he will have made it more costly for his 
rivals to inform their customers of the attributes of their brands without using the descriptive 
word.”682  
 
Descriptive terms may be protected as trademark if they acquire distinctiveness through the 
acquisition of secondary meaning. This may happen when the descriptive term in question 
has been used exclusively over a period of time by the producer of one brand. The descriptive 
meaning of that term may be largely forgotten and the term may come to signify to most 
people the name of that particular brand. This is a natural progression. Once this happen, 
allowing the term to be appropriated as a trademark may create net social benefits by 
reducing search costs more than it raises the costs to competitors, who are no longer to use 
the same term.
683
 Giving trademark protection to non-distinctive signs would be harmful 
because this would be likely to prevent others from using identifiers that they require in order 
to be able to compete effectively.
684
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(3) Genericness  
 
A sign is generic when it defines a category or type to which the goods belong. Examples of 
generic terms are “furniture”, “chair”, “drink”, “coffee”, and “instant coffee”, etc.685 A term 
can be classified as generic in two different ways. First, a term is generic if the public 
commonly used the term to refer a class of products. Second, a distinctive term can become 
generic through common use if the public begins to use that term to refer to a class of 
products rather than to a particular brand of that product, a phenomenon known as 
“genericide”. 686 Famous cases of genericide include Kleenex and Aspirin. In all these cases, 
courts found that, within the relevant community, the word no longer identified a unique 
source.
687
 There are two widely accepted tests of genericness. One is based upon public 
understanding of the primary significance of a trademarked word. The other is the availability 
of alternative product names.
688
 However, it is possible to reclaim trademarks that fell into 
the public domain through investment and efforts.
689
 In 1896, the U.S. Supreme Court found 
the trademark SINGER generic for sewing machines.
690
 In 1953, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeal held that the Singer Manufacturing Company had reclaimed the mark SINGER 
through extensive and continuous use and varied advertising.
691
 Courts and scholars generally 
agree that granting exclusive rights over generic terms would inhibit free expression in the 
marketplace and harm competition and consumers’ interests. Thus, the general trademark 
doctrine under which a generic term cannot be trademarked and protection immediately 
ceases if a trademark becomes generic, functions as a safeguard to maintain fair competition 
in the market place and to protect consumer interests.
 692
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Trademarked generic terms may raise significant problems to competitors. When one firm 
controls a trademarked generic word exclusively, that firm’s competitors often face artificial 
marketing problems that affect both their market share and their ability to compete. This is 
because competitors who cannot legally designate their products by the term that most 
consumers call them must develop other strategies to overcome this impediment and to 
convince consumers that these competing brands are also the “real thing”.693 Thus, if the 
producer of one brand could appropriate the name of the product, he would earn rents 
because of the added cost to his rivals of describing their products.
694
 Therefore generic terms 
should remain part of the public domain; allowing the exclusive appropriation of a generic 
word would be unfair to competitors. It would be unfair to unduly restrict a competitor from 
use these words.
695
 Such unfair competitive advantage resulting from the exclusive use of a 
generic term is sometimes regarded as having monopolistic effects. According to the US 
Supreme Court, allowing such exclusive appropriation “would result in mischievous 
monopolies”, “would greatly embarrass trade” and, would “secure exclusive rights to 
individuals in that which is the common right of many.”696 It was opined in that “recognition 
of property in the common name of an article could be tantamount to granting a monopoly in 
that commodity.”697 The monopoly resulting from the appropriation of a generic name would 
be described as a product monopoly but is more accurately a language monopoly.
698
 A single 
business, thus, should not have a monopoly on the use of common words that consumers use 
to refer generally to a product. A business with an exclusive right to use a generic term as a 
trademark has an unfair advantage if competitors cannot use the same term to communicate 
their own products.
699
 The genericness doctrine in trademark law plays an important role in 
preventing “anticompetive misuse of trademarks.” and in maintaining fair competition in the 
market place. If a generic term could be trademarked, competitors would encounter enormous 
“difficulty informing consumers that they were competitors, because they would be unable, 
without elaborate and possibly confusing paraphrase, to give the name of the product they 
were selling.”700 Nguyen, thus, argues that a generic term should not be exclusively used 
even if it has accumulated goodwill, sharing such goodwill of the generic name “is the 
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exercise of a right possessed by all—and in the free exercise of which the consuming public 
is deeply interested.”701 It is held by the U.S. Supreme Court that every member of the public 
“was, and remained, free to call the product by its generic name.”702 For example, it is held 
that “You Have Mail” is generic and that AOL may not exclude others from using the same 
words in connection with their email service.
703
  
 
Trademarked generic words can also raise significant problems for consumers.
704
 According 
to Folsom and Teply, generic terms can be “hybrids,” that is, “they can be perform a variety 
of informational functions—ranging from the provision of pure commercial or source-related 
information to the provision of pure generic or product-category information—at the same 
time.”705 Folsom and Teply further distinguish two situations. First, a trademarked generic 
word can be discontinuously hybrids. In this situation, for some consumers, the trademarked 
word will denominate only the product’s genus and will carry no source significance. But for 
other consumers, the discontinuously hybrid trademark will have only source significance.
706
 
Second, a trademarked word may be simultaneously hybrid: that is, it may function for some 
consumers both as a generic term designating a product class and at the same time as a 
source-significant, commercial symbol.
707
  
 
Based on this analysis, Folsom and Teply categorize three types of consumers: (i) Those who 
are unaware of any source significance for the mark and who use the word as a product-
category word, thereby facing added search or transaction costs.
708
 In purchasing that type of 
product, they will employ the trademarked generic word and will not expect to receive a 
specific manufacturer’s product. Members of the general public will frequently possess this 
perception of the trademarked word’s significance, and increased search costs are likely to 
result from their questions as to the substitutability of competing products.
709
 (ii) Those who 
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are aware of the source and non-price significance of the mark and who do not perceive, or 
use, the word as a product-category word; for such consumers, the non-price informational 
signals originating with the trademarked word will be those associated with a properly 
functioning trademark.
710
 (iii) Those who know that the mark has source significance, but 
who also use it in a product-category sense, and thereby may suffer increased search costs.
711
 
In certain market contexts, those consumers for whom a mark is simultaneously hybrid may 
be faced with uncertainty as to whether other products have the desirable category-
characteristics that they associate with the trademarked word. This uncertainty may in some 
instances create unnecessary search costs by impairing consumers’ efficient identification of 
objectivity satisfactory substitutes.
712
 
 
4.2.1.3 Rights conferred  
 
Ownership of a trademark entails two main groups of rights. On the one hand, the owners 
have the right to exclude others from certain unauthorized use. He, on the other, can authorize 
or even assign his mark. These rights are subject to an array of exceptions.  
 
(1) Right to exclude  
 
The owner of a trademark has a right to exclude other from the commercial use of a mark that 
is likely to cause confusion with the owner’s mark as to the source of sponsorship of the 
parties’ goods or services.713 The “use in commerce” and “in connection with” requirements 
have been widely understood to impose infringement liability only on those who created 
confusion in the process of selling, marketing, or advertising their own products. The 
likelihood-of-confusion standard, the core focus of trademark law, takes for granted that the 
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defendant is using the mark to promote its own sales.
714
 Trademark infringement is a type of 
unfair competition. Both trademark infringement and unfair competition are commercial 
tort.
715
 In the US, trademark infringement has long been categorized as a species and 
subcategory of unfair competition law. The US Supreme Court held that “[T]he common law 
of trademarks is but a part of the broader law of unfair competition.”716 The protection of 
collective marks and certification marks is enforced under general trademark law. In principle, 
an action for infringement is initiated by the owner of the mark.
717
  
 
To prevail in an action for trademark infringement, the plaintiff must show that the mark in 
question qualifies for protection and that the defendant’s use of a similar mark creates a 
likelihood of confusion. The touchstone for infringement is the likelihood of confusion from 
the standpoint of the average purchaser.
718A likelihood of confusion “exists when customers 
viewing the mark would probably assume that the product or service it represents is 
associated with the source of a different product or service identified by a similar mark.”719 
 
The defendant has a series of defenses of defects include: (i) That the registration or the 
incontestable right to use the mark was obtained fraudulently; or (ii) That the mark has been 
abandoned; or (iii) That the registered is being used, by or with the permission of registrant; 
or (iv) That the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use, 
otherwise than as a mark, of the party’s individual name in his own business, or of the 
individual name of anyone in privity with such party, or of a term or device which is 
descriptive of and used fairly in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such part, 
or their geographic origin; or (v) That the mark whose use by a party is charged as an 
infringement was adopted without knowledge of the registrant’s prior use and has been 
continuously used by such or those in privity with him from a date prior to prescribed; or (vi) 
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That the mark has been or is being used to violate the antitrust laws of the United States; or  
(vii) That the mark is functional; or (viii) That equitable principles, including laches, estoppel, 
or acquiescence are applicable.
720
 
 
Under the Lanham Act, any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or 
any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, 
or false or misleading representation of fact, which (i) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause 
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with 
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or 
commercial activities by another person, or (ii) in commercial advertising or promotion, 
misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or 
another person’s goods or services, or commercial activities.721       
 
One further right, which is applicable only to famous, highly distinctive marks, is the right to 
prevent trademark dilution, which meaning the lessening of the capacity of a mark to identify 
a unique product or service.
722
 Only the commercial use of a mark—that is, a use in 
connection with the marketing of products or services—can constitute an actionable 
infringement or dilution. Therefore, merely wearing a counterfeit shirt should not give rise to 
liability on the part of the consumer who is not using the mark to identify a business or to 
market goods or services. Infringement of a mark by dilution is a totally different kind of tort 
than infringement by a likelihood of confusion and is subject to different rules.
723
 A mark is 
famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a 
designation of source of goods or services of the mark’s owner.724 Dilution by blurring is 
association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that 
impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.
725
 Dilution by tarnishment: is association 
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arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the 
reputation of the famous mark.
726
 
 
Certain types of acts which are not actionable as dilution by blurring or by tarnishment: (i) 
any fair use, including a nominative fair use or descriptive fair use, or facilitation of such fair 
use, of a famous mark by another person other than as a designation of the person’s own 
goods or services; including use in connection with advertising or promotion that permits 
consumers to compare goods or services; or identifying and parodying, criticizing, or 
commenting upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark owner; 
(ii) all forms of news reporting and news commentary; (iii) any noncommercial use of a 
mark.
727
 
  
Dilution law has been a controversial issue. McCarthy defines, in the context of US 
trademark law, “dilution” as “the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and 
distinguish goods or services”, regardless of the presence or absence of competition between 
the owner of the famous mark and other parties or likelihood of confusion, mistake, or 
deception.
728
 Ghosh et al, argue that dilution law “does not exist to protect the public. It is not 
based on a likelihood of confusion standard, but only exists to protect the quasi-property 
rights a holder has in maintaining the integrity and distinctiveness of his marks.”729The 
suspicion of dilution doctrine is that why should government provide this right if the 
consumers need against confusion are already provided by the likelihood of confusion form 
of liability?
730
 Posner proposes a consumer protection justification for dilution: dilution 
doctrine might spare consumers the imagination costs they would otherwise incur if diluting 
conduct were permitted.
731
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Table 2: Remedies available under the Lanham Act
732
  
 
 Injunctive Relief Damages 
1114(a) and 1125(a) -Equitable relief available under 1116 
-Destruction of infringing article available 
under 1118 
Available under 1117 
-profits, that can be enhanced or 
diminished by judge 
-damages that can be trebled 
-attorney’s fees in exceptional cases 
-statutory damages for counterfeit marks 
1125(c) -injunctive relief is primary remedy under 
1125(c)(2) 
-if wilful dilution of infringing article 
available under 1118 
-If wilfully dilution, then profits, damages 
and attorney’s as under 1117 
 
1125(d) -Forfeiture or cancellation of domain 
name under 1125(d)(1)(c) 
-actual damages and profits or statutory 
damages under 1117(d) 
-No damages for an in rem action under 
1125(d)(2) 
 
(2) Right to authorize and assign  
 
The owner of a trademark can authorize others to use his mark or even assign his mark. In 
order to prevent trademarks from becoming an instrument of consumer confusion, United 
States trademark law places significant restrictions on a trademark owner’s ability to sell or 
license the mark. These restrictions take two basic forms. First, trademarks cannot be 
assigned “in gross”—that is, without the goodwill and other assets accompanying the line of 
business the trademark represents. Second, if a trademark owner licenses the right to produce 
or sell trademarked goods to another, the owner must supervise the licensee to make sure that 
the goods produced or sold under the trademark are of comparable quality to existing 
trademarked products. Failure to comply with these rules can invalidate the trademark 
altogether.”733 
 
4.2.1.4 Geographical marks  
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(1) Principles  
 
The United States has historically been reluctant to provide trademark protection for 
geographic indicators, that is, a type of marks that indicate the geographic origin of a product 
or service, because of the potential anti-competitive effects.
734
 Under the prevailing common-
law rules in effect during the first half of the twentieth century, a geographic mark could be 
protected provided the merchant demonstrates secondary meaning.
735
 It is observed that for 
well over a century, the US courts have treated geographic terms as a subject of special 
concern.
736
 The traditional goal of the law of geographic trademarks is to protect “the 
communicative needs of competitors.” 737  The focus is not on the applicant, but on the 
applicant’s competitors.738  
 
In an 1871 case, the Supreme Court held that the grant of exclusive use over geographical 
terms will “embarrass trade”:  
 
“Could such phrase, as “Pennsylvania wheat,” “Kentucky hemp,” “Virginia tobacco,” or “Sea 
Island cotton,” be protected as trademarks; could anyone prevent all others from using them, 
or from selling articles produced in the districts they describe under those appellations, it 
would greatly embarrass trade, and secure exclusive rights to individuals in that which is the 
common right of many.”739  
 
Later in 1901, the Supreme Court, in considering the application of the word “Elgin” to 
watches, developed two general principles. First, the general rule that words describing the 
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place of manufacture cannot be reserved as trademarks and that the first comer cannot deny 
others the right to advertise the geographic origin of their goods. Second, if the term has 
developed a secondary meaning as a brand, the use of the term could be limited under the 
principles of unfair competition, so as to avoid deceiving the public.
 740
 The US Congress 
adopted the first effective federal trademark statute in 1905.
741
 The 1905 Act went so far as to 
ban the registration of any purported trademark that was “merely a geographic name or 
term.”742 Under the dominant interpretation of the Trademark Act of 1905, no brand name 
that consists of a geographic term could ever be registered as a trademark, no matter how 
remote and obscure the place, on the ground that all place names should remain available for 
use by all competitors.
743
  
 
In a nutshell, four general principles had been developed prior to the Lanham Act 1946: (i) 
the general rule that geographic terms cannot be protected as trademarks; (ii) the exception 
for terms that have developed secondary meaning; (iii) the potential restraint under principles 
of unfair competition when trademark rights are not available; and (iv) when trademark rights 
are available, the continued freedom of others to use a geographic term in its geographic 
sense.
744
  
 
(2) Validity of geographical marks under the Lanham Act  
 
Under the Lanham Act, complying with the established principles, a geographical mark can 
be registered as trademark if it is considered inherently distinctive or to have acquired 
distinctiveness. It is possible for a geographical mark be considered fanciful, arbitrary, or 
suggestive mark and thus inherently distinctive. Some pseudo-geographic terms might be 
categorized as fanciful because no such place exists, except in the mythology of advertising. 
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“Nature Valley” probably falls in this category.745A geographical mark may be considered 
arbitrary because it “conveys no relationship between the product and the named place.”746 
Courts often provide “Alaska bananas” as an example of a trademark based on geographic 
location that would suggest to no one a genuine connection between the place and the 
goods.
747
 This example also shows the nature of the goods is an important criterion in 
determining the registrability of a geographical mark.  The term “Alaska”, for example, might 
be geographically descriptive when applied to salmon.  But it would deceive no one when 
applied to bananas.
748
 Other examples may include North Pole for bananas, Salem for 
cigarettes, and Atlantic for magazine.
749
  
 
A mark is unregistrable when it consists of a mark which “when used on or in connection 
with the goods of the applicant is primarily geographically descriptive of them.”750 A mark 
which is primarily geographically descriptive is registrable when it becomes distinctive of the 
applicant’s goods in commerce.751 Terms which are descriptive of the geographic location of 
origin of goods or services are descriptive marks.
752
 A mark cannot be registered when it 
consists of a mark which when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is 
“primarily geographically descriptive” of them.753 To establish a prima facie case for the 
refusal to register a mark as primarily geographically descriptive, the examining attorney 
must show that: (i) the primary significance of the mark is a generally known geographic 
location; (ii) the goods or services originate in the place identified in the mark; and (iii) 
purchasers would be likely to believe that the goods or services originate in the geographic 
place identified in the mark.
754
 If the mark is remote or obscure, the public is unlikely to 
make a goods/place or services/place association.
755
 It is held that there is no sufficient 
evidence to establish that public in United States would perceive VITTEL as the name of a 
place where cosmetic products originate. That is, Vittel, France is found to be 
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obscure.
756“NORMANDIE CAMEMBERT” (“CAMEMBERT” disclaimed) is held primarily 
geographically descriptive of cheese because NORMANDIE is the French spelling for 
Normandy, consumers would recognize NORMANDIE as the equivalent of Normandy, the 
primary significance of Normandy is a known geographic place in France, and 
CAMEMBERT is generic for applicant’s goods.757 
 
A geographical mark is unregistrable if it is considered deceptive or generic. A mark is 
unregistrable when it consists of or comprises of “deceptive” matter.758 Some brand names 
containing geographic terms are found to provide deceptive information to consumers and are 
denied protection for that reason regardless of whether they have obtained secondary 
meaning.
759
 Sometimes, geographical marks may be considered as generic marks and, 
therefore, cannot be reserved as trademarks because they are understood as naming a variety 
of goods, and anyone selling that variety of goods must have an equal right to use the term.
760
 
A geographic term or design is considered generic if United States consumers view it as 
designating the genus of the goods, rather than their geographic origin.
761
 For example, the 
TTAB denies the registration of “Montrachet” as a trademark under the reason that 
“Montrachet” has become a generic term for goat cheese.762  
 
The Lanham Act adds two categories of unregistrable geographical marks to implement GI 
protection obligations under international treaties. The first category is known as primarily 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive. This category was made unregistrable in order to 
implement the protection for GIs contained in the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA).
763
 A mark is unregistrable when it consists of a mark which “when used on or in 
connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily geographically deceptively 
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misdescriptive of them.”764 That is, if a term directly conveys a relationship between the 
product and a place and the goods do not come from that place, then the mark is primarily 
“geographically deceptively misdescriptive” of the goods.765 To support a refusal to register a 
mark as primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive mark, the examining attorney 
must show that (i) the primary significance of the mark is a generally known geographic 
location; (ii) the goods or services do not originate in the place identified in the mark; (iii) 
purchasers would be likely to believe that the goods or services originate in the geographic 
place identified in the mark; (iv) the misrepresentation is a material factor in a significant 
portion of the relevant consumer’s decision to buy the goods or use the services,766 
 
An example of “primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive” mark is found in the In 
re Save Venice New York case. Save Venice is a non-for-profit New York corporation 
devoted to preserving and restoring some cultural treasure of Venice, Italy. On January 7, 
1997, Save Venice filed an intent-for-use application with the USPTO for a composite mark 
which amalgamates the phrases “THE VENICE COLLECTION” and “SAVE VENICE, INC.” 
with a drawing of the Lion of St. Mark. The applicant sought registration on the principal 
register of this mark to cover a variety of goods in nine different international classes. With 
the exception of some glass products, none of the applicant’s designated goods originated in 
Venice. The USPTO refused registration of those goods not originated in Venice under 15 
USC 1052(e)(3) because it was considered that the mark was primarily geographically 
deceptively misdescriptive. The court affirmed USPTO’s refusal to register’s mark on the 
grounds that the mark is primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive.
767
   
 
Prior to 1993, it was possible to overcome a section 2(e) finding by a showing of acquired 
secondary meaning. 
768
 According to McCarthy and Devitt the theory is that “consumers have 
the right to be told the truth as to the origin of goods unless it can be shown that they have 
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become conditioned over a period of time to view the mark as indicating a commercial rather 
than a geographic origin.”769 The US amended its law to implement GI provision contained in 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Since then, this bar cannot be saved by 
acquired distinctiveness.
770
 This amendment, made to implement international treaties on GIs, 
is seen as deviation from the established principles.
771
 
 
(v) GIs for wines and spirits  
 
A mark is unregistrable if it consists of or comprises “a geographical indication which, when 
used on or in connection with wines or spirits, identifies a place other than the origin of the 
goods and is first used on or in connection with wines or spirits by the applicant on or after 
one year after the date on which the WTO Agreement…enters into force with respect to the 
United States.”772 This provision was added to the Lanham Act in order to implement the 
additional protection for GIs for wines and spirits under Article 23 of the TRIPS 
Agreement.
773
 It does not apply to geographical indications that were first used in commerce 
on or in connection with wines or spirits prior to January 1, 1996.
774
 Section 2(a) constitutes 
an absolute bar to the registration of false geographical indications used on wines or spirits on 
either the Principal Register or the Supplemental Register. Neither a disclaimer of the 
geographical designation nor a claim that it has acquired distinctiveness can obviate the 
refusal if the mark consists of or comprises a geographical indication that identifies a place 
other than the origin of the wines or spirits.”775 Again, this provision, added to implement GI 
protection obligation, is regarded as a deviation from established principles.
776
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(3) Scope of protection  
 
Since the most important policy goal in regulating protection of geographic marks is that of 
preserving access to terms competitors need to describe their goods, then the most important 
feature of the protection granted is the exception for descriptive fair use.
777
 Descriptive fair 
use has long been recognized at common law as a limit on injunctive relief against the use of 
geographical terms. Lanham Act 33(b)(4), That the use of the name, term, or device charged 
to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark…of a term or device which is 
descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe…their geographic origin.778 
“The fair use defence arise when a competitor uses a mark in its common or primarily sense 
to describe the competitor’s own products.”779 The justification for the fair use defence is 
found in “the public interest in allowing competitors to make free use of the English language 
to describe their goods.”780 The fair use defence “forbids a trademark registrant to appropriate 
a descriptive term for his exclusive use and so prevent others from actually describing a 
characteristic of their goods.”781 In KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 
the U.S. Supreme opines that some degree of consumer confusion was compatible with fair 
use.
782
 That is, toleration of some confusion is required by the fair use defence.
783
 That is 
even if a senior has achieved secondary meaning in a geographically descriptive term, anyone 
who is in fact located in that place has a limited right to tell consumers of the location.
784
 
Thus, even if a United States producer acquired trademark rights to GHANA for cocoa, 
Ghanaian cocoa producers’ rights to use the term in a purely geographically descriptive 
manner would be preserved under the fair use defense. This allows anyone who is in fact 
located in a territory to tell purchasers of its location in a purely descriptive, non-trademark 
manner. In such cases, the rights of the trademark owners are balanced against the right of the 
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producer in the particular area. This may require the use of disclaimers or other explanatory 
matter.
785
 
 
4.2.1.5 Interpreting GIs as trademarks  
 
The difference between the definitions of GIs under the TRIPS Agreement and trademarks 
under the Lanham Act is obvious. This, however, does not prevent the USPTO and some 
commentators from interpreting GIs as trademarks. It is argued by the USPTO that 
trademarks and GIs are functionally similar concepts. Geographical indications can be 
viewed as a subset of trademarks. Geographical indications serve the same functions as 
trademarks, because like trademarks they are (i) source-identifiers, (ii) guarantees of quality, 
and (iii) valuable business interests.
786
 Secondly, according to USPTO, these two concepts 
may overlap. This happens: 
 
“[I]f a geographic sign is used in such a way as to identify the source of the goods/services 
and over time, consumers start to recognize it as identifying a particular company or 
manufacturer or group of producers, the geographic sign no longer describes only where the 
goods/services come from, it also describes the “source” of the goods/services. At that point, 
the sign has “secondary meaning” or “acquired distinctiveness.” The primarily meaning to 
consumers is the geographic place; the secondary meaning to the producing or manufacturing 
source. If a descriptive sign has “secondary meaning” to consumers, the sign has a source-
identifying capacity and is protectable as a trademark. Because of this feature of U.S. 
trademark law, GI can also be protected as trademarks…”787 
 
Beresford finds this interpretation agreeable, “although this is relatively rare.”788 In support of 
Beresford, Brody argues that a small number of trademarks registered this way also qualify as 
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geographical indications within the meaning of TRIPS. The example he provides is 
WATERFORD for crystal ware.
789
 
 
This interpretation, however, fails to settle the potential tension or paradox between GIs and 
trademarks. On the one hand, under the TRIPS Agreement, a GI is an indication identifying a 
good as originating in a place where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the 
good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin. From the trademark perspective, 
these definitional criteria make a GI “by definition descriptive.”790  One the other hand, the 
requirement of distinctiveness, inherent or acquired secondary is not consistent with TRIPS 
definition of GIs.
791
 Efforts to conciliate this tension have led to confusing result. Echols, for 
example, claims that “GIs are…not purely descriptive terms, their function is analogous to a 
descriptive function.” 792  Gangjee claims that a GI “is both descriptive of origin and 
distinctive.”793 But he further explains that distinctiveness for a GI means “the ability to 
differentiate between similar products on the marketplace and not in the classical trademark 
sense, depends explicitly on geographical origin.”794 
 
One further concern is that a trademark with geographical reference does not “guarantee” the 
geographical origin of the good it identifies. As O’Connor has pointed out that several 
trademarks with geographical references exist for quality products, such as “Idaho’s Best” 
and “Lake Placid Premium Citrus”, however, do not imply that any quality standards or 
geographic standards are being met. Therefore, it is entirely possible that the trademark 
“Idaho’s Best” could identify potatoes that were grown in California, and merely processed in 
Idaho State.
795
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Some commentators seem sceptical about the suitability of trademarks as a legal means for 
GI protection. According to McCarthy, GIs are treated in U.S. “as a subset of the law of 
trademarks, protectable as certification marks or collective marks.”796 WIPO categorizes four 
types of legal means, namely, unfair competition and passing off, protected appellations of 
origin and registered geographical indications, collective and certification marks, and 
administrative schemes for protection. Trademarks are not included in this categorization 
because of the “general principle that individual trademarks must not be descriptive or 
deceptive, geographical terms cannot serve as individual trademarks, unless they have 
acquired distinctive character through use, or their use is fanciful and, therefore, is not 
deceiving as to origin of the goods on which the trademarks are used.” 797  For Coerper, 
certification marks provide “the only means for establishing a registered property right in a 
geographical indication, including a wine appellation, in the United States.”798 
 
4.2.2 Certification marks 
 
4.2.2.1 Essentials of certification marks  
 
Under the Lanham Act, a certification mark is any word, name, symbol, or any combination 
“used by a person other than its owner, or…which its owner has a bona fide intention to 
permit a person other than the owner to use in commerce”.799  Certification marks can be 
used to certify (i) regional or other origin; (ii) material, mode of manufacture, quality, 
accuracy or other characteristics of the goods/services; or (iii) that the work or labor on the 
goods/service was performed by a member of a union or other organization.
800
 These 
                                                          
796
 McCarthy (n 666) § 14:21. 
797
 WIPO SCT/8/4 (April 2 2002) ‘Document SCT/6/3/Rev. on Geographical Indications: Historical 
Background, Nature of Rights, Existing Systems for Protection and Obtaining Protection in Other Countries’, p. 
8.  
798
 Milo G. Coerper, ‘Certification Marks as a Means of Protecting Wine Appellations in the United States’ 16 
IPL Newsletter (1997-1998) 24, 24.  
799
 15 USC § 1127. 
800
 15 USC § 1127; USPTO (n 664) 2; Terry E. Holtzman, ‘Tips from the Trademark Examining Operation’ 81 
TMR (1991) 180, 180-181. TMEP, 1306.01 (2009). 
133 
 
categories are not mutually exclusive, that is, the “same mark can be used to certify one or 
more aspects of the same goods or services”801 Although defined and protected under the 
Lanham Act, the certification mark is “a special creature created for a purpose uniquely 
different from that of an ordinary service mark or trademark.”802 A certification mark is used 
to inform purchasers that the goods or services of a person possess certain characteristics or 
meet certain qualifications or standards established by another person. Under the US law, 
certification marks differ from trademarks by two characteristics. One is that the owner of a 
certification mark does not use it. The other is that a certification mark does not indicate 
commercial source nor distinguish the goods or services of one person from those of another 
person. This means that any entity, which meets the certifying standards, is entitled to use the 
certification mark.
803
 A certification mark can be registered “by persons, and nations, States, 
municipalities, and the like, exercising legitimate control over the use of the marks sought to 
be registered, even though not possessing an industrial or commercial establishment”.804 In 
practice, certification marks tend to be owned by a collective group such as a trade group or a 
government entity, including state agricultural agencies, which establish the standards and 
criteria that a product must meet to bear the organization’s certification mark.805  
 
Apart from the prevention of public confusion, certification marks serve “further public 
interest in free and open competition among producers and distributors of the certified 
products.” 806  To ensure such interests be respected, the Lanham Act provides that 
cancellation of certification marks can happen at any time for any of the four reasons: (i) if 
the owner does not control or is not able legitimately to exercise control over the use of the 
mark;
807
 (ii) if the owner engages in the production or marketing of any goods or services to 
which the certification mark is applied;
808
 (iii) if the owner permits the use of the certification 
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mark for purposes other than to certify;
809
 (iv) if the owner discriminately refuses to certify or 
to continue to certify the goods or services of any person who maintains the standards or 
conditions which such mark certifies.
810
 By requiring certification mark holders to license all 
individuals who meet the certification criteria, the Lanham Act ensures that the market will 
include as many participants as can produce conforming goods. By preventing mark holders 
from becoming market participants, it removes incentives for mark holders to engage in 
anticompetitive conduct. The Lanham Act’s cancellation provisions thus appear designed to 
promote free competition in the market for certified products.”811 
 
The certification mark has it origin in the fourteenth-century England. In 1300, a statute of 
King Edward I provided that no silver or gold ware could be sold until it had been tested at 
the Guild of Goldsmiths for the proportion of precious to base metal in the mixture. Then, if 
approved, the article was to be struck with the “King’s Mark”, as a guarantee of quality. The 
King’s Mark resembles modern certification mark because “it attested to verification of 
product against a standard.”812 The Guild of Goldsmiths was equipped with the power to 
search shop and workplaces for non-compliant goods and use of counterfeit marks.
813
 The 
King’s Mark had it conceptual foundation in “regulation”, that is, “the process by which 
governments impose requirements on enterprises, citizens, and government itself, including 
laws, orders, and other rules.” The objectives of regulation typically are to protect values 
such as the quality and quantities of goods, environmental quality, public health and safety.
814
 
This regulatory law declines with the power of guild and the advent of the industrial 
revolution and a climate of economic liberalism.
815
 American case law had recognized the 
validity of a mark used for certification purposes prior to its federal registrability.
816
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Subsequently, statutory recognition was given in 1946 through the passage of the Lanham 
Act.
817
 
 
There has been a disagreement on the IP status of certification marks. It is agreed that 
although the certification mark is named and defined in a basic federal statute dealing with 
trademarks, it is a distinct kind of mark, “a special creature created for a purpose uniquely 
different from that of an ordinary service mark or trademark.”818 The exact nature of the 
certification mark is, however, still unclear. Carvalho denies the IP status of certification 
marks. According to Carvalho, the certification mark aims at certifying certain technical 
characteristics of the goods or their method of production and is, thus, not covered by the 
definition of trademark under Article 15.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. Furthermore, their role is 
not to distinguish goods or services but rather to harmonize them, similarly to technical 
standards. From his point of view, certification marks are “very close to industrial property, 
but they are not part of it” and should be understood as labels belonging to consumers’ 
protection.
819
 On the contrary, Brody argues that certification marks are a form of communal 
property because they are controlled by a certifying body and the mark may be used by 
multiple parties within the community, subject to the control of the certifying or collective 
body.
820
 McCarthy, Schechter, and Franklyn suggest that certification marks are “a very 
limited form of compulsory licensing” because the one who has registered a term as 
certification mark must license or permit use of the mark by anyone maintains the standards 
or conditions the mark certifies.
821
 In this sense, they are similar to compulsory licensing, that 
is, a “government mandated arrangement allowing third parties to use another’s intellectual 
property upon payment of a specified fee regardless of objections the owner of the 
intellectual property in order to accomplish some political or social objectives, or deal with 
problems of market failure.”822 Based on the features that the owner of a certification mark 
may not produce goods protected by the mark and discriminately refuse to all those producers 
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whose goods meet the standards set out by the owner of the mark, Faulhaber regards 
certification marks as “unique intellectual property rights” because they do not convey the 
exclusive rights of trademark.
823
 
 
All these comments have their merits. As explained, the two basic shared characteristics of IP 
are the intangibility of subject matter and the negative nature of rights.
824
 Based on these two 
criteria, it seems proper to consider certification marks IP, even though their exclusivity is 
rather limited. 
 
4.2.2.2 Protecting GIs as certification marks  
 
The connection between certification marks and GI protection seems straightforward. As one 
commentator puts it that a “certification mark protects a geographical indication when it is 
used to certify regional origin.”825 According to Belson, the “re-emergence” of certification 
mark in the US in the late nineteenth century was closely related to the need to deal with 
goodwill attached to geographical names, at a time when the courts were presented with a 
large number of cases concerning the adoption of geographical names on products and 
commodities originating from particular geographical locations.
826
 The certification mark has 
been considered as the principal method by which geographical indications can be protected 
under the US law.
827
 During the Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations, the United States 
proposed that “[c]ontracting parties shall protect geographical indications that certify regional 
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origin by providing for their registration as certification or collective marks.” 828  USPTO 
claims that GIs can be protected as certification marks under the US regime.
829
  
 
It is claimed that GIs can be protected as certification marks either through registration by the 
USPTO or through the common law without being registered.
830
 One feature, which enable 
the US trademark law to accommodate the concept of GI as defined under the TRIPS 
Agreement is that geographically descriptive terms can be registered as certification marks 
without acquired distinctiveness.
831
 A geographical term may be used, either alone or as a 
portion of a composite mark, to certify that the goods originate in a particular geographical 
region identified by the term. When seeking to register for this purpose, neither secondary 
meaning nor disclaimer is required.
832
 Under certain circumstances, the name of the place 
from which goods or services originate may function as a certification mark. When 
geographic terms are used to certify regional origin (e.g., “Idaho” used to certify that potatoes 
are grown in Idaho), registration of certification marks should not be refused and on the 
ground of geographical descriptiveness and disclaimers of these geographic terms should not 
be required
833
 However, again, like in the case of trademarks, the “essential” place-product 
nexus is not a requirement for protection. As Justin Hughes has pointed out, as long as the 
certification standards are applied in a non-discriminatory fashion, the USPTO does not care 
what the certification standards are.
834
 Section 2(e)(2) of the Lanham Act prohibits 
registration of a mark that is primarily geographically descriptive of the goods or services 
named in the application “except as indications of regional origin may be registrable under 
section 1054 of this title”.835 This provision is interpreted as allowing a geographical name to 
be protected as a certification mark even though it is primarily geographically descriptive. As 
noted in the Roquefort case: 
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“A geographical name does not require a secondary meaning in order to qualify for 
registration as a certification mark. It is true that section 1054 provides that certification 
marks are “subject to the provisions relating to the registration of trademarks, so far as they 
are applicable…” But section 1052(c)(2), which prohibits registration of names primarily 
geographically descriptive, specifically excepts “indications of regional origin” registrable 
under section 1054. Therefore, a geographical name may be registered as a certification mark 
even though it is primarily descriptive.”836 
 
In this sense, the US trademark law provides opportunities for traders who intend to use 
geographical place names as certification marks which allow them to exploit the valuable 
public association of the place name with special traditional skills or particular geographical 
features.
837
 However, a geographical name that has become generic remains unregistrable.
838
  
“FONTINA”, for example, was held a generic name of a type of cheese rather than a 
certification mark indicating regional origin, in view of the fact that non-certified producers 
outside that region use the term to identify non-certified cheeses.
839
 Similarly, the TTAB held 
that the term CHABLIS, which is a French appellation of origin for wine AOC, was 
unprotectable as a certification mark because it had become generic for light, white wine and 
did not primarily indicate the place of origin to U.S. consumers.
840
  
 
In spite of the fact that the statute does not prohibit individuals or private organizations from 
owning geographical certification marks, in most instances the authority that exercises 
control over the use of a geographical term as a certification mark is “a governmental body or 
a body operating with governmental authorization.”841 The reason is that a government entity 
is often “in the best position to establish and regulate standards, to control the use of mark 
and to ensure that discriminatory activity will occur.” 842  Usually, the registrants are 
governmental authorities.
843
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Geographical certification marks can also develop as a matter of common law without 
USPTO registration.
844
 This may happen if, over the course of time, the geographical name, 
adopted as a mark becomes a synonym for superior quality. Under this circumstance, the 
geographical name in effect “certifies the origin of the goods, and the goodwill and reputation 
in the name deemed deserving of protection under the common law principle of passing 
off.”845 “SUNSHINE TREE”, for example, was held as an unregistered and valid certification 
mark for citrus from Florida.
846
  
 
Foreign producers can also gain protection in US without regard to whether the name is 
protected under their own country.
847
 The rule established under “COGNAC” is that a 
certification mark exists at common law if the use of the geographical designation is 
controlled and limited in such a manner that it reliably indicates to purchasers that the goods 
bearing the designation come exclusively from a particular region.
848
 Thus, if a geographical 
name is controlled locally in France or Italy, the producers market in the United States, and 
no one else in the United States is using the GI for the same product, there are probably 
common law trademark rights under U.S. trademark doctrine. This means that a European 
producer can gain common law protection of its geographical indication in the United States 
without regard to whether the GI is protected under an EU member’s trademark law, 
geographical indication law or both.
849
 In “COGNAC” the French government and a 
consortium of Cognac producers successfully blocked the registration of the trademark 
“Canadian Mist and Cognac” by Brown-Forman Corp. through extensive litigation before the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.  Among other things, 
this precedent-setting case established that "Cognac" is a common-law certification mark 
entitled to full protection by the U.S. PTO against registration of confusingly similar marks.  
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Following the established trademark law principles, when a geographical term is used as a 
certification mark, two elements are of basic concern. One is to preserve the freedom of all 
persons in the region to use the term and the other is to prevent abuses or illegal uses of the 
mark that would be detrimental to all those entitled to use the mark.
850
 Geographically 
descriptive terms are generally regarded as inherently weak and entitled to less protection 
than arbitrary or suggestive marks. Ordinarily, a term that describes the geographic source of 
a product is not protectable without a showing of acquired distinctiveness. When a 
geographic term is used as a certification mark, two elements are of basic concern. One is to 
preserve the freedom of all persons in the region to use the term. The other is to prevent 
abuses or illegal uses of the mark which would be detrimental to all those entitled to use the 
mark. Normally, a private individual is not considered to be in the best position to fulfil these 
objectives. The government of a region would be the logical authority to control the use of 
the name of that region. The government, either directly or through a body to which it has 
given authority, would have power to preserve the right of all persons and to prevent abuse or 
illegal use of the mark.
851
 This approach is criticised by Gangjee a “non-exclusive concession” 
that: “Trade mark doctrine continues to view a geographical term either as a descriptive 
expression open to all or as capable of individual appropriation through acquired 
distinctiveness, but is uncomfortable with a collective, geographical yet brand-like and 
distinctive usage. Collective or certification marks are viewed as a non-exclusive concession 
in this circumstance.”852 Gangjee uses the example of “Tequila” to substantiate his criticism. 
According to Gangjee, the US ‘Tequila’ certification mark has to coexist with 263 other live 
applications or registrations, which also include the name “Tequila”.853  
 
The State of Idaho Potato Commission v. G & T Terminal Packaging Inc.
854
 case illustrates 
the specific context in which the owner of a geographical certification may exclude others 
from using the mark. State of Idaho Potato Commission (IPC) is a statutorily-created agency 
of the State of Idaho formed for the purpose of promoting Idaho potatoes. IPC finances its 
promotional work in part by licensing several certification marks for Idaho potatoes including 
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“Idaho” and “Grown in Idaho.” G & T is a wholesale distributor of potatoes. Beginning in 
1968, G & T entered into a series of licenses with IPC to use IPC’s certification marks. The 
most recent of these licenses expired on September 1, 1998.
855
 It is held that G & T violates 
the Lanham Act by purchasing bags with IPC’s certification mark on them and using them to 
package potatoes after G & T’s license to use the mark has expired.856 G & T acknowledges 
that it was using IPC’s registered mark on packages of potatoes without a license to do so. 
The issue of whether its behaviour constituted counterfeiting therefore turns on whether its 
use of IPC’s certification mark was likely to cause confusion.857  
 
G & T contends that its unlicensed use of IPC’s mark was not likely to cause confusion 
because the potatoes it packaged were genuine Idaho potatoes.
858
 But this was not accepted 
by the court: “In the certification mark context, the mark holder’s ability to institute quality 
controls seems vital if a mark is to serve its purpose. By licensing a party to use the “Idaho” 
mark, IPC certifies that the party’s potatoes meet the standards the mark represents… By 
depriving IPC of the opportunity to monitor and control quality, G & T created the potential 
for consumer confusion…here, the actual quality of the goods is irrelevant; it is the control of 
quality…G & T’s use of the certification mark implied that its potatoes had been produced 
and distributed in accordance with IPC’s quality control procedures, and the fact that this was 
not the case was likely to cause consumer confusion.
859
 Why was 117’s statutory penalties 
available in this case: because injunctive relief is not enough: In addition, those making 
unauthorized use of the mark gain a market advantage by avoiding the expense of record 
keeping and following IPC’s other rules 860  It is held that G & T’s use constituted 
counterfeiting: “G & T’s unlicensed use of IPC’s certification mark was likely to cause 
confusion and to undermine the effectiveness of IPC’s certification mark licensing regime”861  
 
                                                          
855
 State of Idaho Potato Commission, para. 3.  
856
 State of Idaho Potato Commission, para. 7.  
857
 State of Idaho Potato Commission, para. 54.  
858
 State of Idaho Potato Commission, para. 55.  
859
 State of Idaho Potato Commission, para. 56.  
860
 State of Idaho Potato Commission, para. 57.  
861
 State of Idaho Potato Commission, para. 58.  
142 
 
The traditional principle has not been always followed. An unconventional and puzzling 
interpretation is provided by the TTAB in the India Tea Board decision. In this case, the 
TTAB holds that the presumption that a geographic term is inherently weak does not attach to 
geographic terms that are used to certify regional origin. A mark that is registered on the 
Principal Register is entailed to all 7(b) presumptions including the presumption that the 
mark is distinctive.
862
 According to Brody, by this interpretation, the TTAB creates what he 
terms “geographical distinctiveness”:  
 
“In recognizing and legitimizing this type of distinctiveness…the TTAB depart from the 
traditional concept of distinctiveness (that is, the “single source” concept) to create a variant 
that is uniquely applicable to, and beneficial for the protection of, regional certification and 
collective marks. The concept of geographical distinctiveness is an important jurisprudential 
innovation in the evolving U.S. treatment of geographical indications.”863 
 
However, he also finds this the meaning of this innovation difficult to understand:  
 
“[T]he TTAB in Tea Board classified DARJEELIN as not merely “distinctive” but 
“inherently distinctive,” because it was registered without any claim of acquired 
distinctiveness under Section 2(f) of the Lanham Act. This classification was relevant and 
important to the Board’s conclusion that DARJEELIN was a strong mark, worthy of broad 
protection. But this classification of DARJEELING, or any geographical indication, as 
“inherently distinctive” is puzzling, to say the least.”864 
 
4.2.3 Collective trademarks 
 
4.2.3.1 Essentials of collective trademarks  
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The Lanham Act defines the term “collective mark” as a trademark or service mark: (i) used 
by the members of a cooperative, an association, or other collective group or organization, or 
(ii) which such cooperative, association, or other collective group or organization has a bona 
fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the principal register established 
by this chapter, and includes marks indicating the membership in a union, an association, or 
other organization.
865
 Thus, there are two types of collective marks in the United States. One 
is collective trademarks or service marks and, the other, collective membership marks.
866 
A 
collective membership mark is a mark adopted for the purpose of indicating membership in 
an organized collective group, such as a union, an association, or other organization. Neither 
the collective nor its members uses the collective membership mark to identify and 
distinguish goods or services; rather, the sole function of such a mark is to indicate that the 
person displaying the mark is a member of the organized collective group. A collective 
trademark or collective service mark is a mark adopted by a “collective” (i.e., an association, 
union, cooperative, fraternal organization, or other organized collective group) for use only 
by its members, who in turn use the mark to identify their goods or services and distinguish 
them from those of non-members. The “collective” itself neither sells goods nor performs 
services under a collective trademark or collective service mark, but the collective may 
advertise or otherwise promote the goods or services sold or rendered by its members under 
the mark.
867
  
 
Collective trademarks as such are unprotected at common law because the common law right 
to exclude others from appropriating a trademark can only be acquired by its owner through 
previous use.
868
 Collective trademarks originated abroad among loose organizations of 
producers desiring to indicate the regional origin of their goods. Because these foreign marks 
were protected in the United States under international agreement, Congress made collective 
marks available to American producers to put its citizens on parity with the citizens and 
                                                          
865
 15 USC § 1127. 
866
 USPTO (n 655) 4; Belson (n 813) 21. 
867
 Aloe Crème Laboratories, Inc. v. American Society for Aesthetic Plastic Surgery, Inc., 192 USPQ 170, 173 
(TTAB 1976); 15 USC § 1127; USPTO ‘glossary’ <http://www.uspto.gov/main/glossary/index.html#c>; WIPO 
understands collective marks as “signs which distinguish the geographical origin, material, mode of manufacture 
or other common characteristics of goods or services of different enterprises using the collective mark. The 
owner may be either an association of which those enterprises are members or any other entity, including a 
public institution or a cooperative.” See 
<http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/collective_marks/collective_marks.htm>. 
868
 Note (n 816) 528.  
144 
 
associations of foreign countries.
869
According to Belson, the collective trademark has its 
origin in medieval guild marks. The earliest guilds were religious or social associations. Later 
forms of guild were formed to control specific trades and protect their members’ trading 
interests. The guild as such did not carry on a trade. That was left to the individual members, 
acting independently and subject to the by-laws of the guild, by controlling, among other 
things, the use of markings on products, the guilds controlled, policed, and enforced 
standards of workmanship, the quality of merchandise, and weights and measures.
870
 Article 
7bis of the Paris Convention obliges member States to protect collective marks belonging to 
associations “even if such associations do not possess an industrial or commercial 
establishment.”871 The provision was first introduced in the 1911 Washington Conference of 
the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and was further 
elaborated by the Revision Conference of London in 1934.
872
 In the United States collective 
marks have been registrable to foreign and domestic association since 1936 and 1938 
respectively. In 1936, the US trademark law was amended to provide for registration of 
collective marks to associations located in foreign countries, in order to implement treaty 
obligations. However, the registration of collective marks owned by domestic associations 
was refused until legislation provided for such registrations. In this only achieved in 1938. 
873
 
The 1938 amendment of the Trademark Act of 1905 provides for registration of a mark by an 
owner who “exercises legitimate control over the use of a collective mark.”874 The purpose of 
this bill is to accord “the same privilege to American industrialists, which is now given under 
our laws to foreign industrialists.”875 
 
The nature and function collective trademark have been controversial. Some commentators 
treat collective trademarks just like regular trademarks.
876
 According to Carvalho, the word 
“trademarks” as used in the TRIPS Agreement, comprises individual and collective marks. 
This is basically because collective marks also perform the same function as trademarks if 
they are used in the same manner as individual marks to the extent that, instead of referring to 
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an individual form, they refer to a collective entity.
877
 Similarly, Beresford argues that 
collective trademarks and collective service marks indicate commercial origin of goods or 
services just as regular trademarks and service marks do, but as collective marks they indicate 
origin in members of a group rather than origin in any one member or party.
878
 Other 
commentators pay more attention on the differences between collective trademarks and 
regular trademarks. Diamond refers to collective trademarks as a special trademark system or 
agreement because they involve the use of a mark by persons other than its owner.
879
 
Breitenfeld further points the definitional contradiction between these two categories:  
 
“The Act states that a trademark is used by “a manufacturer or merchant” and that a service 
mark identifies the services of “one person.” Yet it defines a collective mark as a type of 
trademark or service mark. How can a collective mark, which by definition is used by more 
than one person, be kind of trademark or service mark, which by definition is used by only 
one person?”880 
 
The economic function of collective trademarks has been another focus of criticism. 
Collective trademarks have been criticized because they may violate the economic rationales 
behind trademark protection. As it has been pointed out, allowing “a single, shared symbol to 
identify the goods or services of several producers” may cause consumer confusion and 
prevent them from choosing preferred products.
881
 Surely, this concern may be reduced or 
eliminated by requiring the association to set standard quality to regulate the use of the 
collective trademark. But doing so will reduce competition in a given industry.
882
 By 
allowing competitors to merchandise their products in the same market under identical indicia 
of origin, the collective mark also discourages product competition.
883
 This concern seems to 
be verified by the one advocate of collective trademarks, who claims that “small entities can 
profit by joining together and forming an association. As an association, with collective 
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marks and widespread advertising, each entity is better off than it would have been by 
itself …”884  
 
Furthermore, there is a functional overlapping between collective trademarks and 
certification marks, namely, collective marks’ certifying function overlap with certification 
marks
885
 Collective marks are not defined in the same way by the various national 
legislations “but they can be said to be signs which serve not to distinguish the goods or 
services of one enterprise from those of other enterprises, but to distinguish the geographical 
origin or other common characteristics of goods or services of different enterprises which 
use the collective mark under the control of its owner. These marks generally imply a certain 
guarantee of quality.” 886  Collective marks are owned by a collective body such as, for 
example, a trade association or an association of producers or manufacturers, and serve to 
indicate that person who uses the collective mark is a member of that collectivity.
887
 
Membership in the association that is the owner of the collective mark is, generally speaking, 
subject to compliance with certain rules, such as the geographical area of production of the 
goods on which the collective mark is used, or standards of production of such goods.
888
 A 
collective mark is owned by an association or “collective” for the use of its members.889 “All 
members of the group use the mark; therefore, no one can own the mark, and the collective 
organization holds the title to the collectively used mark for the benefit of all members of the 
group. It has, however, also been observed that collective marks may also denote 
certification.
890
 As Firth has observed, the language used in the World Intellectual Property 
Organization’s training manual, which describes a collective mark as a mark that “does not 
distinguish between different concerns, but serves to distinguish goods or services with 
common characteristics from goods or services without those characteristics” seems more to 
describe a certification mark than an association mark. 
891
 The experience of U.S. law also 
shows that collective marks could function to certify. It is observed that various collective 
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trademarks owned by associations of fruit growers, which are used by their members to 
advertise their fruits, are, in effect, certify that fruit with their collective trademark is from a 
certain region and claiming that it is distinctive and superior.
892
 An agricultural cooperative 
of produce sellers is an example of a collective organization, which does not sell its own 
goods, or render services, but promotes the goods and services of its members.” 893  A 
collective trademark, for example, can be a mark such as one used by an association of 
regional fruit growers to indicate the regional origin of the fruit. Texas Grape Growers and 
Dried Fruits and Tree Nuts, California are good illustrations. “The associations, through 
advertising and marketing, attempt to distinguish, for example, “Texas Grapes” as being the 
grapes of choice. The association that owns the collective trademark “Texas Grape Growers 
Association” does not sell grapes, but its member growers do.894  
 
 
The value of having collective trademarks has been questioned by commentators. Collective 
marks are treated like regular trademark.
895
 Breitenfeld suggests that the inclusion of 
collective trademark as a category of mark independent of certification was based on a 
misunderstanding.
896
 Since the existence of collective trademarks may lead to the possibility 
of consumer confusion and anticompetitive behaviour and their function overlaps with that of 
certification marks, 
897
 there are calls for their statutory reform. It is argued that there is no 
need to have both types of marks in the same jurisdiction and that collective trademarks 
should be abolished.
898
 The first recommended solution is to abolish collective trademarks 
(but retain collective membership marks).
899
 The second solution is to retain collective 
trademarks and enact legislation to prevent their abuse.
900
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4.2.3.2 Protecting GIs as collective trademarks   
 
The Lanham Act provisionally forbids the registration of a mark that “when used on or in 
connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily geographically descriptive of them, 
except as indications of regional origin may be registrable under section 4.”901 An exception 
is allowed when the mark is registered as “indications of regional origin” as certification 
marks and collective marks.
902
 That is to say, an indication of regional origin may be 
registered as a collective mark or certification mark disregarding the lack of distinctiveness. 
Again, this feature allows geographical collective marks to cover GIs as defined under TRIPS 
Agreement.
903
 It is submitted that because collective trademarks are treated just as regular 
trademark, “government involvement with this kind of geographical indication is no different 
than it is with the trademarks HILTON HOTELS or PEPSI.” 904  When compared with 
certification marks, geographical collective trademarks may be more attractive for private 
interests because parties who produce the goods in question can still own them, and there is 
no obligation to permit anyone whose product meets the production criteria to use the mark. 
The state of Wisconsin, for example, could register a mark for “Wisconsin Cheese.” In this 
case, registration would not be hampered by its geographic descriptiveness. However, the 
exclusivity of such geographical collective trademarks is quite limited in some respects. The 
fair use defense allows others to describe, in good faith, the geographic origin of their goods. 
It is also limited to the class of goods specified in the application for registration. 
905
    
 
4.3 Measures regulating product labelling and advertising   
 
Under the US law, geographical designations are also regulated through administrative 
schemes. This takes place when geographical designations are “used on goods the marketing 
of which is subject to an administrative approval procedure, this procedure may be applied 
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also for controlling the use of geographical indications applied to those goods.” 906  This 
section examines two types of measures regulating product labelling and advertising. The 
first type involves the classification of names of geographical significance by administrative 
authorities. The use of the geographical names under the second type involves producers’ 
initiatives and application and approval by government. Under the third types, products are 
protected through an array of national and state laws and regulation.  
 
4.3.1 Classification of names of geographical significance  
 
4.3.1.1 Wines 
 
The Congress passed the Federal Alcohol Administration Act (FAA Act) in 1935.
907
 The Act 
is enacted to fill the legal vacuum created by Prohibition and its repeal.
908
 The FAA Act 
prohibits the sale of alcohol beverage products that are not labelled in conformity with 
regulations intended to prohibit consumer deception and to provide the consumer with 
adequate information about the identity of the product. It prohibits, inter alia, consumer 
deception and the use of misleading statements on labels, and ensures that labels provide the 
consumer with adequate information as to the identity and quality of the product. Section 
205(e) authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe regulations for the labelling of 
wine, distilled spirits, and malt beverages.
909
 Prior to 2003, the federal regulation governing 
labelling and advertising of wine was administered by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms (ATF). The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Alcohol and Tobacco 
Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB). Rendering the functions of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco 
and Firearms (ATF) into two new organizations with separate functions, the Act created a 
new tax and trade bureau within the Department of the Treasury, and shifted certain law 
enforcement functions of ATF to the Department of Justice. The Act called for the tax 
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collection functions to remain with the Department of the Treasury; and the new organization 
was called the “Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau.”910 TTB is an agency of the US 
Department of the Treasury created by the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
911
 The TTB is 
headed by an Administrator who performs such duties as assigned by the Under Secretary for 
Enforcement of the Department of the Treasury.
912
 The mission of TTB is to collect alcohol, 
tobacco, firearms, and ammunition excise taxes owed and to ensure that alcohol beverages 
are produced, labelled, advertised and marketed in accordance with Federal law.
913
 
 
(1) Classification of terms of geographical significance  
 
The TTB divides names of geographic significance for wines into three classes, namely, 
generic terms, semi-generic terms, and non-generic terms. Each class of names receives 
different level of protection. The classification is based on the determination of a TTB 
official’s assessment of American consumers’ perspective.914 
 
A name of geographic significance, which has not been found by the Administrator to be 
generic or semi-generic may be used only to designate wines of the origin indicated by such 
name, but such name shall not be deemed to be the distinctive designation of a wine unless 
the Administrator finds that it is known to the consumer and to the trade as the designation of 
a specific wine of a particular place or region, distinguishable from all other wines.
915
 (2) 
Examples of nongeneric names which are not distinctive designations of specific grape wines 
are: American, California, Lake Erie, Napa Valley, New York State, French, Spanish. 
Additional examples of foreign nongeneric names are listed in subpart C of part 12 of this 
chapter.
916
 Examples of nongeneric names which are also distinctive designations of specific 
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grape wines are: Bordeaux Blanc, Bordeaux Rouge, Graves, Medoc, Saint-Julien, Chateau 
Yquem, Chateau Margaux, Chateau Lafite, Pommard, Chambertin, Montrachet, Rhone, 
Liebfraumilch, Rudesheimer, Forster, Deidesheimer, Schloss Johannisberger, Lagrima, and 
Lacryma Christi. A list of foreign distinctive designations, as determined by the 
Administrator, appears in subpart D of part 12 of this chapter.
917
 
 
A name of geographic significance which is also the designation of a class or type of wine, 
shall be deemed to have become generic only if so found by the Administrator.
918
 Examples 
of generic names, originally having geographic significance, which are designations for a 
class or type of wine may include Vermouth and Sake.
919
 
 
A name of geographic significance, which is also the designation of a class or type of wine, 
shall be deemed to have become semi-generic only if so found by the Administrator. Semi-
generic designations may be used to designate wines of an origin other than that indicated by 
such name only if there appears in direct conjunction therewith an appropriate appellation of 
origin disclosing the true place of origin of the wine, and if the wine so designated conforms 
to the standard of identity, if any, for such wine contained in the regulations in this part or, if 
there be no such standard, to the trade understanding of such class or type.
920
 Examples of 
semi-generic names which are also type designations for grape wines are Angelica, Burgundy, 
Claret, Chablis, Champagne, Chianti, Malaga, Marsala, Madeira, Moselle, Port, Rhine Wine 
(syn. Hock), Sauterne, Haut Sauterne, Sherry, and Tokay.
921
 
 
(2) Controversies over semi-generic terms  
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The category of semi-generic terms has been a source of controversy. First, it is contended 
that this category is “a contradiction of its mandate to protect the public against deceptive and 
misleading practices in the alcohol industry”.922 The ATF has allowed winemakers to use 
“semi-generic” regional names to designate wines of an origin other than that indicated by 
the regional name, with the proviso that the winemaker place the true appellation of origin 
somewhere on the label as well. According to Josel, the real purpose of this policy is to 
enable “American winemakers to sell an entire line of domestically-grown wine products 
commonly referral to as “jug wines” with centuries-old A.O.C. regional classifications on 
their labels.”923 By doing so, it allows US products to be marketed on the goodwill and 
reputation of French wine, dilutes the original product’s reputation in the eyes of its 
consumers, confuses the consumer who is untrained in the complexities of the B.A.T.F wine 
classifications, and allows the use of the French AOC regional names that have acquired 
widespread secondary meaning, and may therefore amount to an infringement of an 
unregistered trademark under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
924
 Secondly, the term “semi-generic” 
is new to the trademark lexicon. It is not entirely clear where and how such classifications fit 
into the Lanham Act’s analysis of the spectrum of distinctiveness.925 The only way to know 
what this term really means is through the examples provided by the TTB.
926
 Without any 
apparent logic or justification, the TTB includes the region of AOC Sauternes and its smaller, 
more famous, subset region of AOC Haut Sauternes together under the same semi-generic 
category. Similarly, it is difficult to understand how the AOC Sauternes region has been 
given only a semi-generic classification, while the neighbouring AOC Graves region has 
been classified as “nongeneric name which are also distinctive designations of specific grape 
wines. Confusion also arises 
927
 Farley argues that the category of semi-generic fails to 
comply with TRIPS GI provision. The TRIPS Agreement prohibits false GIs used in 
connection with wines or spirits, even where the true origin of the goods is indicated. There is 
an exception where the term has become generic. However, semi-generic is not mentioned in 
TRIPS and, therefore, there is no exception for terms that have become semi-generic.
928
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In response to Articles 23 and 24 of the TRIPS Agreement, the US Congress amended 
applicable ATF laws under the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 
1997 amends 26 U.S.C 5388 governing the use of semi-generic wine designations by adding 
a new subsection (c) to the latter.
 929
 This amendment allows the U.S. wine makers to use 
semi-generic designations on wine not produced in that area if they disclose the true place of 
origin in direct conjunction with the borrowed indication and the wine conforms to the 
standard of identity as set forth in the regulations.
930
 According to Murphy, this amendment 
represents the victory of “American vintners’ lobbying efforts.” 931  The effect of this 
amendment is multi-fold. First, it clarifies American producers’ ability to use semi-generic 
terms.
932
 More importantly, it allows any producer who has permissibly used a geographical 
indicator to continue using it regardless of how long he or she has done so because “26 USC 
5388 lacking any requirement that a producer must have used a geographical indicator for a 
certain term before becoming eligible for an exception.” 933  Secondly, by incorporating 
verbatim the list of “semi-generic” names provided in 27 CFR 4.24(b), the statute actually 
takes away TTB’s discretionary power to expand the list of protected “non-generic” 
geographical indicators.
934
 It is, thus, “more difficult for the U.S. Trade Representative to 
‘trade away’ the semi-generic names in trade discussions with the European Union.”935 Rose 
thus takes this amendment as evidence of the “lack of respect” the United States has 
historically shown for Articles 23 and 24 of the TRIPS Agreement.
 936
  Brody argues that this 
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federal legislation, in fact, contravenes the United States’ TRIPS obligations by strengthening 
American producers’ ability to use false or inaccurate but non-misleading GIs.937 Lindquist 
contends that, by doing so, the US Congress “tested the boundaries” of TRIPS Article 23” 
and ignored the EU’s desire to see the semi-generic names as protected GIs.938 
 
On March 10, 2006 the United States and the European Community signed the Agreement 
between the United States of American and the European Community on Trade in Wine. This 
Agreement provides for, inter alia, the United States limiting the use of certain semi-generic 
names in the US market and recognizing certain names of origin in each other’s market.939 
The US agrees to seek legislative changes to limit the use of 16 semi-generic names, as well 
as retsina used on wine labels.  The names covered by the Agreement include: burgundy, 
chablis, champagne, chianti, claret, haute sauterne, hock, madeira, malaga, marsala, moselle, 
port, retsina, rhine, sauterne, sherry, and tokay (Article 6 and Annex II). First, with regard to 
semi-generic terms of origin, under Section 1 of Article 6, the United States pledges to seek a 
change in legal status for a set of 17 generic terms such that these terms can only be used on 
wines produced in the European Community.
940
 Wine labels that do not conform to this 
provision are to be blocked form the market.
941
 Section 2 of Article 6 is a grandfather clause 
whereby Section 1 does not apply to winemakers using a prohibited term as defined by 
Annex II “where such use has occurred in the United States” before the later of December 13, 
2005, or the signing of the Wine Agreement.
942
 In addition, the wine labels for wines 
employing semi-generic terms must comply with the BATF regulations that were in force as 
of September 14, 2005.
943
 Accordingly, such labels must indicate the wine’s true origin as the 
United States.
944
 The US Congress codified these provisions as section 422 of the Tax Relief 
and Health Care Act of 2006, which was signed into law by President Bush on December 20, 
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2006. The new rules grandfather existing uses of these semi-generic names, but prohibit new 
brands from using these names on non-European wine.
 945
    
 
4.3.1.2 Spirit drinks  
 
For spirit drinks, the TTB sets a three-part classification scheme: (i) generic names; (ii) non-
generic distinctive names; (iii) non-generic non-distinctive names.
946
 Only such geographical 
names for distilled spirits as the appropriate TTB officer finds have by usage and common 
knowledge lost their geographical significance to such extent that they have become generic 
shall be deemed to have become generic. Examples are London dry gin, Geneva (Hollands) 
gin.
947
 Geographical names that are not names for distinctive types of distilled spirits, and 
that have not become generic, shall not be applied to distilled spirits produced in any other 
place than the particular place or region indicated in the name. Examples are Cognac, 
Armagnac, Greek brandy, Pisco brandy, Jamaica rum, Puerto Rico rum, Demerara rum.
948
 
Geographical names for distinctive types of distilled spirits (other than names found by the 
appropriate TTB officer under paragraph (k)(2) of this section to have become generic) shall 
not be applied to distilled spirits produced in any other place than the particular region 
indicated by the name, unless (i) in direct conjunction with the name there appears the word 
“type” or the word “American” or some other adjective indicating the true place of 
production, in lettering substantially as conspicuous as such name, and (ii) the distilled spirits 
to which the name is applied conform to the distilled spirits of that particular region. The 
following are examples of distinctive types of distilled spirits with geographical names that 
have not become generic: Eau de Vie de Dantzig (Danziger Goldwasser), Ojen, Swedish 
punch. Geographical names for distinctive types of distilled spirits shall be used to designate 
only distilled spirits conforming to the standard of identity, if any, for such type specified in 
this section, or if no such standard is so specified, then in accordance with the trade 
understanding of that distinctive type.
949
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“Highlands” and similar words connoting, indicating, or commonly associated with Scotland, 
shall not be used to designate any product not wholly produced in Scotland.
950
 
 
It is commented by O’Connor that the protection of GIs in the case of spirits is less clear than 
in the case of wine and the classification is, again, inconsistent with Article 23.1 of the 
TRIPS Agreement.
951
  
 
4.3.1.3 Cheese names  
 
The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is an agency of the United States Department 
of Health and Human Services and is responsible for protecting the public health by assuring 
the safety, efficacy, and security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, medical 
devices, food supply, cosmetics, and products that emit radiation. The FDA is also 
responsible for advancing the public health by helping to speed innovations that make 
medicines and foods more effective, safer, and more affordable; and helping the public get 
the accurate, science-based information they need to use medicines and foods to improve 
their health.
952
 FDA exercises, inter alia, regulatory authority over the labelling of food.
953
 
Food labelling is required for most “conventional foods”, including prepared foods, such as 
breads, cereals, canned and frozen foods, snacks, desserts, drinks, etc., raw produce, such as 
fruits and vegetables, and fish.
954
  
 
Under the rubric “Cheeses and related cheese products”, Part 133 of 21 CFR provides 
detailed regulations regarding the circumstances in which specific cheeses can be identified 
by particular names. These regulations, which describe the method of preparation required to 
denominate cheeses by specific names, including many names that arguably have 
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geographical significance, such as “Edam”,955  “Gorgonzola”,956  “Gouda”,957  “Gruyére”,958 
“Limburger”,959 “Mozzarella”,960 “Muenster”,961 “Neufchatel”,962 and “Roquefort”.963 Taking 
“Roquefort cheese” as an example, Section 133.184 provides a detailed description of 
“Roquefort cheese, sheep’s milk blue-mold, and blue-mold cheese from sheep’s milk”, which 
reads as follows: 
 
“Roquefort cheese, sheep's milk blue-mold cheese, blue-mold cheese from sheep's milk, is 
the food prepared by the procedure set forth in paragraph (a)(2) of this section or by any other 
procedure which produces a finished cheese having the same physical and chemical 
properties. It is characterized by the presence of bluish-green mold, Penicillium roque fortii, 
throughout the cheese. The minimum milk fat content is 50 percent by weight of the solids 
and the maximum moisture content is 45 percent by weight […] The dairy ingredients used 
may be pasteurized. Roquefort cheese is at least 60 days old.”964 
 
The effect of FDA’s regulation is not entirely clear. One commentator argues that the 
regulation in effect treats these designations as the generic names for a particular type of 
cheese rather than as an indication of geographical origin because each of these categories 
defines the cheese in question by reference to the method of production rather than its 
geographical origin.
965
 However, the actual relation between this regulation and trademark 
law is uncertain. In the Roquefort case, Faehndrich contended that because the FDA had 
ruled that sheep’s milk blue-mold cheese may be known as “Roquefort,” The District Court 
rejected this defense. “The standards of identity adopted by the Food and Drug 
Administration for sheep’s milk blue-mode cheese are not helpful to the defendant…The fact 
that such product may be called Roquefort does not mean that the name is available to anyone 
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who chooses to use it. Defendant argues: ‘To say that no one can use the word “Roquefort” in 
describing the cheese is to say that no one can make Roquefort Cheese.’ In the first place, 
anyone can make sheep’s milk blue-mold cheese and can market it under any name he sees fit 
except that if it is not made it in the Community of Roquefort, he may not call it ‘Roquefort 
Cheese.’”966 
 
4.3.1.4 Agricultural products  
 
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) is a United States Federal Executive 
Department (or Cabinet Department).
967
 The “general design and duties” of the USDA are to 
“acquire and to diffuse among the people of the United States useful information on subjects 
connected with agriculture, rural development, aquaculture, and human nutrition, in the most 
general and comprehensive sense of those terms, and to procure, propagate, and distribute 
among the people new and valuable seeds and plants.” 968  The USDA uses its labelling 
provisions to regulate labelling of origin.
969
 Section 317.8 of Part 9 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, which prohibits “false or misleading labelling or practices”, provides that “no 
product or any of its wrappers, packaging, or other containers shall bear any false or 
misleading marking, label, or other labelling and no statement, word, picture, design, or 
device which conveys any false impression or gives any false indication of origin or quality 
or is otherwise false or misleading shall appear in any marking or other labelling.”970 
 
However, this provision also conditionally allows the use of terms “having geographical 
significance with reference to a locality other than that in which the product is prepared” on 
labels or containers of products: “Terms having geographical significance with reference to a 
locality other than that in which the product is prepared may appear on the label only when 
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qualified by the word style, type, or brand, as the case may be, in the same size and style of 
lettering as in the geographical term, and accompanied with a prominent qualifying statement 
identifying the country, State, Territory, or locality in which the product is prepared, using 
terms appropriate to effect the qualification.”971 Qualifications may be exempted when a 
geographical term has come into general usage as a trade name and has been approved by the 
Administrator as being a generic term. The provision further provides a list of geographic 
terms the use of which “need not be accompanied with the word style, type, or brand, or a 
statement identifying the locality in which the product is prepared”: (i) The terms frankfurter, 
vienna, bologna, lebanon bologna, braunschweiger, thuringer, genoa, leona, berliner, holstein, 
goteborg, milan, polish, italian, and their modifications, as applied to sausages; (2) the terms 
Brunswick and irish as applied to stews and; (3) the term boston as applied to pork shoulder 
butts.
972
 
 
4.3.2 Appellations of origin and viticultural areas 
 
The US has an expanding wine industry. To protect its domestic markets, US created 
regulations that deal with the establishment of geographical regions. The TTB regulations 
recognize American viticultural areas (AVAs). By identifying domestic areas as regions 
where quality products are produced, the US allows wine producers to market their wines 
under names that imply quality and consistency.
973
 On the other hand, the United States wine 
and spirits industries do benefit from their own nomenclature rules, as well as from Article 24 
of the TRIPS Agreement.
974
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The TTB also administers “appellations of origin.”975 Here, the term “appellation of origin” is 
used in a sense different from that under the Lisbon Agreement. The TTB understands an 
appellation of origin as “another name for the place in which the dominant grapes used in the 
wine were grown.”976 The United States recognizes appellations of origin for both American 
wine and foreign wine.
977
 An American appellation of origin can be the name of the United 
States, a State, two or three States which are contiguous, a county, two or three counties in 
the same States, or geographic region called a viticultural area.
978
 There are three 
requirements for an American wine to be entitled to an appellation of origin other than a 
multicounty or multistate appellation, or a viticultural area: (i) At least 75 percent of the wine 
is derived from fruit or agricultural products grown in the appellation area indicated; (ii) it 
has been fully finished (except for cellar treatment pursuant to §4.22(c), and blending which 
does not result in an alteration of class or type under §4.22(b)) in the United States, if labelled 
“American”; or, if labelled with a State appellation, within the labelled State or an adjacent 
State; or if labelled with a county appellation, within the State in which the labelled county is 
located; and (iii) it conforms to the laws and regulations of the named appellation area 
governing the composition, method of manufacture, and designation of wines made in such 
place.
979
 
 
An appellation of origin for imported wine may be a country, a state, province, territory, or 
similar political subdivision of a country equivalent to a state or county; or a viticultural 
area.
980
 An imported wine is entitled to an appellation of origin other than a viticultural area 
if: (i) At least 75 per cent of the wine is derived from fruit or agricultural products grown in 
the area indicated by the appellation of origin and (ii) The wine conforms to the requirements 
of the foreign laws and regulations governing the composition, method of production, and 
designation of wines available for consumption within the country of origin.
981
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The TTB rules distinguish appellations that refer to political subdivisions, such as a county, a 
state, a county or political equivalent in foreign countries and appellations refer to viticultural 
areas.
982
 More stringent requirements are set for appellations of origin referring to a specific 
viticultural area rather than to an appellation of origin based on a political subdivision.
983
 In 
the United States, beginning in 1978, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) 
began establishing “American Viticultural Areas”. 984  The TTB regulations and practices 
understand a viticultural area for American wine as “a delimited grape-growing region 
distinguishable by geographical features, the boundaries of which have been recognized and 
defined” under Title 27 of the Code of Federal Regulations.985 A wine may be labelled with a 
viticultural area appellation if: (i) The appellation has been approved under part 9 of this title 
or by the appropriate foreign government; (ii) Not less than 85 percent of the wine is derived 
from grapes grown within the boundaries of the viticultural area; (iii) In the case of foreign 
wine, it conforms to the requirements of the foreign laws and regulations governing the 
composition, method of production, and designation of wines available for consumption 
within the country of origin; and (iv) In the case of American wine, it has been fully finished 
within the State, or one of the States, within which the labelled viticultural area is located 
(except for cellar treatment pursuant to §4.22(c), and blending which does not result in an 
alteration of class and type under §4.22(b)).
986
 
 
Any interested party may make a petition for the establishment of an AVA to the 
Administrator of TTB.
987
 TTB uses “the informal rulemaking process, under 5 U.S.C. 533” in 
establishing viticultural areas.
988
 A petition must be made in writing and contain the 
following information: (i) Evidence that the name of the viticultural area is locally and/or 
nationally known as referring to the area specified in the application; (ii) Historical or current 
evidence that the boundaries of the viticultural area are as specified in the application; (iii) 
Evidence relating to the geographical features (climate, soil, elevation, physical features, etc.) 
which distinguish the viticultural features of the proposed area from surrounding areas; (iv) 
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The specific boundaries of the viticultural area, based on features which can be found on 
United States Geological Survey (U.S.G.S.) maps of the largest applicable scale; and (v) A 
copy of the appropriate U.S.G.S. map(s) with the boundaries prominently marked.
989
 For 
imported wine, the TTB accepts the definition of the viticultural area under foreign law.
990
 
 
If the petition is successful, the regulations allow the name of an approved AVA to be used as 
an appellation of origin in the labelling and advertising of wine. Thus, the general rule is that 
wineries and bottlers are prohibited from using an AVA name as a brand name unless the 
wine they produce satisfies the appellation of origin requirements. For example, a winery 
cannot use the term “Napa Valley” in a brand name, unless the wine conforms to Napa 
Valley AVA requirement.
991
 
 
The Department of the Treasury decided to establish “the Snipes Mountain” viticultural area 
in Yakima County, Washington
992
. This AVA covers 4,145-acre of land. The effective date 
of this AVA is February 20, 2009.
993
 The petition proposing the establishment of the Snipes 
Mountain viticultural area was submitted by Mr. Todd Newhouse of the Upland Winery in 
Outlook, Washington on behalf of the grape growers in the Snipe Mountain area.
994
 TTB 
publishes Notice No. 82 regarding the proposed Snipes Mountain viticultual area in Federal 
Register (73 FR 22883) on April 28, 2008. In that notice, TTB invited comments by June 27, 
2008, from all interested persons.
995
 After “careful review of the petition and the comments 
received”, TTB finds that the evidence submitted supports the establishment of the proposed 
AVA. Therefore, under the authority of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act and part of 
the TTB regulations, the TTB establishes the “Snipes Mountain” viticultural area, effective 
30 days from the publication.
996
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4.3.3 Protection of “Vidalia” for Onions  
 
“Vidalia Onion” illustrates how national and local governments interact to protect the name 
and quality of a regional specialty. The name “Vidalia onion” is protected under an array of 
state and federal laws, including the Georgia Vidalia Onion Act of 1986, federal certification 
mark registration, the Federal Marketing Order No. 955 (1989), and products produced in 
distinct geographical areas.  
 
4.3.3.1 The Georgia Vidalia Onion Act of 1986 
 
It is observed that “[t]he strongest form of legal protection for geographical indications in the 
United States may be found in state law. Some state statutes restrict the use of specific 
geographical indications associated with local specialty products.” These state statutes have 
limited territorial effect and do nothing to protect importers of foreign food or beverage 
products.
997
 An example of such law is Georgia’s “Vidalia” onions. The Georgia Vidalia 
Onion Act of 1986 defines Vidalia onions as onions produced in 13 counties and portions of 
seven others, all in the state of Georgia. Vidalia onions are a yellow granex hybrid that is 
grown in many other part of the country, but it is “only in the defined production area that the 
soil and climate combine to produce the special characteristics of the sweet Vidalia onion.” 
The Act provides for criminal and civil penalties for the selling, packaging, or labeling of any 
onion which fails to conform to these definitions.
998
 
 
4.3.1.2 Certification mark 
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“VIDALIA” for fresh onions is federally registered as a certification mark in 1992. The 
owner of this certification mark is the Georgia Department of Agriculture.
999
 This 
certification mark is intended to be used by persons authorized by certifier, and will certify 
that the goods in connection with which it is used are yellow Granex type onions and are 
grown by authorized growers within the Vidalia onion production area in Georgia as defined 
in the Georgia Vidalia onion act of 1986.
1000
 
 
4.3.1.3 The Federal Marketing Order 
 
Vidalia Onions are subject to US Federal Marketing Order No. 955.
1001
 Marketing orders 
originated in the 1920s. Farmers tried to impose guidelines regulating crops voluntarily. In 
1937, the Federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act was passed.
1002
 Marketing orders 
are enforced directly through government power. They join the regulatory authority of the 
United States government with the self-administration by producers in an attempt to enhance 
the economic condition of producers. Producers subject to marketing orders relinquish some 
of their power in making marketing decisions. While handlers and consumers receive some 
benefits from marketing orders, producers seem to experience a greater advantage.
1003
 The 
purpose of marketing orders is to “establish and maintain…orderly marketing conditions for 
agricultural commodities in interstate commerce…” and “to protect the interest of the 
consumer.” Marketing orders are created to promote production, further research and 
development projects, and set “minimum standards of quality, maturity, grading and 
inspection requirements.” Marketing orders are “designed to help stabilize market conditions” 
for agricultural commodities, thereby preventing “unreasonable fluctuations in supplies sand 
prices.”1004 There are six categories of activities: (i) Control of total quantity or surplus; (ii) 
Grade, size, maturity or other quality control; (iii) Regulation of flow to market; (iv) Pack 
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and/or container regulation; (v) Assessment for research; (vi) Assessment for advertising and 
promotion.
1005
  The things that marketing order do: “These activities are the sorts of things 
large firms in other industries would do.” 1006  The legal status of the marketing order 
committee is an unsettled issue.
1007
 Federal marketing orders provide limited antitrust 
immunity.
 1008
 Collusive action to control production to fix price is illegal. But it is not illegal 
for a single firm to control production of its own product. Marketing orders are created to 
allow a group of farmers to act like a single firm to control the total production and 
marketing.
1009
Federal Marketing Orders and international trade: Section 8(e) of the 
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act (AMAA) states that whenever standards are imposed 
under a Federal Marketing Order, imports of these commodities must meet the same 
standards. Under the federal marketing order, imported commodities also must comply with 
the federal standards before they may be sold on the United States market.
1010
 This provision 
was a source of contention in the 1994 U.S.-Mexico trade negotiations. On one hand, section 
8(e) permits the imposition of standards on foreign imports, and therefore is a trade barrier. 
On the other hand, section 8(e) requires the same standard applied to both domestic- and 
foreign-produced goods, so that the standards do not explicitly discriminate against 
imports.
1011
 
 
4.3.1.4 Products produced in distinct geographic areas        
 
Vidalia onions are subject also to a protective measure known as “products produced in 
distinct geographical areas”1012 By virtue of this measure, no person may use the unique 
name or geographical designation of such commodity to promote the sale of a similar 
commodity produced outside such area, State, or region if the following three requirements 
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are met: (i) Subject to a Federal marketing order under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement 
Act of 1937; (ii) Traditionally identified as being produced in a distinct geographic area, 
State, or region; and (iii) The unique identity, based on such distinct geographic area, of 
which has been promoted with funds collected through producer contributions pursuant to 
such marketing orders.
 1013
A violation of this section is considered an unfair conduct as 
stipulated under paragraphs (4) and (5) of section 2 of the Perishable Agricultural 
Commodities Act and thus incurs monetary penalty not to exceed $2,000 in lieu of a formal 
proceeding for the suspension or revocation of license, any payment so made to be deposited 
into the Treasury of the United States as miscellaneous receipts. 
1014
  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
US law does not recognize GIs as a sui generis category of IP. The United States protects GIs 
through a number of regimes deriving from a collection of unrelated laws and regulations. 
These laws and regulations serve different policy objectives and consumer protection and the 
prevention of unfair competition are only part of them. There is an inherent incompatibility 
between the concepts of trademarks and GIs. Although included under the Lanham Act, 
certification marks and collective trademarks are two special categories of marks. In US, the 
origins of both categories of marks were in some connected to the protection of geographical 
designations. Conceptually, these two categories of marks better accommodate GIs. However, 
being subject to the general principles of trademark law, the protection for GIs that these two 
categories of marks can provide is rather limited and uncertain. Administrative schemes 
regulating product labeling and advertising are used to regulate commercial use of 
geographical designations. These regulations serve diverse policy goals, ranging from 
consumer protection, domestic producer protection, to facilitate the development of specific 
industry.  
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Chapter 5 The EU Sui Generis Paradigm 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
This Chapter explores the relation between GIs and IP in the context of EU sui generis GI 
paradigm.  It consists of three main parts. First, it introduces the historical and theoretical 
foundations of sui generis GI law.  Secondly, it provides a close examination of sui generis 
GI law by examining EU GI regulation for agro-food products. This includes a close look at 
the policy background against which the EU introduced the GI Regulation for agricultural 
products and foodstuffs and the legal mechanism administering and protecting GIs. Thirdly, it 
explores two most controversial issues concerning the GI-IP relation, namely, the IP status of 
sui generis GIs and the justifiability of granting such protection. As it will be concluded that 
EU sui generis GIs constitute a unique species of IP.    
 
5.2 Historical and theoretical foundations  
 
5.2.1 Historical foundation  
 
The early history of sui generis GI law is obscure. It is generally agreed that GI law has its 
origin in France.
1015
 However, there is no consensus on the exact time of beginning. 
According to O’Connor, the first product that was specifically protected via registration 
concerning its appellation of origin was the French cheese Roquefort, dating back to the 15
th
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century.
1016
 Caenegem traces the origin of French GI protection as an instrument devised to 
ensure that poor soil areas were indirectly protected or subsidized. Prior to the French 
Revolution of 1789, two privileges were granted to the winegrowers of the Bordeaux region. 
First, wines came from outlying regions, not being part of the Bordeaux area, were not to be 
brought down by river for sale before 11 November of each year. This is said to be able to 
give the Bordeaux wines a valuable window of monopoly over the sale of wines into the 
lucrative markets of England and Holland. Secondly, the wines of Bordeaux were the only 
ones entitled to barrels of special form and dimensions, allowing the wines of Bordeaux 
travel better during export.
1017
 These privileges were abolished on 4 August 1789 as a result 
of the Revolution. In fighting for their privileges, residents of Bordeaux invoked rural policy 
as one of the reasons against abolition. It was argued that apart from guaranteeing the 
genuineness of the crus (vintages) for foreigners, these privileges were granted to encourage 
the growing of vine in the land of Bordeaux, which was not amenable to the growing of other 
crops. Such protectionist measures “allowed the people of Bordeaux to build up a financial 
surplus so they could afford to import grain to feed the population.”1018  Based on such 
historical evidence, Caenegem concludes that “[i]t was for the purpose of ensuring that poor 
soil areas were indirectly protected or subsidized in relation to growing vines that much of 
the original geographically-based protection systems were devised.”1019 Hughes considers the 
appellations law as “a modern phenomenon” created in 1855 when the Medoc vineyards of 
Bordeaux were classified.
1020
 In 1919, the French legislature enacted a more protective 
measure that recognized quality as a factor in production of certain goods, notably wine and 
cheese, and created appellations of origin. Under the legislation, a product could bear the 
appellation of origin if all of its ingredients came from the geographical region indicated. 
Harvesters, distillers, wholesalers, and shippers of wine faced serious penalties for fraudulent 
misrepresentation of origin.
1021
 The Law of July 4, 1931 began the appellation controlée 
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system and officially recognized appellations of origin as titles of quality.
1022
 The system of 
appellations controlée provided for regulation and control of wine labelling and ensures the 
uniformity of production conditions and quality of particular wines.
1023
 The decret-loi of July 
39, 193 for wines, eaux-de-vie, champagne, and mousseux established the L’Institut national 
des appellations d’origine. The Institut had two main functions, namely, to set standards and 
monitor appellations d’origines controlée (AOC) and to defend against fraud.1024 
 
The development of Champagne is often used to illustrate the historical development of sui 
generis GI law. “Champagne” enjoys a unique and celebrated status in the world of GIs. The 
Champagne name was “one of the very first appellations of origin to be recognized by 
legislators and is one of the oldest and most famous in the world.”1025 It has been hailed as 
the “crown jewel of all GIs.” 1026  For marketing experts, Champagne represents a true 
international success. Champagne is one of the few products on the global wine market to 
enjoy sustained export success and healthy profits.
1027
  Champagne has achieved the status of 
a cultural icon, which is central to the process of European social transformation between the 
late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century.
1028
 The Comité interprofessionnel du Vin de Champagne or, 
CIVC, the representative body of all interest parties of Champagne, is the model for all such 
organizations, such as, the consorzio of Italy and Spain’s consejo regulador.1029  Use of the 
name Champagne has been “the cause of riot and bloodshed, the impetus for convening 
multilateral conventions, the subject of international litigation and the cause for profound 
speculation in numerous books and articles.”1030  
 
                                                          
1022
 Lori E. Simon, ‘Appellation of Origin: The Continuing Controversy’ 5 Nw J Int’l L & Bus (1983-1984) 132, 
145. 
1023
 Simon (n 1022) 132, 145, at n. 67.  
1024
 Simon (n 1022) 132, 145 
1025
 WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Comité Interprofessionel du Vin de Champagne (CIVC) v. 
Richard Doyle, Case No. DIE2007-0005.  
1026
 Annette Kur, ‘Quibbling Siblings—Commenting to Dev Ganjee’s Presentation’ 82 Chi-Kent L Rev (2007) 
1317, 1321 at n. 12.   
1027
 Anne Sharp and James Smith, ‘Champagne’s Sparkling Success’ 8 International Market Review (1991) 13, 
13.  
1028
 Kolleen M. Guy, ‘“Oiling the Wheels of Social Life”: Myths and Marketing in Champagne during the Belle 
Epoque’ 22 French Historical Studies (1999) 211, 212. 
1029
 Jancis Robinson, The Oxford Companion to Wines (3
rd
 edn, OUP 2006) 190.  
1030
 Alfred Philip Knoll, ‘Champagne’ 19 Int’l & Comp L Q (1970) 309, 309.  
170 
 
Champagne, with its three champagne towns Rheims, Epernay, and Ay, was the first region 
to make sparkling wine in any quantity.
1031
 Between 1668 and 1746, the name “Champagne” 
had come to designate a sparkling wine that was produced in the Champagne Province of 
France.
1032
 The Champagne business as we know it today was, however, born in the first 40 
years of the 19
th
 century.
1033
 By 1853 the total had reached twenty millions bottles. 
Remarkably, much of Champagne’s success depended on exporting market, such as Germany, 
Britain, the United States, and Russia, rather than on the French market.
1034
 During this 
period, Champagne had become the world’s first “wine industry”, dominated by a number of 
internationally famous brand names.
1035
 The success of Champagne attracted not only 
consumers but also imitators and fraudsters. The French Law of July 1824 treated false 
indications of source in the same manner as to the manufacturer. This law was a criminal 
statute that punished all false representations as to a product’s origin, whether it consisted of 
a French mark, a French commercial name, or a French appellation of origin.
1036
 Relying on 
this statute, a group of merchants of Champagne brought an action against a M. Bernard who 
had branded the corks of his sparkling Saumur with the name Ay and Verzy.
1037
  Fraud came 
not only from outside, but also from inside, the Champagne area. It is reported that Bollinger, 
a Champagne house founded in 1829,
1038
 successfully prosecuted two growers who delivered 
grapes which had come from other communes.
1039
   
 
The period between 1840s and 1890s has been hailed as “Champagne’s most untroubled and 
glorious epoch.”1040 During this period, Champagne’s most important market was not in 
France, but in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Russia.
1041
 This period also saw the 
gradual genericization of the name champagne.
1042
 Competition from lower price products, 
such as German Sekt and Italian Asti Spumante increased and the quality of real champagne 
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was not necessarily superior to some of the alternatives.
1043
 In order to take effective 
collective action to promote the drink in international market and to prevent the genericzation 
and misrepresentation of the name Champagne within and without France, the “Syndicat du 
Commerce des vins de Champagne”, initiated by some major Champagne houses, was 
formed in 1882.
1044
 The purpose of the Syndicat was to defend the name and reputation of 
champagne. As soon as it was established, the Syndicat started to “use every weapon it could, 
through law suits as well as intervention by the French authorities at home and abroad.” 1045 
The Syndicat, for example, wrote to French consuls asking help from the French government 
against German law which it claimed actively helped fraudsters.
1046
 The Syndicat fought a 
long battle against its own government to secure a reduction in the tax on the sugar its 
members used.
1047
 Champagne was also the “impetus” behind the Madrid Agreement and 
Lisbon Agreement.
1048
 Faith describes the Madrid Agreement as the “first diplomatic victory” 
of the “Syndicat du Commerce des vins de Champagne”.1049 
 
The arrival of phyllexora in 1890 started a new phase of the history of Champagne. This vine 
plague caused a major shortage of grapes and forced merchants to search for new sources of 
supply, often in foreign countries, and through the production of artificial wines. This 
development altered the distribution of power in the commodity chain, strengthening the 
position of the merchants while weakening that of the growers. Growers reacted to this 
change by seeking institutional changes and demanding government intervention.
1050
 
Collective action by growers within Champagne had been existed since 1850s when a 
fungoid disease was affecting the grapes. The arrival of phylloxera in 1890 led to the need of 
further collective measures to combat the plague, to avert disaster and to replant the 
vineyards.
1051
 The Association syndicale autorisée por la défense des vignes contre le 
phylloxera was formed by 17,370 growers in 1891. The Assiociation syndicale had the legal 
power to uproot and destroy diseased vines. A large number of associations were also created 
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at the village level. In March 1898, the Association Viticole Champenoise (AVC) was 
established as an umbrella organization on the initiative of some leading champagne houses 
to provide funds and practical helps to individual local syndicates. The AVC was accepted by 
the growers because it allowed the growers to retained full control over the local decision 
making.
1052
 The Phylloxera also created what Gangjee called “[i]deal conditions…for the 
fraudulent misrepresentation of origin.”1053 Since the beginning, Champagne introduced a 
new concept in the wine industry because the manufacturing methods of Champagne require 
time and capital investment beyond the reach of almost any farmer. The industrialists, thus, 
found it easy to dominate his suppliers simply by refusing to buy grapes until they were in 
danger of becoming worthless and the farmer grew desperate. There was no any workable 
regulation to prevent producers from buying grapes outside the region because it “was not 
then defined in any meaningful way by law.”1054 A ruling in 1889 made it illegal for French 
producers from outside the Marne to use the term Champagne or vins de champagne but it 
was not illegal for the Champagne houses to buy wine from elsewhere and then manufacture 
it locally as Champagne. The Syndicat du commerce used a voluntary code of conduct, 
requiring members to sell as “Champagne” only wines that were produced from locally 
grown grapes and made in the region. This control had not been effective and had no effect 
on producers outside the Syndicat.
1055
 The major shortage caused by phylloxera forced 
merchants to search for new sources of supply from outside traditional champagne region. 
This development resulted in the fall of prices of grapes as well as the profits of grape 
growers and the strengthening of the market power of the merchants. To overcome the 
situation, growers resorted to further collective action and government intervention. In 
August 1904 a new collective organization, the Fédération des syndicats viticoles de la 
Champagne, was established by grape growers specifically to control fraud. Also worried 
about the declining reputation of champagne, some members of the merchants’ Syndicat 
agreed with the Fédération on the official boundaries of the true champagne. The Fédération 
played an important role in attaching a clause to the 1905 legislation on consumer protection 
that referred to establishing regional appellations.
1056
 By doing so, the 1905 law offered “a 
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political opportunity to restrict the market power of houses specializing in cheap 
champagne.” 1057  The 1905 law raised another problem. The task for establishing the 
geographical boundaries was left to the Ministry of Agriculture. Growers who were excluded 
from the appellation and merchants specializing in cheap champagne immediately started 
lobbying the Ministry. Growers faced further economic difficulties after the poor harvest of 
1908 and 1910.
1058
 The discontent finally led to the outbreak of the Champagne riots of 1910 
and 1911.
1059
  In 1911, troops were summoned to stop the destruction of large quantities of 
wines that had been brought from outside the Champagne region for making into 
Champagne.
1060
 The Champagne area was demarcated in 1911 and 1927 respectively. The 
current Champagne production area was defined and delimited by the law of 22
nd
 of July 
1927.
1061
 Grape prices were agreed according to growing area in 1919. In 1935, vineyard 
owners and business leaders set up the Chalons Committee, made up of an equal number of 
representatives from both sides with the power to fix prices for all transactions between the 
vineyards and business. The Chalons Committee becomes the National Champagne Bureau 
with wider jurisdiction in 1940. In 1941, the National Champagne Bureau became the Comite 
Interprofessionnel du Vin de Champagne (CIVC), a trade organization established by statute 
to administer the common interests of everyone within the Champagne industry.
1062
 This 
association between negociants and vine-growers serves as the foundation for the CIVC.
1063
 
The decision making body of the CIVC are composed of equal numbers of vine-growers and 
negociants. They meet as often as necessary and deal with everything of interest to the two 
professions. The CIVC has been granted wide reaching powers to enable it to be active in all 
areas: economic, technical, social, commercial and legal. Principal activities of the CIVC 
include the regulation of the market, the provision of technical standards, the promotion of 
commercial expansion, the protection of the Champagne appellation, and the communication 
of information on Champagne to the public.
1064
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5.2.2 Theoretical foundation: terroir  
 
It has been recognized that French system of appellations controlée is based on, or guided by, 
the idea of terroir.
1065
 “Terroir” is a French word without direct or suitable English 
translation. This word usually refers to “an area or terrain, usually rather small, whose soil 
and microclimate impart distinctive qualities to food products.”1066 Hughes defines terroir as 
an “essential land/qualities nexus”.1067 Josling uses it to refer to “the essential link between 
the location in which a food or beverage is produced and its quality or other consumer 
attributes.
1068
 Historically, terroir is particular closely associated with the production of wine. 
It is in the case of wine where “the concept of terroir reaches its most elaborate 
expression.”1069 In his Terroir: the Role of Geology, Climate and Culture in the Making of 
French Wines, James E. Wilson expounds the concept of terroir as follows:  
 
“Terroir has become a buzz word in English language wine literature. This lighthearted use 
disregards reverence for the land which is a critical, invisible element of the term. The true 
concept is not easily grasped but includes physical elements of the vineyard habitat—the vine, 
subsoil, siting, draining, and microclimate. Beyond the measurable ecosystem, there is an 
additional dimension—the spiritual aspect that recognizes the joys, the heartbreaks, the pride, 
the sweat, and the frustrations of its history.”1070  
 
A popular wine book designing to provide an introductory course for the general public 
explains terroir in a less poetic but succinct language:  
 
“[T]erroir” is an almost mystical concept that sums up a wine’s sense of place. Not only the 
soil and climate, but also the rainfall, the gradient of the vineyard, even cultural environment 
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and winemaking traditions where the grapes were grown are considered deeply important to 
the finished wine in some parts of world, mainly Europe.”1071  
 
The author then goes on to explain the relation between terroir and wine labels that:  
 
“That’s why many premium European brands do not proclaim their grapes varieties proudly 
on their labels. Instead, the place where the grapes were grown comes to fore: Chablis, 
Sancerre, Mosel, Rioja, et al. are all thought to be far more important than the type of vine 
used. The idea is that, above all else, a wine bears and retains the distinctive character of the 
area where it was made. And no other wine (despite being made with the same grapes) can 
taste exactly like that.”1072 
 
The terroir theory can be traced back to the fifteen century in Europe and is best epitomised 
by the French AOC system, which created a specific type of French wine, the AOC 
wines.”1073 The concept of terroir is, however, not limited to the production of wine. The 
French concept of “terroir” is the idea that food and wines receive their unique flavours and 
qualities from the “soil, climate, culture, and tradition[s]” of the regions where the products 
are grown, produced, and created.
1074
 Bérard and Marchenay describe “produit de terroir” as 
traditional local agricultural products and foodstuffs whose qualities cross time and space and 
are anchored in a specific place and history.
1075
 The terroir assumption predetermines GIs 
part of agricultural issue. This is because, as an expert in agricultural geography puts it, 
agriculture, or farming, ‘is the manifestation of the interaction between people and the 
environment’.1076 And “unlike many aspects of economic activity, the contributions made by 
the physical environment can be of fundamental significance to the nature of the farming 
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system.”1077 It is argued that, being modelled on the French AOC system, the EU sui generis 
GI law “undoubtedly protects AOCs in their full sense under French law.”1078  
 
5.3 Elements of the GI Regulation  
 
This section examines the elements of the GI Regulation including its policy background, 
protectable subject matter, registration procedures, product specification, rights conferred, 
and relation to generic names. 
 
5.3.1 Policy background  
 
The factors leading to the introduction of the GI Regulation in 1992 were twofold. On the one 
hand there was a political need to protect producers of certain traditional food products. GIs 
were, on the other hand, adopted in the context of the reform of the Common Agricultural 
Policy because they have certain shared policy threads.  
 
5.3.1.1 Political need  
 
The Treaty of Rome of 1957 created the European Economic Community (EEC). The goal of 
the EEC is to create an internal market, that is, “an area without internal frontiers in which 
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the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured.”1079 Different national 
food standards between EC Member States often constituted serious barriers to trade.
1080
  The 
Commission initially sought to harmonise standards on the basis of Article 100 of the Treaty 
of Rome, which provides for “Directives for the approximation of such provisions…in 
Member States as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common market.” 
The first item of legislation in this field, which substantially reduced the number of permitted 
food colourings, was enacted in 1962. In 1969, the Commission put forward a long list of 
foodstuffs for harmonization.  
 
The Court of Justice has also been playing an important role as in the development of the 
internal market. The Court’s decision in 1979 in Cassis de Dijon established a new legal 
standard for the resolution of trade dispute among the member states, made it plausible for 
Community elites to envision the creation of a single internal market.
1081
  The Cassis de 
Dijon case was brought by a German importer, Rewe Zentral AG, which wished to import the 
French liqueur into Germany. Cassis de Dijon is a blackcurrant liqueur lawfully produced and 
marketed in France. The alcoholic beverage was excluded from the German market simply 
because the standards for marketing of liqueurs in Germany differed from the standards in 
France. Since under German law, the liqueur has too little alcohol to qualify as a liqueur and 
too much to qualify as a wine. Rewe was not allowed to import it. After the German courts 
upheld the ruling, Rewe took the case to the European Court of Justice in 1978. It is held by 
ECJ that there is no valid reason to prevent alcoholic beverages legally produced and 
marketed in one Member State from being market in another.
1082
 The ECJ held that different 
technical standards do not justify a prohibition on the free movement of goods. It ruled in 
favour of Rewe, arguing that if the cassis met French standards for a liqueur, then it could be 
sold as a liqueur in Germany. In so ruling, the Court established the principle of mutual 
recognition and thereby created a simple standard for resolving trade disputes.
1083
 The 
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principle of mutual recognition was established in 1979 by Cassis de Dijon was confirmed by 
subsequent cases.
1084
  
 
According to O’Connor, the political need for EC rules on GIs for agro-food products 
became apparent in the wake of the Cassis de Dijon judgment of 1979. The principle of 
mutual recognition was seen as a possible threat to local producers of traditional “quality” 
foodstuffs. These producers, who often has protection for their names and products under 
national law, sought to protect their local markets and their local (and not so local) names 
from mass-produced food products of a similar nature legally produced and marketed in the  
Member States.
1085
 One further development deepened the worry of local producers is that 
the Commission decided to give up the compositional law approach, that is, developing 
detailed regulations on the composition and manufacturing characteristics of each foodstuff 
(“recipe law”).1086 In response to this development, the French requested the introduction of a 
Community measure intended to protect the designation of origin in January 1988. This 
request was supported by Italy in 1988, then by Spain in 1989. The request was accepted and 
Council Regulation 2081/92 was the result.
1087
. 
 
5.3.1.2 CAP reforms  
 
Council Regulation 2081/92 explicitly states that the 1992 GI Regulation was adopted “as 
part of the adjustment of the common agricultural policy.”1088 As it stands today, EU sui 
generis GI law is part of EU food quality schemes. Food quality schemes, in turn, constitute 
part of EU rural development scheme, the second pillar of the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP).
1089
 To understand this arrangement, it is necessary to examine how sui generis GIs fit 
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into the fabric of the CAP reform. The substantive connection between these sui generis GIs 
and EU agricultural policy lies in the concept of agricultural multifunationality. That is, sui 
generis GIs are considered as possessing two multifunctional characters, namely, quality food 
products and rural development potential.  
 
According to Cardwell, European agriculture, despite all the reforms and changes, possesses 
two “consistent and defining” features, namely, “exceptionalism” and 
“multifunctionality”. 1090  Agriculture “has always been accorded special status in the 
European Community”. 1091  Such “exceptionalism” has been reflected in the fact that 
agriculture was the only sector of industry to be accorded its own title in the 1957 Treaty of 
Rome
1092
 and that provisions of the Chapter relating to rules of competition apply to 
production and trade in agricultural products only to the extent determined, recognition of the 
priority given to agricultural policy over the objectives of the Treaty in the area in the 
competition area.
1093
 The term “multifunctionality” refers to the fact that an economic 
activity may have multiple outputs and, by virtue of this, may contribute to several societal 
objectives at once. Multifunctionality is, thus, an activity-oriented concept that refers to 
specific properties of the production process and its multiple outputs.
1094
 In the context of 
agriculture, it generally refers to the “[i]dea that agriculture has many functions in addition to 
producing food and fibre, e.g. environmental protection, landscape preservation, rural 
employment, food security, etc.” 1095  The OECD identifies two key elements of 
multifunctionality. One is the existence of multiple commodity and non-commodity outputs 
that are jointly produced by agriculture. The other is the fact that some of the non-commodity 
outputs exhibit the characteristics of externalities or public goods, with the result that markets 
for these goods do not exist or function poorly.
1096
 For European Commission, agriculture is 
multifunctional because “it is not limited to the sole function of producing food and fibres but 
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it also has a number of other functions.”1097 Different aspects illustrating the multifunctional 
character of agriculture include: the safety and quality of food, the protection of environment, 
the conservation of infinite resources, the preservation of rural landscapes and the 
contribution to the socio-economic development of rural areas including the generation of 
employment opportunities.
1098
  According to Cardwell and Rodgers, multifunctionality has 
been the “overarching” and “stable” objective of the European agricultural policy, “although 
the specific legislative measures would appear to have been evolutionary.”1099  
 
The European Union has a Common Agricultural Policy from the outset. The Common 
Agricultural Policy is a listed policy area in the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The main reason that 
agriculture had to become involved in European integration is because agriculture is an 
important part of the economy.
1100
 Under the Treaty of Rome 1957 the CAP are of five 
objectives. The first objective is to increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical 
progress and by ensuring the rational development of agricultural production and the 
optimum utilisation of the factors of production, in particular, labour. Secondly, by doing so, 
the CAP shall ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in particular by 
increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in agriculture. Thirdly, it aims to 
stabilise markets. Fourthly, it aims to assure the availability of supplies. The final objective is 
to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices.
1101
 According to Woods, these 
objectives have made the CAP a “milestone in the development of capitalist agriculture.”1102 
Agreed in 1968, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which created a single market for 
agricultural products and guaranteed prices to EEC farmers for everything they produced was 
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very much reflecting French national interests.
1103
  The CAP “was not designed to direct the 
details of day to day management at farm level, but it has a major influence on farm 
management decisions. It seeks to support the agricultural sector and farm incomes as well as 
other objectives, mainly through providing economic incentives. Farmers react to these 
incentives in different ways and are affected by many other influences, such as world market 
prices, consumer preferences, technological changes, family traditions etc.”1104 
 
The emphasis of the early CAP was on encouraging better agricultural productivity so that 
consumers had a stable supply of affordable food and ensure that the EU had a viable 
agricultural sector. The CAP offered subsidies and systems guaranteeing high prices to 
farmers, providing incentives for them to produce more. Financial assistance was provided 
for the restructuring of farming, for example by subsidising farm investment in favour of 
farm growth and management of technology skills so that they were adapted to the economic 
and social conditions at the time.
1105
 Although measures concerning rural development and 
agri-environment were introduced,
1106
 they were not considered as important as the markets 
and prices measures.
1107
 The CAP is an undoubted success in terms of its central objective of 
increasing agricultural production.
1108
 It did this, however, at the expense of encouraging 
over-production, benefiting large-scale commercial farmers at the expense of small farmers, 
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ignoring the environmental consequences of greater use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, 
and making the CAP the largest item in the Community budget, which in turn diverted 
spending from other areas.
1109
 By 1984 the implementation of the CAP was consuming 70 
per cent of the European Community’s entire budget, and a quarter of that was being spent on 
storing surplus produce.
1110
 Under this situation, agricultural policy reform in the EU has 
been driven by the triple concerns of over-production, environmental degradation and the 
financial cost of the Common Agricultural Policy. Periodic reforms have been attempted 
since the early 1980s.
1111
  
 
The first major reform of the CAP, the MacSharry reform, took place in 1992.
1112
 The reform 
aimed to improve the competitiveness of EU agriculture, stabilise the agricultural markets, 
diversify the production and protect the environment, as well as stabilise the EU budget 
expenditure.
1113
 Price support for some products was reduced or even eliminated. 
Compensation was given by direct income support. According to Meester, the change toward 
direct income support to farmers meant “a fundamental change in the philosophy of the 
CAP.”1114 Three “accompanying measures” were also adopted as part of the 1992 reform 
package alongside the reform of market support.
1115
 These included a scheme introduced to 
promote the cessation of farming through early retirement,
1116
 an environmental measure 
adopted to introduced a Community aid scheme for forestry measure,
1117
 and the Agri-
Environment Regulation,
1118
 which established a framework for Community aid, financed by 
the Guarantee Section, for schemes devised by the Members States which contributed to 
agriculture income diversification and rural development and which had a positive impact on 
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the environment.
1119
 Nonetheless, it is assessed that although the MacSharry reforms added a 
more effective rural and environmental measures, they “did not fundamentally alter the fact 
that the CAP was a price support and production control policy.”1120 
 
Further changes were introduced under the Agenda 2000 reforms. The Agenda 2000 
represented a ‘deepening and extending’ of the 1992 reform through further shifts from price 
support to direct payments.
1121
 The Council adopted Regulation 1259/1999 which established 
common rules for direct support scheme under the common agricultural policy.
1122
 Under this 
Regulation, direct supports or direct payments were granted directly to the framers within one 
of the support schemes in the framework of the common agricultural policy.
1123
 Thus, the 
Agenda 2000 reforms, as Rodgers puts it, “ushered in a period of fundamental change in CAP 
support regimes, and in particular a major shift in financial support away from agricultural 
products towards producers.” 1124  Article 3 of Council Regulation 1259/1999 allowed 
Members States to set “specific environmental requirements constituting a condition for 
direct payments.”1125 By doing so, it introduced the concept of cross-compliance,1126 that is, a 
“farmer receiving a payment under the single payment scheme must observe the…conditions 
established in the European legislation and the domestic Regulations implementing them with 
appropriation derogation.”1127 The Agenda 2000 reforms also saw the establishment of rural 
development as the “Second Pillar” of the CAP, alongside the First Pillar, which provides 
agricultural market and income support.
1128
 The legal basis of this new Second pillar was 
provided by the 1999 Rural Development Regulation,
1129
 which reorganized and simplified 
existing rural development measures and brought together all previous rural development 
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measures, including the 1992 accompanying measures on agri-environment, early retirement 
and forestry, into one composite framework regulation.
1130
 This Regulation establishes the 
framework for Community support for “sustainable rural development.”1131 It states that rural 
development measures “shall accompany and complement other measures of the common 
agricultural policy and thus contribute to the achievement of the objectives laid down in 
Article 33 of the Treaty.”1132 It lists eleven areas that the “[s]upport for rural development, 
related to farming activities and their conversion,” may concern: (i) the improvement of 
structures in agricultural holdings and structures for the processing and marketing of 
agricultural products, (ii) the conversion and reorientation of agricultural production potential, 
the introduction of new technologies and the improvement of product quality, (iii) the 
encouragement of non-food production, (iv) sustainable forest development, (v) the 
diversification of activities with the aim of complementary or alternative activities, (vi) the 
maintenance and reinforcement of viable social fabric in rural areas, (vii) the development of 
economic activities and the maintenance and creation of employment with the aim of 
ensuring a better exploitation of existing inherent potential, (viii) the improvement of 
working and living conditions, (ix) the maintenance and promotion of low-input farming 
systems, (x) the preservation and promotion of a high nature value and a sustainable 
agriculture respecting environmental requirements, (xi) the removal of inequalities and the 
promotion of opportunities for men and women, in particular by supporting projects initiated 
and implemented by women.
1133
 Thus, as commented by McMahon, the Agenda 2000 
reforms “signalled a further realignment of the twin pillars of the CAP towards a situation of 
greater equilibrium”1134 
 
The First Pillar of the CAP was “fundamentally reformed” by the 2003 Mid-term Review.1135 
The first important decision was the introduction of the Single Farm Payment (SFP), which 
replaced most of the direct payments to farmers offered under previous reforms.
1136
 Under the 
terms of SFP, agricultural support is decoupled from production and a system of payment 
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entitlements established for each holdings based initially on the average support payments 
under CAP support regimes for each years in the three-year reference period 2000-2002, 
expressed at 2002 claim rates.
1137
 A major aim of the single payment is to allow farmers to 
become more market-oriented and to release their entrepreneurial potential.
1138
 It is also 
intended in part to secure ‘green box’ exemption from domestic support reduction 
commitments in the WTO negotiations.
1139
 Second, the concept of cross-compliance has been 
radically extended under the SFP.
1140
 At the time of the reform of 2003, the granting of 
support was connected to the respect of various criteria, such as the protection of 
environment, animal welfare, food safety, or good farming practices.
1141
 This cross 
compliance consists of two separate elements: (i) adherence to a number of statutory 
management requirements relating to public, animal and plant health, the environment and 
animal welfare; (ii) land that is no longer used for production purposes must be maintained in 
good agricultural and environmental condition (GAEC)”1142 As to the Second Pillar of the 
CAP, the Mid-term Review also materially amended the 1999 Rural Development 
Regulation.
1143
 Further changes were introduced in 2005 with the enactment of a new rural 
development regime under Council Regulation (EC) 1698/2005 on support for rural 
development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD)
1144
 The 
mission of the EAFRD is to “contribute to the promotion of sustainable rural development 
throughout the Community in a complementary manner to the market and income support 
policies of the common agricultural policy, to cohesion policy and to the common fishery 
policy.
1145
 Support for rural development is designed to contribute to achieving three main 
objectives. The first is to improve the competitiveness of agriculture and forestry by 
supporting restructuring, development and innovation. The second is to improve the 
environment and the countryside by supporting land management. Finally, it is designed to 
improve the quality of life in rural areas and encouraging diversification of economic 
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activity.
1146
 These objectives are to be implemented by means of the “four axes” including: (i) 
improving the competitiveness of the agricultural and forestry sector, (ii) improving the 
environment and the countryside, (iii) the quality of life in rural areas and diversification of 
the rural economy, and (iv) the Leader approach of rural development.
1147
  
 
In 18 November 2010, the European Commission issued a communication titled “The CAP 
towards 2020: Meeting the food, nature resource and territorial challenges of the future”.1148 
The objectives of this Communication are to “highlight the key challenges and the major 
policy issues regarding EU agriculture and rural areas” and to “outline possible policy 
orientations and options for the future.” 1149  The Communication identifies three main 
challenges of the CAP as food security, environment and climate change, and territorial 
balance.
1150
 In responds to these challenges, the three main objectives for the future CAP 
would be (i) viable food production, (ii) sustainable management of natural resources and 
climate action and (iii) balanced territorial development.
1151
 It is proposed that the future 
CAP should remain a strong common policy structured around its two pillars. In broad terms, 
the views expressed recommended the following strategic aims: (i) To preserve the food 
production potential on a sustainable basis throughout the EU, so as to guarantee long-term 
food security for European citizens and to contribute to growing world food demand”; (ii) To 
support farming communities that provide the European citizens with quality, value and 
diversity of food produced sustainably, in line with environmental, water, animal health and 
welfare, plant health and public health requirements; and (iii)To maintain viable rural 
communities, for whom farming is an important economic activity creating local employment; 
this delivers multiple economic, social, environmental and territorial benefits.
1152
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While the 1992 GI Regulation explicitly locates GI policy as part of the adjustment of the 
CAP,
1153
 the substantive connection between these two is to be found in the European 
concept of agricultural multifunationality. In The European Model of Agriculture, Cardwell 
discusses Council Regulation 2081/92 under the heading “Other Multifunctional Measures 
prior to the Agenda 2000 Reforms”.1154  According to Cardwell, Council Regulation 2081/92 
is one of the “developments of multifunctional character…taking place outside the common 
organizations of the market and…the accompanying measures.” 1155  Two multifunctional 
characters of sui generis GIs can observed. First, there has been a presumption that agro-food 
products “linked to specific geographical origins or specific production methods” are quality 
products.
1156
 This is the consistent view since the EC Commission’s 1985 Green Paper.1157 
The document calls for a diversification of policy instruments in order to realize a number of 
objectives that cannot be reached through the almost exclusive reliance on price support. The 
Green Paper lists the priorities of the CAP as reducing surpluses, promoting the quality and 
variety of agricultural production, improving the incomes of small family farms, supporting 
the agriculture in areas where it is necessary for rural development, promoting awareness of 
farmers of environmental questions and assisting the processing industry.
1158
 The aims of the 
1985 Green Paper were to some extent taken up by the package of reforms introduced in 
1988. In its 1988 communication titled ‘The Future of Rural Society’, the EU expresses its 
intention to promote a Community policy on protecting “agricultural and food products of 
identifiable geographical origin” as a policy tool to reorient the CAP.1159 Thus, part of the 
reason for adopting the 1992 GI Regulation was the promotion of “agricultural products and 
foodstuffs with an identifiable geographical origin” meets the observed trend that “consumers 
are tending to attach greater importance to the quality of foodstuffs rather than to quality”.1160 
One further multifunctional character of sui generis GIs lies in its economic potential for 
rural areas.  From the perspective of EU policy makers, the 1992 GI Regulation was 
introduced because “the promotion of products having certain characteristics could be of 
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considerable benefit to the rural economy, in particular to less-favoured or remote areas, by 
improving the incomes of farmers and by retaining the rural population in these areas.”1161 
 
5.3.2 Protectable subject matter  
 
EU sui generis GI law protects two categories of names, namely, protected designation of 
origin (PDO) and protected geographical indication (PGI). The Regulation provides not only 
the criteria for names but also for the underlying products.   
 
5.3.2.1 Definition of PDOs and PGIs  
 
A PDO is a name of a region, a specific place or, in exceptional cases, a country, used to 
describe an agricultural product or a foodstuff. The product identified must be (i) originating 
in that region, specific place or country; (ii) the quality or characteristics of which are 
essentially or exclusively due to a particular geographical environment with its inherent 
natural and human factors; and (iii) the production, processing and preparation of which take 
place in the defined geographical area.
1162
 
 
A PGI is “the name of a region, a specific place or, in exceptional cases, a country, used to 
describe an agricultural product or a foodstuff”. The product identified must (i) originate in 
that region, specific place or country, (ii) possess a specific quality, reputation or other 
characteristics attributable to that geographical origin, and (iii) be produced, processed, or 
prepared in the defined geographical area.
1163
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Traditional geographical or non-geographical names designating an agricultural product or a 
foodstuff which meet the definition of designations of origin or geographical indications can 
also be considered as PDOs or PGIs.
1164
 Commenting in 1992, Kolia predicted that this 
exception “may be extensively used in the future.1165 An example of this is “Feta”. The term 
“Feta” was derived from the Italian fetta or slice. 1166  It was accepted by all parties in 
Germany and Denmark v Commission (Feta, 2005) that the name “Feta” derived from the 
Italian language and had only entered into use in Greece in the seventeenth century. It was 
also accepted that the name was not one of a region, place or country and could not therefore 
be registered as a PDO under art. 2(2) of Regulation 2081/92. It could therefore only be 
registered under art. 2(3) of the Regulation, which extends the definition of designation of 
origin to traditional or non-geographical names which possess qualities or characteristics 
which are due to the environment in which they are produced. 
 
As observed by Lord Hoffman, ‘a PGI is similar to a PDO except the casual link between the 
place of origin and the quality of the product may be a matter of reputation rather than 
verifiable fact’ (quality or characteristics). 1167  To qualify as a PDO, the production, 
processing, and preparation of the product all must take place in the named geographical area. 
For a PGI, it is only necessary for the production, processing or preparation to take place in 
the named geographical area.
1168
 Thus, ‘the link with the area’ is stronger for PDOs.1169 
Josling thus argues that PDOs are designed to establish a ‘close and objective link’ between 
the features of the product and its geographical origin and, thus, can be seen as the “legal 
manifestation” of the concept of terroir. In the case of PGIs, the link needs not to be “close or 
objective” because it can be based on reputation at the time of registration.”1170 The inclusion 
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of reputation as a linking factor between a product and its geographical origin may generate 
subtle but profound impact on the development of GI law. That is, as Bently and Sherman 
have observed, it subtly changes the nature of the protected interest away from something 
which mirrors the model of creation used in patents, copyright, and design law, to something 
more akin to that used in trade mark law.
1171
  
 
Despite technical differences, PDOs and PGIs are afforded the same protection.
1172
  The 
distinction between these two categories is made by the producer or groups initially 
registering the geographic indications.
1173
 The reason for having two types of geographical 
indications is to respect the existing practices.
1174
 According to the Regulation’s recitals, this 
two-tier system was appropriate because of “existing practices” in EU member states i.e. 
neither the French nor the Germans would give up their own definitional approach.”1175 
Gangjee notes the while the PDO is a marginally refracted version of the French Appellation 
of Origin (AO) system, the PGI reflects German practices which protect the “long-standing 
and distinctive reputation for regional products.”1176 
 
5.3.2.2 Criteria for names  
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To be protected as a PDO or PGI, the name in question must be “geographical” in the sense 
that it is able to evoke, in the mind of the consumer, qualities linked to a particular place. 
This is made clear by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in a series of cases concerning 
French legislation designed to protect the designation “Mountain” for agricultural products. It 
is held that the description “mountain” cannot be protected as a PDO or PGI because it is too 
general in character, transcends national frontiers, and evokes in the mind of the consumer 
qualities linked abstractly with highland origin and not with a particular place, region or 
country.
1177
   
 
Names falling with one of the following four categories are unregistrable:   
 
(i) generic names: The very fact that a name has become generic per se is sufficient for its 
being excluded from GI protection. However, names incorporating a generic name are 
registrable. For example, Cheddar is a generic for hard cheese and as such would not be 
eligible to be registered either as a PDO or PGI. Nonetheless, West Country Farm Cheddar 
cheese has been registered as a PDO.
1178
 The Regulation does not provide such thing as an 
exhaustive list of generic names. The genericiness of a name can, thus, only be determined on 
a case by case basis.
1179
 
 
(ii) Names conflicting with names of plant varieties or animal breeds: A geographical name 
may not be registered if the name in question conflicts with the name of a plant variety or 
animal breed. This exclusion is subject to the condition that the use of such a name as a GI “is 
likely to mislead the consumer as to the true origin of the product.”1180  
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(iii) Homonymous names: A name wholly or partially homonymous with that of a name 
already registered under this Regulation must only be registered with due regard for local and 
traditional usage and the actual risk of confusion.
1181
 
 
(iv) Established trademarks:  A name may not be registered as a PDO or a PGI if it has 
already been registered as a trademark. Article 3.4 sets three conditions are duly considered: 
the reputation and renown of the trademark; the length of time the trademark has been; the 
registration is liable to mislead the consumer as to the true origin of the product.
1182
 
 
5.3.2.3 Criteria for products   
 
(1) Product covered  
 
The scope of Regulation 510/2006 is limited to “certain agricultural products and foodstuffs 
for which a link exists between product or foodstuffs characteristics and geographical 
origin.”1183 Lists of eligible products are provided in Annex 1 to the Treaty of Rome, Annex I 
to this Regulation and Annex II to this Regulation.
1184
 Wine-sector products, except wine 
vinegars, and spirit drinks are not regulated in this Regulation.
1185
 The Commission are 
empowered to amend Annex I and II to this Regulation. Salt and cotton were added to Annex 
I and II respectively in 2008.
1186
 Thus, eligible products are not always strictly limited to 
agricultural products intended for human consumption.  
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(2) Product-place link  
 
The product identified by a PDO must be (i) originating in that region, specific place or 
country; (ii) the quality or characteristics of which are essentially or exclusively due to a 
particular geographical environment with its inherent natural and human factors; and (iii) the 
production, processing and preparation of which take place in the defined geographical 
area.
1187
 The product identified by a PGI must (i) originate in that region, specific place or 
country, (ii) possess a specific quality, reputation or other characteristics attributable to that 
geographical origin, and (iii) be produced, processed, or prepared in the defined geographical 
area.
1188
 MacMaolain comments that this geographical environment “can, of course, under 
the terms of the Regulation, be an entire country, provided that the defined area possesses 
specific natural and human factors which are capable of giving a foodstuff its specific 
characteristics. The area must present homogenous natural factors which distinguish it from 
the areas adjoining it.”1189  
 
5.3.3 Registration  
 
The PDO or PGI status is only acquired by registration. The registration procedure starts with 
the groups of producers or processors who want to obtain protection filing an application to 
the relevant national agency.
1190
 Upon verifying that necessary requirements are met, the 
national agency then forwards the application to the European Commission, which is 
responsible for approving or rejecting it. If the Commission decides that the name qualifies 
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for protection, a summary sheet is published in the Official Journal of the European 
Communities. Once the summary of the specification is published, third parties have six 
months in which they are able to object to the registration. If no valid objections are made to 
the proposed registration, the Commission then publishes the name entered in the Register in 
the Official Journal. Once registered, the product name is automatically protected in all 
member states.
1191
  
 
“A group” and “only a group” is entitled to apply for registration. A group means “any 
association, irrespective of its legal form or composition, of producers or processors working 
with the same agricultural products or foodstuffs.” 1192  Exceptionally, a “natural or legal 
person may be treated as a group” and, thus, eligible for application for registration.1193 Such 
exceptional circumstances may arise when the person concerned is the only producer in the 
defined geographical area willing to submit an application and the defined geographical area 
possesses characteristics which differs appreciably from those of neighbouring areas or the 
characteristics of the product are different from those produced in neighbouring areas.
1194
 The 
applicant group must define the product according to precise specifications and send an 
application to the national authority.
1195
  
 
5.3.4 Product specification  
 
To be registered as a PDO or a PGI, the product must comply with a product specification.
1196
 
The product specification is one of the central elements of geographical indications; it plays 
important roles at every aspect of GIs. First, during the registration process, it sets out the 
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information that is used to determine whether a name should be protected. Second, once a 
name is registered, this specification, which contains detailed requirements of the protected 
product, sets out the standards that producers and processors must comply with if they wish 
to use the protected name. Finally, the specification also helps to delineate the scope of 
protection. That is, it provides the basis of ascertaining the scope of intangible interest 
conferred by registration.
1197
 
 
A product specification shall contain the following aspects: 
(i) The name of the agricultural product or foodstuff comprising the designation of origin or 
geographical indication; 
(ii) A description of the agricultural product or foodstuff, including the raw materials;  
(iii) The definition of the geographical area; 
(iv) Evidence that the agricultural product or foodstuff originates in the defined geographical 
area; 
(v) A description of the method of obtaining the agricultural product or foodstuff and, if 
appropriate, the authentic and unvarying local methods as well as information concerning 
packaging; 
(vi) Details bearing out the link between the quality, characteristics, or reputation of the 
agricultural product or foodstuff and the geographical environment; 
(vii) The name and address of authorities or bodies verifying compliance with the provisions 
of the specification;  
(viii) Any specific labelling rule for the agricultural product or foodstuff in question;  
(ix) Any requirements laid down by Community or national provisions.
1198
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It is possible to make changes to the product specification after registration. A group eligible 
for application for registration and having a legitimate interest may apply for approval of an 
amendment to a specification, in particular to take account of developments in scientific and 
technical knowledge or to redefine the designated geographical area.
1199
 The procedure of 
amending product specifications is similar to that of application for registration.
1200
 
Amendments to the product specification require the approval of the Commission. For 
example, amendments to the specification for the PDO ‘Grana Padano’ were approved by the 
Commission in 2001.
1201
 
 
5.3.5 Rights conferred    
 
Once registered, a PDO/PGI entails two categories of rights to its legitimate users, namely, 
right to use and right to exclude. These rights may last in perpetuity if the registration is not 
cancelled. A registration name may be cancelled through two routes. The Commission may 
initiate to cancel a registered name if it considers the conditions of the specification are not 
complied with.
1202
 Any natural or legal person having a legitimate interest may request 
cancellation of the registration.
1203
 The procedure for registration is applicable mutatis 
mutandis in the case of cancellation.
1204
 “Newcastle Brown Ale”, a PGI registered since 1996, 
was cancelled in August 2007.
1205
 The registration was cancelled by the Commission because 
the “compliance with the conditions of the specification for an agricultural product or 
foodstuff covered a protected name is no longer ensured.”1206  
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5.3.5.1 Right to use  
 
A name registered may be used by any operator marketing agricultural product or foodstuffs 
conforming to the corresponding specification.
1207
 Therefore, a PDO or a PGI does not confer 
the right to use a registered name or logo on any particular individual or specific group. 
Instead, it confers such rights on any undertaking whose products meet the prescribed 
geographical and qualitative requirements. This may mean, in theory, at least, that “producers 
who were not part of the original application are able to use a protected name, so long as their 
products conform to the registered specification.”1208 Thus, GIs grant protection to all the 
qualified goods produced within a particular geographical region. For example, the GI 
Parmigiano-Reggiano is used by “about six hundred producers of the cheese, all of which are 
located within a specific region of Italy.”1209  
 
Since anyone who complies with the specification is eligible to use the name, there is a need 
to establish a mechanism to verify the compliance of the product specification before placing 
the product on the market.
1210
 Verification of compliance with the specification is conducted 
by either the competent authority or a control body and the cost of such verification is borne 
by the operators subject to the control.
1211
 Checks that farmers have adhered to the product 
specification are undertaken by public authorities or by private certification bodies.
1212
 
Member States conduct administrative controls on the use of registered names on products in 
distribution and retail under specific legislation on wines and spirits and as part of the official 
control of EU food law for other products.
1213
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Applicants are obliged to name an authority or body to “verify compliance with the 
provisions contained in the product specification”.1214 The nominated inspection body can 
either be a public body or a private body which complies with the appropriate standards. The 
task of an inspection body is to undertake regular inspections of their registered products to 
ensure that the requirements of the specification are being met. Inspection costs are borne by 
the producers using the protected name.
1215
 Experts in agricultural economics view the EU 
origin protection system as ‘structured around three groups of participants: 
producers/processors, regulators, and inspection agencies.’1216 In some Member States the 
national competent authority also acts as the control body. For example, the French national 
competent authority responsible for GI affairs, the Institut National des Appellation d’Origine 
(INAO), also acts as the inspection body of a PDO or PGI.
1217
 In the UK, the national 
competent authority and the control body are separate. The UK responsible national 
competent authority is the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA). The designated inspection body for Melton Mowbray Pork Pie is the Product 
Authentication Inspectorate Limited. (para. 4.7, C 85/20)   (Para. 4.4 C 85/18) “The 
nominated inspection body will conduct annual check on each producer to ensure that they 
are complying with the specification. Each member will receive their own Certification 
number provided by the inspection body to display on packaging and any other point of sale 
material when selling Melton Mowbray Pork Pie.” 
 
5.3.5.2 Right to exclude   
 
The protection of PDO/PGI is subject to “the principle of specialty” in so far as they are 
protected in relation to certain kinds of products.
1218
 A registered PDO or PGI gives its 
legitimate users the exclusive right to use the name for products that comply with the 
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 Council Regulation, art. 4.2 
1215
 Bently and Sherman (n 1171) 997. 
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 D J Hayes, S H Lence, and A Stoppa, ‘Farmer-Owned Brands?’ 20 Agribusiness (2004) 269, 273. 
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registered specifications.
1219
 EU sui generis GI protection prevents the use of such names 
even where there is no consumer confusion.
1220
 Names registered under the GI Regulation are 
protected against the following four categories of acts:  
 
(i) any direct or indirect commercial use of a registered name in respect of products not 
covered by the registration in so far as those products are comparable to the products 
registered under that name or in so far as using the name exploits the reputation of the 
protected name;
1221
  
 
(ii) any misuse, imitation or evocation, even if the true origin or  the product is indicated or if 
the protected name is translated or accompanied by an expression such as ‘style’, ‘type’, 
‘method’, ‘as produced in’, ‘imitation’ or similar;1222  
 
(iii) any other false or misleading indication as to the provenance, origin, nature or essential 
qualities of the product, on the inner or outer packaging, advertising material or documents 
relating to the product concerned, and the packing of the product in a container liable to 
convey a false impression as to its origin;
1223
  
 
(iv) any other practice liable to mislead the consumer as to the true origin of the product
1224
  
 
5.3.5.3 Conflict between GIs and trademarks  
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Establishing GIs as a sui generis IPR leads to the necessity of dealing with the relation 
between GIs and trademarks. Two general rules governing the relation between GIs and 
trademarks are: (i) the registration of a name under the GI Regulation will have the effect of 
preventing the registration of a similar trademark submitted after the date of submission of 
the registration application to the Commission.
1225
 A trademark registered in breach of this 
provision shall be invalidated.
1226
 (ii) A PDO or PGI shall not be registered where, in the light 
of a trademark’s reputation and renown and the length of time it has been used, registration is 
liable to mislead the consumer as to the true identity of the product.
1227
 It is, thus, commented 
that the CTM is at a disadvantage compared to the GI where questions of priority arise 
between an earlier trade mark and a later PGI or PDO.
1228
 The name “Grana Padano”, for 
example, was registered as a PDO for Italian hard cheese in 1996. In 1998, Biraghi S.p.A., 
succeeded in registering as a CTM “Grana Biraghi” for cheese. Subsequently, the proprietor 
of the PDO, the Consorzio per la Tutela Formaggio Grana Padano, was successful in 
applying for a declaration of invalidity to have the mark cancelled in 2001.
1229
  Under certain 
circumstances, a PDO or PGI may co-exist with a trademark, either registered or established 
by use. The term “co-existence” refers to a legal regime under which “a GI and a trade mark 
can both be used concurrently to some extent even though the use of one or both of them 
would otherwise infringe the rights conferred by the other”.1230 That is, the trademark in 
question may continue to be used notwithstanding the registration of a PDO or PGI. This may 
happen when the trademark in question “has been applied for, registered, or established by 
use…in good faith within the territory of the Community, before either the date of protection 
of the designation of origin or geographical indication in the country of origin or before 1 
January 1996”.1231 For example, it is held by the ECJ that the PGI ‘Bayerisches Bier’ may co-
exist with pre-existing trademarks of third parties in which the word ‘Bavaria’ appears and 
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which were registered in good faith before the date on which the application for registration 
of the PGI ‘Bayerisches Bier’ was lodged.1232  
 
5.3.5.4 Terms of protection  
 
The protection of PDO/PGI is of indefinite duration, so long as the conditions of the product 
specification continue to be met.
1233
 A registered name may be cancelled through two routes: 
(i) the Commission may initiate to cancel a registered name if it considers the conditions of 
the specification are not complied with
1234
 and (ii) any natural or legal person having a 
legitimate interest may request cancellation of the registration, giving reasons for the 
request.
1235
 The procedure for registration is applicable mutatis mutandis in the case of 
cancellation.
1236
 “Newcastle Brown Ale”, a PGI registered since 1996, was cancelled by 
virtue of a Commission Regulation in August 2007. The registration was cancelled by the 
Commission because the “compliance with the conditions of the specification for an 
agricultural product or foodstuff covered a protected name is no longer ensured.”1237  
 
5.3.6 Sui generis GIs and generic names  
 
The relation between EU sui generis GIs and generic names has been a controversial one. 
The GI Regulation establishes two seemingly simple rules to govern this issue. First, generic 
names cannot be protected as PDOs or PGIs. Second, protected names may not become 
generic.
1238
 However, the real picture is far more ambiguous and complicated. EU sui generis 
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GI law is sometimes accused of being the “expansion of legal protection for generic 
names.”1239 As it will be shown in this section, this accusation is, to a great extent, justified.  
 
5.3.6.1 Definition of PDO/PGI  
 
There is a subtle difference between the definitions of PDO/PGI and TRIPS-GIs. Under the 
TRIPS, GI are “indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a Member, 
or a region or locality in that territory.” This makes a TRIPS-GI is by definition 
descriptive.
1240
  A PDO/PGI is “the name of a region, a specific place or, in exceptional cases, 
a country, used to describe an agricultural product or a foodstuff.” This definition reads like a 
generic name for agro-food product. Commission Regulation (EC) No 1898/2006, which 
implements Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006, further sets qualifications for eligible 
names, which read even more confusingly similar to generic names: (i) “Only a name that is 
in use in commerce or in common language, or which has been used historically to refer to 
the specific agricultural product or foodstuff, may be registered.”1241 (ii) “Only a name that is 
used, whether in commerce or in common language, to refer to the specific agricultural 
product or foodstuff may be registered.”1242  
 
5.3.6.2 Criteria for genericness  
 
Generic names cannot be protected as PDO or PGI. A name becomes generic when it “has 
become the common name of an agricultural product or a foodstuff in the Community.”1243 
The very fact that a name has become generic per se is sufficient for its being excluded from 
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GI protection. No additional condition is needed.
1244
 Since there is no such thing as an 
exhaustive list of generic names, the genericness of a name can only be defined when a 
producer group attempts to register such names.
1245
 It is specifically provides that, in order to 
establish whether or not a name has become generic, account is to be taken of the existing 
situation in the Member States in which the name originates and in areas of consumption; the 
existing situation in other Member States; and the relevant national or Community laws.
1246
 
The “benchmarking rulings” in determining the genericness of a designation are found in the 
renowned Feta cases.
1247
  
 
The name “Feta” was registered in 1996 as a PDO at Community level to cover “Feta” cheese 
produced from ewe’s and goat’s milk in Greece. Denmark, Germany and France contested 
that decision. It is submitted that cheese has been produced (also from cows’ milk) in these 
countries since 1930s and legally marketed under the name “Feta” since 1963 in Denmark, 
1981 in the Netherlands, 1980 in France and 1985 in Germany. Later, the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) annulled the contested Community Regulation 1107/96 to the extent to which it 
registered “Feta” as a protected designation of origin for “Feta” produced in Greece. 
Following the Court’s ruling, the Commission invited the Member States to provide 
information on the production, consumption and available knowledge on the denomination of 
“Feta”. The information it obtained was then submitted to the Scientific Committee for 
examination.
1248
 To establish whether or not a name become generic, account has to be taken 
of the several factors: 
(i) the existing situation in the EC Member State in which the name originates; 
(ii) the situation in the areas of consumption; 
(iii) the existing situation in the other EC Member States; 
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(iv) the relevant national or community laws. 
The Scientific Committee concluded that the fact that a product is manufactured outside the 
area of origin did not imply that the name has become generic and as a consequence it 
adopted a unanimous opinion that the term “Feta” is not generic. The Committee considered 
that production and consumption of “Feta” is heavily concentrated in Greece and to 
consumers the name “Feta” is also associated with a Greek origin implying that the name has 
not become generic on the EU territory. Subsequently, the Commission adopted Regulation 
1829/2002 of October 14, 2002 amending the Annex to Regulation 1107/96 to include “Feta” 
on the list of protected PDOs. Annulment proceedings against this decision were lodged by 
Denmark on December 30, 2002 in the ECJ and by German producers of “Feta”, French 
producers of “Feta” and Danish producers of “Feta” in the court of First Instance.1249 In 2005, 
the ECJ upheld the finding of the European Commission that “Feta”, instead of being a 
generic term for a type of white cheese, was a designation for cheese with a Greek origin.
1250
 
 
The Feta decision shows that the genericness in the context of EU sui generis GI law is 
determined on the basis of a detailed analysis of an array of factors, such as the relevant 
national and Community legislation, its historical development, the data relating to 
production, marketing and sale, both in the Member State of origin and in other Member 
States. The perception of the average consumer is only one of factors to be considered.
1251
 
Thus, as Gangjee has pointed out, although both sui generis GI law and Community 
Trademark law refuse to protect generic terms, the thresholds for genericness are different 
under these two regimes. In the case of the Community Trademark, the sign cannot be 
registered if absolute grounds for refusal, of which generic or common use is one, occur in a 
part of the Community. For GIs, the genericide analysis is thus weighted in favour of home 
producers.”1252 Thus, one commentator claims that “[a]lthough the GI Regulation prohibits 
the registration of geographical names that have become generic…there are few obstacles to 
recovering exclusive use of a name under the GI system. Recent case law of the ECJ in Feta, 
Parmesan, Bayerisches Bier highlights the way in which the court has succeeded in giving a 
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restrictive interpretation to the exclusion of generic names…to the effect that, if the name 
retains the ability to evoke the place of production, it will likely be allowed to proceed to 
registration.”1253 Jeremy Reed criticizes the ECJ’s decision: 
 
“[T]he ECJ’s judgment is not particularly well reasoned. The poor reasoning gives the 
impression that the judgment has been written with the aim of reaching a particular 
conclusion, fudging or obscuring the reasoning where necessary in order to obtain the desired 
result.”1254 
 
Thus, Ricolfi concludes that “the EU Court of Justice has confirmed that the suspicion that 
the access requirements for GI protection may be too low, as shown in the second Feta case 
(2005), while the scope of protection of the same symbols may be too broad, as shown in the 
string of cases that goes from Cambozola (1999) to Parmesan (2008), passing through 
Prosciutto di Parma (2005).”1255 
 
5.3.6.3 Protected GIs may not become generic  
 
More suspicious is the rule that Article 13.2 protected names may not become generic.
1256
 
The very existence of this provision itself testifies that the legislator is aware of the 
possibility that a registered name may become generic after registration and it is a policy 
decision to continue protection even though as the protected name has become de facto 
generic. Therefore, the accusations that GIs institutionalize protection for generic names and 
create unfair competitive advantages for certain producers are, at least, partially justified.   
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5.3.6.4 GI policy requiring protection of genericness  
 
As concluded by Nation that generic has a nuanced meaning in the context of GIs. All GIs are 
“innately generic because they refer to a class of products, as opposed to one particular 
product.” However, GIs are not categorically denied protection on this basis. GIs are not 
viewed as generic terms “as long as their name remains geographically descriptive.”1257 
However, the innate intimacy between PDI/PGI and generic names is in line with the policy 
goal of the GI Regulation. Part of the motive behind 1992 GI Regulation is to protect 
traditional food producers from competition.
1258
 As pointed out by MacMaolain has that it is 
the exclusion, rather than the inclusion, of generic products that constitutes a paradox to the 
legislative rationale behind the GI Regulation because the very motive of PDO/PGI is to 
protect those products that “have become, and remained, popular amongst consumers” and it 
is these products that “non-national or non-traditional producers would be most likely to try 
and plagiarise given their level of popularity.”1259 By protecting these product names, the 
Origin Regulation “provides opportunities for small-scale producers to use these quality 
symbols as a means of promoting their products, without the long and costly process of 
obtaining a trademark for their products.” 1260 
 
5.4 The IP controversies of sui generis GIs  
 
The relation between sui generis GIs and IP has been a controversial issue. At debate are the 
IP status of sui generis GIs and their justifiability. In this section, it will be argued that EU sui 
generis GI law is a form of IP because it does possess the two shared characteristics of IP and 
it is unique among IP in terms of its economic justifications.  
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5.4.1 The IP status of sui generis GIs  
 
Despite its inclusion in the TRIPS Agreement, the IP status of GIs has been questioned from 
time to time.
1261
 In the UK, Lord Hoffmann claimed that ‘a PDO is a form of intellectual 
property right.’1262  The ECJ held in the Feta case that PDOs “fall within the scope of 
industrial and commercial property rights.
1263
 MacQueen, Waelde, and Laurie describe GIs as 
“a form of intellectual property rooted in agricultural policy and designed to highlight a link 
between the natural geographical advantages or the reputation associated with a place and 
foodstuffs produced in that place.”1264 On the other hand, it is claimed that one cannot make 
GIs a form of IP simply by “calling GIs a form of IP, and dealing with GIs in IP treaties.”1265 
The reason for denying the IP status of GIs is that they are neither “intellectual” nor 
“property”, namely, they lack the quality of IP. First, it is argued that GIs involve no 
creativity that can be deserving of IP protection because a GI is created simply “by the 
adoption of the geographic name itself as the designator of the product” and, thus, there is 
nothing conceived or invented by the so-called owner.
1266
 Second, it is argued that GIs are 
not IP because they seem to have no owner,
1267
cannot be sold,
1268
 cannot be 
licensed,
1269
cannot be dealt with independently of the region or locality to which they 
append,
1270
and cannot be used in an exclusionary manner in that they are open to use by all 
persons in the region or locality making the product in compliance with local laws or 
customs.
1271
  .  
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These objections may not be sufficient for denying the IP status of GIs. As analysed in 
Chapter 2, the two basic shared characteristics of IP are intangibles subject matter and 
negative right.
1272
 Creativity or intellectual input is not a necessary criterion for IP. 
Trademarks, for example, provide protection for marketing symbols. “Intellectual” is not the 
sine qua non condition for IP. As the long established principle has it, trademarks do not 
themselves “depend upon novelty, invention, discovery, or any work of the brain. It requires 
no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought.” 1273  The other essential 
characteristic of IP is its negative nature of right. Aspects of positive rights are essentially 
ancillary.
1274
 Thus, Gangjee argues that GIs are a form of IP because a “successful GI 
registration is functionally similar to a trademark, entitling a certain group of producers to use 
the term while excluding others, even though they may have already been using the term”.1275 
Argued in the context of the French AOC system, Jim Chen defences the IP status of GIs 
because the “farmer nevertheless wields the power to exclude certain competitors, just as any 
residential tenant holds the right of quiet enjoyment even if she is barred from subletting or 
assigning her lease. The power to exclude is the power of property…”1276 He further claims 
AOC as  “an unusual and an unusually strong species of intangible property” because it 
“combines aspects of trademark law and the law of regulated industries” and can never be 
become generic character and thus can never fall into the public domain.
1277
 Again, the ECJ 
held that PDOs fall within the scope of industrial and commercial property rights because the 
“applicable rules protect those entitled to use them against improper use of those designations 
by third parties seeking to profit from the reputation which they have acquired.”1278 More 
specifically, GIs have no difficulty fitting into the concept of what is termed “limited access 
communal property.” According to Clark and Kohler sometimes property rights in things can 
be held by communities, i.e. groups of individuals identified by reference to a particular 
locality or by reference to membership of a particular class or ethnic or tribal group, or by 
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reference to some other general defining characteristic. 
1279
 The defining characteristic of 
communal property is that every member of the community has the right not to be excluded 
from the resource. An individual who is a member of the community therefore has not only 
the privilege to use the thing, but also has a right not to be excluded from it, and consequently 
everyone else in the world has a correlative duty not to interfere with their access to it.
1280
 
Limited access communal property is a subtype of communal property. In limited access 
communal property, the membership of the community is restricted to a specific class. Apart 
from a privilege to use the resource and a right not to be excluded, each member of the 
community also “has a right to exclude all non-members of the community.”1281 
 
5.4.2 Economic justifications for sui generis GIs  
 
The justifiability of EU sui generis GIs has been a vehemently debated issue.
1282
 As observed 
by Raustiala and Munzer:  
 
“The major substantive rights protected by TRIPS are copyright, patent and trademark. These 
rights are familiar and generally well supported as a matter of intellectual property 
theory…Some of the rights protected by TRIPS, however, lack even this foundation, which 
makes their inclusion in the WTO more problematic. Perhaps the most theoretically contested 
of these rights relates to ‘geographical indications’ (GIs).” 1283   
 
The main difficulty of justifying sui generis GIs lies in the inapplicability of the standard 
market failures justifications.
1284
 It will be shown in the following discussion, the 
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justifications for sui generis GIs go beyond market failures and fall within the scope of the 
pursuant of social equity and promotion of merit goods. In order to argue this, it is first 
necessary to explain the economic features of EU sui generis GIs.  
 
5.4.2.1 Economic features of sui generis GIs  
 
Like trademarks, sui generis GI law creates exclusive rights over the use of 
commercial/marketing symbols. However, sui generis GI law protects certain innately 
generic names rather than distinctive signs. Economic theory suggests that by allowing 
exclusive use of such are, sui generis GI law may: (i) create a competition advantage for the 
right-holder by creating artificial marketing barrier for competitors; (ii) in  more extreme case, 
grant a monopoly in that named commodity; and (iii) increase consumer search-cost. In this 
sense, sui generis GIs bear similarities with patents and are an antithesis of trademarks.
1285
  
 
One further feature of sui generis GIs is that it brings together groups of producers to set 
quality standards for products. As Evans observes:  
 
“The collective nature of the GI requires members of the GI to meet and discuss ‘standards’ 
for the awarding of a label. Such a practice is normally viewed at the very least with 
suspicion by competition regulators. One would indeed expect any agreement that, at its core, 
restricts production and excludes existing producers from the market, to seek an exemption 
from competition law.”1286 
 
This has led to the accusation that EU GI system “encourages anti-competitive behaviour by 
fostering cartel behaviour.” 1287 A cartel is a group of producers with an agreement to collude 
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in setting prices and output.
1288
 The members of a cartel behave as if they were a single 
firm.
1289
 Agreements not to compete enable cartels to extract monopoly prices from buyer.
1290
 
In this sense, EU GI law is designed to “eschew normal competition analysis and encourage 
anti-competitive behaviour by GI owners.”1291  
 
5.4.2.2 Sui generis GIs and market failure justifications  
 
IP is normally justified by the need of correcting some sources of market failure. While 
patents and copyright are designed to address the public good problem, trademarks are legal 
responses to the problem of information asymmetry.
1292
 
 
(1) Public goods problem 
 
The main economic justification for patents and copyright is that they serve as incentives for 
the promotion of innovations.
1293
 Applying the economic justification for patents and 
copyright to EU sui generis GIs is problematic. First of all, GIs are not designed to 
incentivize innovation.
1294
 The product specification actually requires a description of “the 
authentic and unvarying local methods”.1295 By doing so, EU sui generis GIs may, in fact, 
have adverse effects on innovations. That is, innovation may itself be restricted by such 
                                                          
1288
 Joseph E. Stiglitz and Carl E. Walsh, Economics (4
th
 edn, W. W. Norton & Company 2006) A-2.  
1289
 John Sloman, Essentials of Economics (3
rd
 edn, Pearson Education Limited 2004) 143. 
1290
 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics (4
th
 edn, Pearson: Addison Wesley Longman 2004) 
287. 
1291
 Evans (n 1286) 358.  
1292
 See above 2.3.  
1293
 See above 2.3.1.  
1294
 Bernard O’Connor, The Law of Geographical Indications (Cameron May, 2004) 373-4. This is, however, 
not to say that GIs disallow innovation. See e.g., Addor and Grazioli ((n 1240) 984) opine that “GIs reward 
collective traditions while allowing for continued evolution…” 
1295
 See above 5.3.4.  
212 
 
protection because it rewards “producers that are situated in certain region and that follow 
production practices associated with that region and its culture and customs.”1296  
 
Due to the anti-innovation effect, GIs are being increasingly considered as part of a wider 
policy measure aimed at protecting and rewarding the traditional knowledge (TK) of local 
communities and indigenous peoples.
 1297
 At a basic level, GIs may protect cultural traditions 
by helping many traditional, historical products remain in production on the market that 
might otherwise have disappeared.
1298
 Downes identifies, in contrast with other types of 
intellectual property, multiple advantages of using GIs to as a policy tool for TK protection. 
First, geographical indications are not designed to reward innovation, but rather to reward 
members of an established group or community for adhering to traditional practices of the 
community or group’s culture.1299 Secondly, rights to control geographical indications can be 
maintained in perpetuity.
1300
 Thirdly, geographical indications also better lend themselves to 
communal organization than do other IPRs. A producer qualified to use a geographical 
indication according to its location and method production. It is immaterial whether the 
producer is an individual, family, partnership, corporation, voluntary association, or 
municipal corporation.
1301
 Finally, geographical indications also accord with the emphasis 
that indigenous communities typically place upon their traditional ways of life, including 
their relationship with their ancestral lands, waters, and living ecosystems.
1302
 However, these 
arguments suggest that the subject matter of TK protection is not the knowledge per se, but 
the mode of production or the cultural heritage. This is reasonable because the “traditional 
knowledge” per se has already existed and there is no need to provide extra incentives. What 
is needed is the incentive to government to maintain the production of the products 
complying with traditional methods. Such cultural heritage or goods are not public good in 
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the economic sense.
1303
 If this is the reason for sui generis GI protection, then its justification 
shall be found elsewhere.  
 
(2) Information asymmetry  
 
There are two ways to connect GIs to the information asymmetry justification. One equates 
GIs with trademarks and the other resorts to terroir.  Some commentators argue that GIs and 
trademarks perform the same economic functions. Like markets for other types goods, the 
market for agricultural and food products is characterized by “varying qualities, only the 
producer is aware of the product’s quality in advance, while the consumer runs the risk of 
buying an inferior product due to adverse selection.”1304 GIs, like trademarks or commercial 
names, geographical indications are “distinctive signs which permit the identification of 
products on the market.” 1305  This argument is fundamentally flawed. It simply fails to 
distinguish the nuanced difference between GIs and trademarks.  
 
Some other commentators, instead of describing GIs as distinctive signs, link information 
asymmetry justification to the terroir theory.
1306
 According to this narrative, the justifiablility 
of GI systems depends on the validity of the terroir assumption that “the character 
(sometimes defined as quality) of the product derives from the physical and human 
environment in which it is produced.”1307 As Josling states:  
 
“The idea of including the place of origin on a label deserves to be taken seriously as a way 
of correcting consumer information asymmetries, by providing information about the 
provenance of a product that might be otherwise difficult to divine. So long as that 
information relates in a reasonably reliable way to a consumer attribute (real or perceived) 
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then it can be presumed to be of benefits. So, using a GI as a proxy for information about the 
consumer attributes of a good may have sound economic as well as social justification. In this 
case, terroir as a concept is benign and even useful. On the other hand, if the link between 
quality and location is not so reliable then the information may deflect choice and instead 
provide marketing advantage to one group of producers by restricting competition. So the 
asymmetric information’s argument for GIs rests at least in principle on an empirical 
foundation, and is subject to investigation.”1308 
 
According to Gangjee, there have been three overlapping narratives of terroir. It has been 
understood as a “holistic and mystical” or “geographical and deterministic” concept or “an 
evolving composite of natural and human factors”.1309 Bently and Sherman analogize the 
exclusive link between product and place with “the idea of the unique expression of the 
author or the novelty of patented inventions.”1310 No matter what terroir may actually mean, 
the essence of the terroir narrative is that specific geographic locations yield product qualities 
that cannot be replicated elsewhere.
1311
 The first challenge that this argument may face is a 
technical one. The value of sui generis GIs as a policy tool to correct information asymmetry 
will be relying on their inherent informational value.  Thus, the key issues for the whole 
debate will “how convincing, reliable, and transparent can such a system possible be? And 
what about its efficiency—would the investment in bureaucracy, testing, and monitoring 
facilities that are inevitable corollaries of its establishment actually be set off by the 
beneficial effects it entails for local producers as well as for consumers?”1312 The Feta case is 
used by Kur to explain what makes her “remain a confessed sceptic”:  
 
“[A]lthough the EU regulation makes it mandatory to establish the link between the quality of 
the product and its geographical origin, it is not so clear how serious and reliable the tests 
actually are. As most of us are laymen in the field, we have to trust the competent authorities 
to do their job correctly. However, what trust that may have existed in the unbiased exercise 
of the European authorities’ tasks was badly shaken, for example, in the context of the “Feta” 
case, which ultimately led to protection of that designation for cheese originating from 
Greece. How convincing is it to claim that the natural surroundings in most of the Greek 
territory—comprising diverse landscape such as isles, plains, and mountains—are exactly 
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such that this particular cheese can be produced, while the same cannot be done in 
neighboring Bulgaria.”1313 
 
One further problem is more methodological. The terroir argument has its merits to certain 
extent. As Moran has pointed out, very few arguments can be made against the use of GIs 
that “guarantee only that the product originates from a specified territory.” 1314  That the 
product cannot be replicated outside the area may provide the reason for prohibiting 
competitors outside the geographical area from using the geographical designation. However, 
it does not explain why the competitors within the geographical area are excluded from using 
the geographical designation to identify their products. There is nothing here to deny the 
importance of allowing the competitors to communicate to consumers the geographical origin:   
 
“Geographic origin may be important to consumers for a variety of reasons. Consumers may 
know, for example, that a particular region has climatic and soil conditions that contribute 
desirable qualities to an agricultural product…Thus, one cost of overly lenient rules regarding 
geographic marks is to hinder competitors in providing information valued by consumers. 
That, in turn, will lessen consumers’ ability to determine whether two brands of a given 
products are, in fact, identical regarding a key trait. The result is increased search costs for 
consumers, and inappropriate market power in the hands of the party controlling the use of 
the geographic term.”1315 
  
Even one ardent advocate of sui generis GI law has to admit that the determination of one 
genuine product is highly political in nature:   
 
“Thus not any ham from the Parma region of Italy can be called Proscuitto di Parma; only 
ham that is air-dried and cured in a certain traditional way, for a certain number of weeks can 
use this label. So what happens if there are 100 producers from a region, who seek to register 
a region, who seek to register a traditional product and 50 make it by process A.B.C., and 40 
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make it by process A.B.D. and 10 follow process A.B.E.F.? Which is the genuine process? 
This can become quite political and controversial.”1316 
 
Thus, the terroir theory fails to link sui generis GIs with the information asymmetry 
justification. Morcom, Roughton, Malyniczhe express their concern about the political nature 
of such protection:  
 
“The purposes served by the existence of PDOs or PGIs is unclear…It is a system seems to 
have grown up as a result of improper pressure being applied on our political decision-makers. 
However, the geographical protection scheme exists; nothing can be done about it and so we 
(as consumers) have to live with it.”1317 
 
5.4.2.3 Sui generis GIs and non-market-failure justifications  
 
For economists, the correction of market failures is not the only justification for government 
intervention in the economy. The government has regulated various sectors of the economy 
for a variety of reasons, not all of which are strictly economic in nature. Political and social 
rationales also have been advanced to justify regulation.
1318
 Two categories of such rationales 
have been generally recognized. First, the government may intervene to pursue social values 
of fairness, or equity, by altering market outcomes. Secondly, the government may intervene 
to promote merit goods or discourage merit bads.
1319
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(1) Pursuant of social equity  
 
As economists have observed that even in perfectly competitive markets, welfare is non-
optimal if the distribution of income is “unjust.” Individual wealth depends on assets (for 
example, money, machines) and skills. Competition rewards those who are the most 
productive and who own productive assets
1320
 and, thus, may “result in some individuals 
receiving too low of an income to survive at a standard of living that is viewed as socially 
acceptable.”1321 High levels of social inequity are often associated with a variety of social and 
political problems, which in turn often result in a climate that does not favour investment. 
Apart from this, inequality may also raise a concern about social justice or fairness in most 
societies.
1322
 One answer is that the morally just distribution of income can be achieved by 
competition plus a system of appropriate income distribution. That is, the government could 
assign wealth initially according to society’s moral values, and then competition would lead 
society to an efficient outcome.
1323
 The government may intervene by providing programs 
attempted to provide a basic safety net, to ensure that all have a minimal level of income 
(through welfare programs), housing, food (through food stamps), and health (through 
Medicaid). Programs that take income from some people and redistribute it to others are 
called transfer programs. Many government programs, including education, have a 
redistributive component, which is especially important in social insurance programs. Low-
wage individuals, for instance, get back more than they contribute to Social Security.”1324  
 
EU sui generis GI law is a policy tool for rural development.
1325
 According to Woods, the 
foremost reason for governments to take an interest in the development of rural areas is the 
“welfarist rationale that the state has a duty to support basic levels of social well-being and to 
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promote equity between its citizens.” 1326 The state therefore intervenes to improve the living 
conditions of people in rural areas and invests in infrastructure to provide public services. It 
also acts to stimulate economic development when the decline or withdrawal of established 
economic activities produces significant unemployment or poverty.
1327
 EU GI model 
represents a paradigm shift from the top-down rural development to a bottom-up rural 
regeneration.
1328
 While top-down rural development is characterized by large, state-led, 
infrastructure projects, bottom-up rural regeneration is characterized by small, community-
led initiatives drawing on indigenous resources.
1329
 Communities are encouraged to assess the 
problems that they face, to identify appropriate solutions, and to design and implement 
regeneration projects. The emphasis is no longer on attracting external investment, but rather 
on enhancing and exploiting local endogenous resources—also known as endogenous 
development.
1330
 EU GI model represents a shift from subsidies to a market-based rural 
development
1331
 Following the principle of endogenous development theory, regional foods 
represent potentially fruitful resources for development as they can incorporate, and valorise, 
many local assets with special or immobile characteristics linked to the area.
1332
 EU Sui 
generis GIs creates incentives for local producers to agree to produce uniform product and 
thus eliminate quality competition. “Since the earliest days in Europe, geographical 
indications were used to protect certain products, use of the place names became attractive. 
To some extent such markings served as a warranty for the quality of goods. To ensure the 
locale’s reputation, the local industry would agree to certain standards of production. The 
granting of a right to use a geographical term associated with particular goods exclusively to 
the producers within a certain region served to limit competition, especially from producers 
outside that region.” 1333 As commentators have observed, EU sui generis GI law bears 
significant similarities with agricultural protective measures under the US law. Echols sees 
the regulatory structure of EU sui generis GI law “offers a paradigm of an approach that is 
more closely related to agricultural, rural development and environmental protection policy 
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than it is to intellectual property.” 1334 Argued in the context of French AOC, Chen views an 
American Viticultural Area (AVA) as “the American analogous of the French AOC.”1335 
Hayes, Lence, and Babcock consider EU-type of GI protection a combination of US 
certification marks and federal market orders. Therefore, without EU-type of GI protection, 
US producers seeking strong protection “are likely to resort to certification marks, perhaps 
combined with marketing orders, to achieve their goals.”1336  
 
(2) Promotion of merits goods  
 
Protection of geographical indications (GIs) constitutes an integral part of EU food quality 
schemes, which identify consumer products having specific qualities resulting from a 
particular origin and/or farming method.
1337
 It was in response to fears about the declining 
quality of such products in the post-Cassis era that the Council approved the legislation in the 
first place.
1338
 Thus, GIs are a policy tool for the maintenance of food quality.
1339
 Using GIs 
as a policy tool for maintaining food quality leads the GI debate into a more controversial 
policy area wherein the justification for government intervention in the economy lies not in 
market failures or social equity but in the promotion of merit goods or discouragement of 
merit bads. A “merit good” may be simply defined as a good of which authorities believe too 
little is being consumed. Therefore, authorities implement measures to increase consumption. 
The opposite of a merit good is a “demerit good,” in which case too much is being consumed 
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and authorities may implement measures to reduce consumption.
1340
 The concept of merit 
goods, thus, inevitably involves the imposition of value judgment through public policy.
1341
 
For example, governments may try to discourage drug taking and encourage education.
1342
 
Jois distinguishes three differences between merit goods and public goods. First, merit goods 
do not benefit everyone, while public goods necessarily do. Second, as a result, merit goods 
create a problem of financing because those who do not benefit may be unwilling to pay for 
them. Third, because some are disadvantaged, the standard justification for public goods—
that all are better off so all must pay—cannot be used.1343  
 
The role of government’s role in the promotion of merit goods is controversial.  By 
encouraging the consumption of certain goods the government acts paternalistically by 
interfering with “the general principle of consumer sovereignty, which holds that individuals 
are the best judges of what is in their own interests and promote their own well-being.”1344 
Many economists believe that government should limit such behaviour to certain basic 
categories such as compulsory education requirements for children.
1345
 
 
As a policy tool for market-based rural development, the protection of GIs is one element of 
the new quality approach. The old quality standards were more designed to prevent fraud in 
the EC agricultural budget than to ensure consumer satisfaction. The old standards were set 
so as to ensure that products brought into intervention at the taxpayer’s expense could be 
resold into the market in times of shortage. The new quality policy is now more focused on 
the consumer acceptance and health and safety.
1346
 Food quality has been described as 
relative concept which “must be defined and measured from the consumer’s perspective”.1347 
Food quality is also “a concept linked to culture and hence complex and multidimensional. It 
contains subjective components, which make it situation-specific, fluid and dynamic across 
                                                          
1340
 Goutam U. Jois, ‘Can’t Touch This! Private Property, Takings, and the Merit Goods Argument’ 48 Tex L 
Rev (2006-2007) 183, 195-196.  
1341
 Jois (n 1340) 198.  
1342
 Stiglitz and Walsh (n 1288) 379. 
1343
 Jois (n 1340) 198.  
1344
 Sitigliz and Walsh (n 1288) 380.   
1345
 Sitigliz and Walsh (n 1288) 380.   
1346
 Bernard O’Connor, ‘The Legal Protection of Geographical Indications’ 1 IPQ (2004) 35, 36.  
1347
 Armand V. Cardello, ‘Food Quality: Relativity, Context and Consumer Expectations’ 6 Food Quality and 
Performance (1995) 163, 163.  
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time. Thus, it is questionable whether a valid measure of quality could be devised” 1348 
According to Grunert, information on the place or region of origin of the product has a long 
history in the food area in Europe.
1349
 This may create the policy background of EU GI law. 
However, as Kur has observed, in Europe, the GI system is rooted in the countries around the 
Mediterranean Sea, such as France, Italy, and Spain. It is less important for countries in 
Northern Europe, such as the United Kingdom or the Scandinavian nations.
1350
  
 
Table 3: Government intervention in the economy and the economic justifications for IP: 
 
intervention 
 
 
 
 
Types of IPRs 
Government intervention in the economy 
Correcting market failures Pursuing 
social  
equity 
Promoting 
merit 
goods 
Imperfect 
competition 
Externalities Information 
asymmetry 
Public 
goods 
Patents    √   
Copyright    √   
Trademarks   √    
Sui generis 
GIs 
    √ √ 
 
 
5.5 Conclusion  
 
The origin of sui generis GI law is closely related to rural policy. The EU sui generis 
paradigm explicitly exploits GIs as a policy tool for agro-food policy. The EU introduced sui 
generis GIs in the early 1990s partly because of the political need to protect local traditional 
food producers and partly because of its potential in benefiting rural economy while 
maintaining food quality which fit into the multifunctional features of the CAP reform. Under 
the EU sui generis GI law, protection is acquired through registration. As a collective right, 
only a group is entitled to apply for registration and a registered name may be used by any 
                                                          
1348
 Christos Fotopoulos and Athanasios Krystallis, ‘Quality Labels as a Marketing Advantage: The Case of the 
PDO Zagora’ Apples in the Greek Market’ 37 European Journal of Marketing (2003) 1350, 1351 
1349
 Klaus G. Grunert, ‘Food Quality and Safety: Consumer Perception and Demand’ 32 European Review of 
Agricultural Economics (2005) 369, 377.  
1350
 Annette Kur in Hughes, J et al, ‘Panel II: That’s a Fine Chablis You’re Not Drinking: The Proper Place for 
Geographical Indications in Trademark Law’ 17 Fordham Intell Prop Media & Ent L J (2006-2007) 933, 939.  
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operator marketing agro-food products conforming to the criteria. A registered name gives its 
legitimate users the right to prevent the unauthorized use of the protected name even where 
there is no consumer confusion. The protection is of indefinite duration so long as the 
conditions for protection continue to be met. EU Sui generis GI law is a unique form of IP. It 
bears similarities with trademarks in that both institutions protect commercial signs. However, 
sui generis GIs law constitutes an antithesis of trademarks because it protects innately names 
that are innately generic. Like patents and copyright, sui generis GIs constitute a deviation 
from the competitive market. Nonetheless, sui generis GIs differ from all the three central 
types of IP in that their justification lies not in the need to correct market failures but in the 
pursuit of social equity and the promotion of merit goods.   
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
 
This thesis has searched for explanations for Taiwan’s GI conundrum: the puzzling questions 
that Taiwanese policymakers and scholars have been facing in implementing Taiwan’s 
obligation of protecting GIs under the TRIPS Agreement. The explanations have been sought 
by exploring and clarifying the relation between GIs and IP under the three international 
regimes, namely, the TRIPS Agreement, the US trademark paradigm, and the EU sui generis 
paradigm respectively. This Chapter first summarises the issues explored in the thesis before 
making final conclusions.  
 
6.1 Summary of findings  
 
Chapter 2 constructed an analytical framework for intellectual property (IP). IP is a generic 
title for patents, copyright, and trademarks and so forth. IP law confers property rights on 
certain forms of information. There are three main types of IP, namely, patents, copyright, 
and trademarks. IP also extends to sui generis rights either by accretion, that is, re-defining an 
existing right to encompass new material, or by emulation, the creation of new right by 
analogy drawn from the types already known. IP has two shared characteristics. One is the 
intangibility of subject matter and the other the negativity of rights. From the economic 
perspective, IP is a form of government intervention in the market justified by the need to 
correct market failures. Through the lens of market failures, patents and copyright and 
trademarks are legal reactions to different subsets of market failures. Patents and copyright 
are developed to overcome the public good problem by providing incentives for innovation. 
They are regarded as “a necessary evil” and should be granted only where necessary because 
they impose multiple social costs. First, they may create monopoly power which may lead to 
deadweight loss and rent-seeking and, thus, misallocation of resources. Second, they create 
artificial barriers to the access of information. Third, it spreads the burdens among consumers. 
Last, they impose costs of administration and enforcement. Policy alternatives to patents and 
copyright may include recognition through publication, academic tenure, prizes for 
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achievements, and, most importantly, subsidy by government. The government subsidy 
system may possess two relative advantages over IP. Under the subsidy system, incentives 
are provided without granting monopoly power over price and the innovations immediately 
become freely available to all. Nonetheless, the subsidy system also possesses inherent 
shortcomings. One the one hand, there is a problem of government ignorance. Competition 
for funding may, on the other hand, lead to the rent-seeking problem.  
 
Trademarks are a legal response to the information asymmetry problem. Trademarks operate 
in the public interest because they increase the supply of information to consumers and, 
thereby, the efficiency of the market. The importance of trademarks in the world of 
information asymmetry is that they reduce consumers’ cost of search for desirable attributes 
of products. A trademark does not give its owner a monopoly in either the mark or the 
underlying goods or services. The most obvious social cost of trademarks is that they restrict 
other traders from using the same or similar sign and that they also incur administration and 
enforcement costs. The universal requirement for a sign to be protected as a trademark is that 
it must be distinctive, that is, it must be able to distinguish the user’s goods or services from 
those offered by others. Lack of distinctiveness may fail to reduce consumer’s search costs. 
Distinctiveness can be either inherent or acquired through secondary meaning. A descriptive 
term describes the qualities or characteristics of a product. The general rule is that a 
descriptive sign cannot be protected as a trademark. The economic incentive for the business 
operators to choose descriptive marks is that they are able to convey information about the 
attributes of the good and thus function as a partial substitute for adverting. Giving trademark 
protection to descriptive signs will be harmful to consumer and competitors because this 
would be likely to prevent others from using the required identifiers to compete effectively. A 
generic sign defines a category of type to which the goods belong. The general rule is that a 
generic term cannot be trademarked and if a trademark becomes a generic term, trademark 
protection should immediately cease. A trademarked generic term harms competitors and 
consumers. The recognition of property in a generic name could be tantamount to granting a 
monopoly in that commodity. A trademarked generic term may also create unnecessary 
consumer search costs by impairing consumers’ efficient identification of objectively 
satisfactory substitutes.  
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Table 4: economic features of patents/copyright and trademarks  
 
 Patents/copyright Trademarks 
Market failures Public goods Information asymmetry 
Relation with 
markets 
competition 
deviating from market competition Facilitating market competition 
Social costs  Monopoly power leading to 
deadweight loss and rent-seeking 
and, thus, misallocation of 
resources 
 Artificial barriers to the access of 
information 
 Spreads the burdens among 
consumers 
 Administration and enforcement 
costs 
 Restricting  other traders from 
using the same or similar sign 
 Administration and enforcement 
costs 
 
Chapters 3 to 5 explored the GI-IP relation in the contexts the TRIPS Agreement, the US 
trademark paradigm, and the EU sui generis paradigms respectively. Despite all the historical, 
institutional, and technical differences, there are three constant and consistent themes shared 
by the three international regimes. First, the relation between GIs and IP has not been fixed; it 
has, instead, been flexible, strategic, and instrumental. Secondly, GIs have been an instrument 
for agro-food policy, the focus of which has been on providing special protection for local 
producers by shielding them from market competition. Thirdly, GIs and trademarks have 
been different institutions. While the latter facilitates market competition by protecting 
distinctive signs, the former deviates from market competition by protecting descriptive or 
generic names.  
 
Chapter 3 explored the GI-IP relation in the context of the TRIPS Agreement. The TRIPS 
Agreement establishes GIs as a category of IP alongside patents, copyrights, and trademarks. 
The inclusion of GIs under the TRIPS Agreement was initiated and insisted upon by the EU. 
The reason for EU to seek GIs protection under TRIPS is to protect their agro-food, 
especially, wine and spirits industries. EU’s proposal was resisted by US and some former 
European colonies. This resistance, however, represented not a reluctance to protect local 
agro-food industry but the determination of these countries to protect their own domestic 
producers’ right to use names originated in Europe. The final inclusion of GIs under the 
TRIPS Agreement represented a strategic compromise between the EU and the US. As a 
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strategic compromise, the TRIPS-GI provisions are characterized by illogicality, 
inconsistency and inconclusiveness. First, GIs are defined as indications which identify a 
good as originating in the territory of a region or locality, where a given quality, reputation or 
other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin. It is 
noteworthy that neither the US trademark paradigm nor the EU sui generis paradigm adopts 
this definition. Secondly, the TRIPS Agreement mandates two level of protection for GIs. For 
GIs in relation to all goods, protection is based on consumer protection and the prevention of 
unfair competition. For GIs for wines and spirits, however, the level of protection is higher in 
that there is no need to show that consumers might be misled or the use constitutes an act of 
unfair competition. The policy rationale behind this level of protection is not explicitly 
expressed in the TRIPS Agreement. The explanation for having two levels of protection is 
that the former reflects the US demand and the latter represents the victory of EU. However, 
since TRIPS failed to specify the legal means for protection, WTO Members are free to 
determine their method of protection and it is explicitly provided that the additional level of 
protection may be enforced by administration actions. Thirdly, Article 24 provides a series of 
highly technical and detailed exceptions to GI protection, which were the conditions for US 
to agree TRIPS GI protection. Fourthly, the TRIPS Agreement also mandates for continuing 
negotiations for the enhancement of GI protection. It is noteworthy that the TRIPS 
Agreement is an integral part of the WTO trademark system. Under the WTO system, GIs are 
not only an IP issue but are also a topic under agricultural negotiations. Thus, the EU has 
brought the GI issue to agricultural negotiations by requesting the “claw-back” of 41 names 
of agro-food products. 
 
Chapter 4 explored the GI-IP relation in the context of the US trademark paradigm. Although 
generally called the trademark paradigm, the US law in fact protect GIs through a collection 
of unrelated laws and regulations, including trademark law and an array of administrative 
schemes. Under the US trademark law, GIs are not specifically defined and understood as an 
interchangeable term for geographical designations. The concept of GIs is inherently 
incompatible with that of trademarks, which protects distinctive terms. US law has been 
historically reluctant to provide trademark protection for geographical designations because 
of the potential anti-competitive effects. The traditional goal of the law of geographical 
trademarks is to protect the communicative needs of competitors. Under the Lanham Act a 
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geographical mark can be registered if it is considered inherently distinctive or to have 
acquired distinctiveness. Therefore, GIs as defined under the TRIPS Agreement are 
unprotectable as trademarks. To make the Lanham Act comply with the TRIPS-GI obligation, 
GIs for wines and spirits were added to the list of unregistrable marks. The US has been 
advocating for the use of certification marks and collective trademarks to protect GIs. Under 
the Lanham Act, a certification mark is used to inform purchasers that the goods or services 
of a person possess certain characteristics or meet certain qualifications or standards 
established by another person. This is clearly a special type of mark created for a purpose 
uniquely different from that of an ordinary trademark. A collective trademark is a mark 
adopted by a collective and used by its members to identify their goods or services and 
distinguish them from those of non-members. Collective trademarks have been criticized 
because they may violate the economic rationales behind trademark protection. They may 
cause consumer confusion by allowing different producers to use the same sign. This 
confusion may be reduced by requiring the association to set quality standards to regulate the 
use of the mark. However, doing so will reduce competition in a given industry. In addition, 
there is a functional overlap between collective trademarks and certification marks. Therefore, 
it is argued that there is no need to have both types of marks in the same jurisdiction and 
collective trademarks should be abolished. These two categories of marks can better 
accommodate the GI concept because geographically descriptive terms are registrable 
without acquired distinctiveness. The effects of GI protection under these two categories are 
weak and uncertain because, being subject to the general rules of trademark law, they have no 
power to stop competitors from using the registered name to communicate the geographical 
origin of their products. While the US trademark law has been reluctant to protect 
geographical names, strong protection for GIs has been provided through an array of 
administrative schemes. First, there are laws and regulations governing the classification of 
terms of geographical significance for wines, spirits, cheese, and other agricultural products, 
which allow domestic producers to use European names for their products even though they 
are produced in the United States. Second, special measures are specifically designed to 
protect domestic wine industry. Third, local agro-food specialty may acquire multiple 
protection through various laws and regulations. The case of Vidalia onions illustrates how 
national and local governments interact to protect the name and quality of a regional specialty. 
The “Vidalia Onion” is protected under the Georgia Vidalia Onion Act of 1986, by 
certification mark, the Federal Marketing Order, and as a Product Produced in Distinct 
Geographic Areas. 
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Chapter 5 explored the GI-IP relation in the context of EU sui generis GI paradigm. The EU 
sui generis paradigm explicitly exploits GIs as a policy tool for agro-food policy. The origin 
of sui generis GI law can be traced back to the privileges granted by the French government 
to rural communities prior to the French Revolution. The EU introduced sui generis GIs in 
the early 1990s partly because of the political need to protect local traditional food producers 
and partly because of its potential in benefiting rural economy while maintaining food quality 
which fit into the multifunctional features of the CAP reform. Under the EU sui generis GI 
law, protection is acquired through registration. As a collective right, only a group is entitled 
to apply for registration and a registered name may be used by any operator marketing agro-
food products conforming to the criteria. A registered name gives its legitimate users the right 
to prevent the unauthorized use of the protected name even where there is no consumer 
confusion. The protection is of indefinite duration so long as the conditions for protection 
continue to be met. EU Sui generis GI law is a unique form of IP. It bears similarities with 
trademarks in that both institutions protect commercial signs. However, sui generis GIs law 
constitutes an antithesis of trademarks because it protects innately names that are innately 
generic. Like patents and copyright, sui generis GIs constitute deviation from the competitive 
market. Nonetheless, sui generis GIs differ from all the three central types of IP in that their 
justification lies not in the need to correct market failures but in the pursuit of social equity 
and the promotion of merit goods.   
 
Table 5: economic features of patents/copyright, trademarks, and sui generis GIs  
 
 Patents/copyright Trademarks Sui generis GIs 
Economic 
justifications 
Market failure: public goods 
problem 
Market failure: information 
asymmetry 
 Pursuant of social 
equity 
 Promotion of merit 
goods 
Relation with 
markets 
competition 
deviating from market 
competition 
Facilitating market 
competition 
deviating from market 
competition 
Social costs  Monopoly power 
leading to 
deadweight loss and 
rent-seeking and, 
thus, misallocation 
of resources 
 Restricting  other 
traders from using 
the same or similar 
sign 
 Administration and 
enforcement costs 
 Restricting  other 
traders from using 
the same or similar 
sign 
 Administration and 
enforcement costs 
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 Artificial barriers to 
the access of 
information 
 Spreads the burdens 
among consumers 
 Administration and 
enforcement costs 
 
 Monopoly power 
leading to 
deadweight loss and 
rent-seeking and, 
thus, misallocation 
of resources 
 Spreads the burdens 
among consumers 
 Impeding innovation 
 
6.2 Conclusions on the Taiwanese GI conundrum   
 
When compared with the three international regimes, the development of Taiwanese GI law 
has been based on unique policy context and theoretical foundation. First, Taiwanese GI law 
has been a reaction to implement an IP obligation imposed by international treaty. This IP-
centred premise has not been changed since 2003. The problems of such a policy premise are 
twofold. At the general level, it contravenes the economic function IP. IP is a form of a 
government intervention in the economy. Such intervention is not an end per se; it is rather 
an instrument for the achievement of other policy goals. Thus, such a policy is to put the cart 
before the horse. More specifically, a GI law without an agro-food policy is a Hamlet without 
the Prince of Demark.
1351
 The doubt about the scope of IP is but a by-product of this IP-
centred view of GI law. Secondly, whereas, under the three international regimes, GIs are 
distinguishable from trademarks, the development of Taiwanese GI law has been based on 
the equation of GIs with trademarks. Under this equation, GIs are just trademarks in another 
name because they are both commercially valuable source-identifiers and they have shared 
rationales, namely, consumer protection and prevention of unfair competition. The fact that 
GIs and trademarks are two separate branches of IP under the TRIPS Agreement and that the 
protection for GIs for wines and spirits are not based on consumer protection or unfair 
competition seems to play no part in this interpretation.  
 
With these two premises in mind, the efforts of Taiwanese policymakers have been focusing 
on absorbing GIs into trademark law. In other words, the theme of Taiwanese GI law has 
                                                          
1351
 The Oxford English Dictionary Volume VI (2
nd
 edn, OUP 1989) 1056: This phrase is used to refer to “a 
performance without the chief actor or a proceeding without the central figure.” 
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been to design a regime which is pro-competitive and anti-competitive at the same time. The 
struggle to design a regime which is capable of embracing two mutually contradictory 
economic rationales has further turned Taiwanese GI law into a state equivalent to the 
“Strange Case of Mr Jekyll and Dr Hyde”1352 The sophistry of negative protection is not only 
a euphemism for the refusal of protection but self-hypnosis allowing the policymaker to 
ignore the obvious incompatibility between GIs and trademarks. The perennial overhaul of 
positive protection is but a witness of the Sisyphean task that Taiwanese policymakers have 
been trying to complete. The introduction of the Main Points for GI Registration 2004 
showed that the policymakers did not ignore the sui generis paradigm. Attempts were made 
to graft the branch of sui generis GI law upon the stem of trademarks. Subsequent 
development under the Examination Guidelines 2007 and TMA 2012 further indicated the 
intention of the policymakers to forge an amalgam of TRIPS, with the US and EU paradigms 
within the existing trademark system. Ironically, all the efforts and struggles only brought 
Taiwanese GI law to where it started. The TMA 2012 nominally provides two categories of 
marks for the positive protection of GIs, namely, geographical certification marks and 
geographical collective trademarks. However, by requiring the proprietor to admit the 
membership of anyone whose product complies with the set criteria, the TMA 2012 in fact 
makes geographical collective trademarks geographical certification marks. That is to say, 
under the TMA 2012, geographical collective trademarks are just geographical certification 
marks apart from the name and thus, ultimately, Taiwanese trademark law only protects GIs 
as certification marks. As to the effect of protection, the TMA 20102 emphasises the fair use 
exception to safeguard the freedom of competitors to describe the origin of their products. 
The TMA 2012 actually brings Taiwanese GI law back to pre-2003 era; all the efforts and 
struggles have added nothing but new terminology. 
 
It is time to end the chaos and emancipate Taiwanese policymakers from their Sisyphean task. 
The manumissio
1353
 required is rather obvious and straightforward. The first task for the 
                                                          
1352
 “Jekyll is the name of the hero of R. L. Stevenson’s story, ‘Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde’ 
(published 1886), who appears as a benevolent and respectable character under the name of Jekyll and the 
opposite under the name of Hyde: used allusively in reference to opposite sides of a person’s character or to 
persons or things of a dual character, alternatively good and evil.” (The Oxford English Dictionary (Volume 
VIII) 2
nd
 edn, 1989, 210) 
1353
 The legal process under Roman law whereby a master freed his slave, see Paul du Plessis, Borkowski’s 
Textbook on Roman Law (4
th
 edn, OUP 2010) 96.   
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policymaker is to view GIs as a policy tool for agro-food industry and rural development. So 
doing, GIs are no more merely an exogenous obligation imposed by the TRIPS Agreement. It 
is rather a policy that may benefit Taiwan’s agro-food industries, rural communities and 
consumers. Under this new policy context, policymakers will adopt, as components of 
Taiwanese GI law, legal measures not because they are intellectual property but because they 
may benefit the policy goals. Secondly, it is equally important to discard the GI-TM equation. 
By distinguishing GIs from trademarks, there is no more need to employ the sophistry of 
“negative protection” to belie the incompatibility between GIs and trademarks. Furthermore, 
the Sisyphean efforts of designing an ideal “positive protection” within the Trademark Act 
can be stopped. The positive protection provisions under the TMA 2012 should be deleted. 
After all, as has shown by the US law, the only thing to do to make trademark law comply 
with the TRIPS-GI obligation is to add GIs for wines and spirits as one of the grounds for 
refusal. Finally, policymakers should reconsider the value of having both certification marks 
and collective trademarks under Taiwanese Trademark Act. As has been argued in this study, 
collective trademarks have been criticised because they may violate the economic rationales 
behind trademark protection. Furthermore, there is a functional overlap between collective 
trademarks and certification marks. It is thus argued that there is no need to have both types 
of marks in the same jurisdiction and that the collective trademark should be abolished. If not 
abolished, the second best solution is to enact legislation to prevent their abuse.
1354
 The 
requirement that the proprietor of a geographical collective trademark to admit the 
membership of anyone whose product complying with the set criteria indicates that 
Taiwanese policymakers are aware of the anti-competitive potential of collective trademarks 
and their functional overlap with certification marks in the context of GI protection. However, 
what is not yet realized is that these problems are common to collective trademarks and not 
limited to use of geographical terms. Therefore, policymakers should further consider 
whether to abolish collective trademarks. 
  
                                                          
1354
 See above 4.2.3.1. 
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